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Summary: This paper is the first in a series of four papers developing an alternative 
approach to growth-enhancing governance in poor countries. Its argument follows an 
earlier paper where we argued that ‘market-enhancing’ governance, also referred to as 
‘good governance’ is not strongly correlated if at all with growth in poor countries 
(even though many of the goals of good governance are desirable in their own right).  
 
The core argument is that ‘growth-enhancing governance’ refers to governance 
capabilities for correcting significant market failures that poor countries face when 
they try to catch up with advanced countries. For a long time, this debate has been 
dominated by a discussion of the North East Asian NICs like South Korea and 
Taiwan, which clearly had very strong growth-enhancing capabilities. Since most 
developing countries clearly do not have these capabilities, the conclusion was that 
this was an interesting but not very relevant discussion for poor countries. 
 
Our argument is that while the grand capabilities of the North East Asian countries are 
indeed unviable policy goals for most developing countries, there is no alternative to 
developing specific, carefully selected growth-enhancing governance capabilities on a 
country-by-country basis. To establish the importance of this approach, we select five 
‘second tier’ growth economies: Thailand, the states of Maharashtra and West Bengal 
in India, Bangladesh and Tanzania, which are all frequently described as market-led 
growth stories. The assumption is that growth in these economies took off without 
much state assistance, and in fact in some cases directly as a result of abandoning 
interventionist policies. We argue that this view is only partially true and can even be 
misleading. We show that even in these second tier countries, business-government 
relationships, accidental rents and rent creation and the presence of appropriate 
governance capabilities for managing these rents were critical for explaining the 
development of critical capabilities and for sustaining the growth that happened, the 
sectors that grew, and indeed the vulnerabilities of these economies. All these 
economies have vulnerable growth processes precisely because the range of sectors 
and technologies that could benefit from growth-enhancing governance capabilities is 
typically limited. Moreover, in many cases, the understanding of the growth process is 
inadequate, and many of the domestic stakeholders can be unaware of the unintended 
consequences of many of these arrangements.  
 
This paper sets the background for a detailed analytical examination of specific 
aspects of growth-enhancing governance in these countries in subsequent papers. 
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 1. Introduction 
The importance of economic growth as an essential condition for achieving broader 
developmental objectives is now frequently recognized in international policy 
discussions. The Growth Report of the Commission on Growth and Development 
(2008) is a recent statement of this recognition based on the experience of developing 
countries and international financial and policy institutions. It is clearly important to 
focus on growth, not to the exclusion of other objectives, but indeed to enable broader 
developmental objectives to be achieved. The Growth Report takes care to point out 
that growth is a complex process involving experimentation and the ability to respond 
to evolving problems. It rightly points out that there is no blueprint of necessary and 
sufficient conditions that can be identified, and responses that are appropriate at one 
stage of development may become a problem if continued for too long.  
 
The report identifies five broad areas where policy appears to have been important for 
achieving sustained high growth in the post-war period. A first broad group of 
policies were important for supporting high levels of accumulation. A second group 
of policies promoted innovation and imitation and accelerated or sustained the 
technological catching up that development involves. A third group of policies 
achieved macroeconomic stabilization. A fourth set of policies ensured the effective 
allocation of land, labour and capital. And finally there were policies that ensured 
social inclusion and were important both for achieving developmental goals but also 
for maintaining the political sustainability of the growth regime (Commission on 
Growth and Development 2008: 34).  The report makes clear that countries used 
different policies and instruments to achieve these goals, and all countries did not 
perform equally strongly on all these fronts all the time. Nevertheless, sustained 
growth over long periods of time did require policies that achieved a significant level 
of success on all these fronts.  
 
These interconnected areas are broadly defined and cover most of the main issues 
relevant for understanding the growth process in developing countries. All these 
policy areas are also strongly interconnected. The debates over macroeconomic 
management have a separate literature and will not be examined further in this work. 
However, aspects of investment, technology acquisition, factor allocation and political 
stabilization are strongly interconnected with each other and with the institutional and 
political governance capabilities that are our focus. We argue that governance 
capabilities that support appropriate policies in these areas are critical for the most 
important processes underpinning growth in developing countries.  
 
As the Growth Commission report sets out, there is considerable debate and empirical 
variation observed in the policies that achieved the outcomes that contributed to 
sustainable growth across countries. Our theoretical framework approaches this 
debate in a particular way. Our starting point is the observation that developing 
countries suffer from serious and sustained market failures that constrain catching up. 
Many of these are well known in the literature, but in recent years, the response to 
market failures has been to focus on a narrow set of governance reforms that are 
aimed at enhancing the efficiency of markets and thereby reducing the extent and 
severity of market failures. The focus of these governance reforms have been market-
enhancing rather than to directly tackle the market failures that constrain 
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accumulation, technology acquisition and other constraints on growth in developing 
countries (Khan 2007a, 2008b).  
 
While progress on market-enhancing governance capabilities is desirable, we have 
argued in an earlier paper that historical evidence suggests progress along these 
directions is unlikely to be rapid or extensive in most developing countries for a 
number of structural reasons (Khan 2008b). As a result, sustaining growth in poor 
countries also requires governance capabilities and policies that directly address 
specific market failures. These governance capabilities may be described as growth-
enhancing governance capabilities to distinguish them from the narrowly market-
enhancing governance capabilities. The hypothesis that we explore in this paper is 
that by accident or design, successful countries had a number of governance 
characteristics and policies that were able to overcome critical market failures in their 
specific context defined by their initial conditions and global market conditions. The 
triggering of growth in countries that were previously not growing could be due to 
complex and fortuitous sets of reasons involving changes in global market conditions, 
financing opportunities, but also changes in domestic institutions and politics that 
allow new capabilities to be developed or existing capabilities to be better used. But 
sustaining growth over time requires the continuous evolution of institutions and 
policies to deal with new constraints and opportunities. Sustaining growth therefore 
has higher governance and capability requirements than triggering growth, a fact that 
has been frequently observed by analysts of growth takeoffs.  
 
The discussion about governance capabilities necessary for sustaining growth has for 
a long time been dominated by the experience of the industrial policy regimes of 
North East Asia (for instance Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). This discussion raised 
questions about the applicability of these insights for most developing countries that 
clearly did not have the strong growth-enhancing governance capabilities of the East 
Asian tigers. The more recent growth experience in South and South East Asia and in 
Africa appears to be driven to a much greater extent by ‘market forces’. As the North 
East Asian countries were also market economies which grew by taking advantage of 
global market opportunities, what ‘market forces’ actually means in this context is 
that there appears to be less significant government interventions in South and South 
East Asia and in Africa, and these countries appear to be growing by leveraging 
already existing technological and productive capabilities or new opportunities in 
commodity markets.  
 
In reality the picture is of course more complex. In the more developed sectors of the 
stronger countries particularly in South and South East Asia, technological progress in 
recent years has indeed been based on developing existing capabilities within firms 
using market incentives and opportunities. But as we shall document, i) existing 
capabilities were themselves very often the result of past capability-building 
programmes where governments were closely involved and ii) the continuation of 
growth even in market-driven societies has depended on appropriate business-
government relationships for addressing changing sets of market failures. It is 
particularly misleading to ignore history, if only because it begs the question of where 
further generations of capabilities and globally competitive firms may be coming 
from to spread growth to new sectors and regions. At the same time, as we shall see, 
fortuitous global conditions or specific business-government relationships also 
allowed the development of some new technological capabilities in a few of these 
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countries. But in general, the governance capabilities responsible for driving growth 
in these later developers in South and South East Asia are considerably different from 
the ones that were observed in the North East Asian developers.  
 
An important difference with North East Asia is that in most of the cases we will look 
at in South and South East Asia and in Africa, the critical governance capabilities did 
not emerge through design, but often emerged in fortuitous ways. Sometimes local 
governance capabilities evolved such that global opportunities could be exploited in 
new ways, sometimes global opportunities changed so significantly that existing 
domestic capabilities were sufficient for triggering growth. As global conditions 
change, or as domestic political and institutional arrangements evolve, some of these 
fortuitous conditions may no longer hold in the near future. For many poor countries, 
therefore, the governance capabilities and opportunities that are allowing some 
countries to enjoy growth are therefore vulnerable in different ways. To understand 
the role of governance capabilities in triggering and sustaining growth in poor 
countries better, we need to identify the role of formal and informal governance 
arrangements in countries that actually enjoyed growth accelerations.  
 
This chapter sets the background for an extensive development of this hypothesis in a 
number of related papers by looking at the growth process in a number of developing 
countries and the governance arrangements underpinning growth in these cases. We 
look at five cases of moderate to high growth over 1980-2005 and ask how these 
growth stories were driven and the types of market failures that may constrain future 
growth in these countries. The cases we focus on are Thailand, the states of 
Maharashtra and West Bengal in India, Bangladesh and Tanzania. All these states 
experienced moderate to high rates of growth in the last 25 years. A closer look at 
these growth stories shows that while there are important differences between them in 
terms of the sectors and technologies they deployed, there are also important 
similarities.  
 
In all these cases, many of the critical investment and technology capabilities on 
which their competitiveness was based were not primarily developed through 
deliberate government policies. In some cases these capabilities were inherited from 
previous regimes of industrial policy that on the whole had failed but which 
nevertheless allowed the development of pockets of competence that were later 
deployed in global markets. In other cases, capabilities developed accidentally as a 
result of global or domestic policies that had other objectives. In other cases previous 
development created firms which had the capability to develop technological capacity 
in-house. While the sources and drivers of growth were different, these countries 
demonstrate a number of interrelated vulnerabilities in the governance and policy 
framework underpinning their growth strategies. These vulnerabilities are not equally 
serious in all cases, but they point to areas where governance capabilities and policies 
could be examined to make growth more sustainable over time. 
 
2. Background  
The background to this paper is an earlier paper on growth and governance which 
identified a number of critical areas for further research (Khan 2007b). That paper 
contrasted two different approaches to improving governance conditions in poor 
countries. The debate over the appropriate governance conditions that promote growth 
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in poor countries is related to broader questions within economics about how to 
identify and deal with critical market failures in developing countries while 
minimizing the cost and seriousness of government failures.  
 
The ability to compete in global markets has rightly been identified as an essential 
condition for sustaining growth. However, it is often wrongly concluded that since 
competitiveness is critical, it is sufficient to introduce free markets and expose 
domestic producers to the discipline of global markets. This is because there are no 
markets without market failures, and market failures are particularly significant in 
developing countries in ways that will be discussed in later sections. The adoption of 
free markets in the presence of market failures can often mean the adoption of policies 
that prevent backward domestic producers getting assistance to achieve 
competitiveness in global markets. In these conditions, low wages are no guarantee of 
inward capital flows or investments by domestic investors in ways that will lift up the 
average living conditions of the country. Indeed, the historical experience has been 
that the adoption of free market strategies in the presence of market failures and 
where domestic producers are far away from the global frontier of technology and 
productivity can lead to a collapse of domestic productive capacity rather than a rapid 
improvement in productivity.  
 
The possibility that free markets could lead to divergence rather than convergence 
was most powerfully experienced by many developing countries during their colonial 
history when free trade policies were accompanied in most cases by a growing 
divergence between themselves and the advanced countries. For instance, from 1873 
to 1947 Indian per capita income declined from around 25% of US per capita income 
to under 10% of the US level (Clark and Wolcott 2002). This happened during a 
period of virtual free trade as India was only allowed minimal tariff protection, a 
period when there was relatively strong protection of the rights of foreign (British) 
investors and virtually no restrictions on the repatriation of capital and profit. The 
proximate cause of this relative decline was simply that it was not profitable to invest 
in higher productivity manufacturing industries or in modern agriculture in India. The 
low productivity of Indian workers was so low that even low wages compared to the 
home country did not give India a competitive advantage for prospective British 
investors in most industries. This problem remains today for most sectors in most 
developing countries.  
 
This is a puzzle because temporary levels of low productivity in poor countries should 
be countered by long-term private investments in upskilling and training, and even in 
investments in critically required ancillary infrastructure. Given the vast wage 
differentials the long-term extra returns should justify these investments in most 
cases. The puzzle disappears only when we look for the significant market failures in 
capital, land and labour markets that prevent these investments. Without any 
corrective assistance and strategies to overcome these market failures, the only areas 
that are likely to grow in a poor free-market economy are sectors which have already 
achieved international competitiveness. These are typically low technology and low 
value added sectors where the productivity gap with more advanced competitors is 
likely to be low and the wage differential can more than compensate for this, giving 
the developing country a competitive advantage in these sectors.  
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The challenge of development is that in most developing countries there are very few 
sectors that already have developed international competitiveness or have good 
prospects of developing international competitiveness rapidly. The rapid growth that 
some developing countries have experienced in recent years can be traced to their 
achievement of global competitiveness in a few sectors like garment stitching, cut 
flowers, simple toy and shoe manufacturing or simple food processing and packaging. 
A few other developing countries like India have achieved global competitiveness in a 
small number of high technology sectors like software, iron and steel and some 
narrow sectors of manufacturing. When we look at these success stories historically, 
we find that in each case global capabilities were built up through very specific 
processes that overcame critical market failures. In many cases these processes were 
accidental, in other cases they were partial successes of broader policies that on the 
whole were not successful and were abandoned in most developing countries during 
the 1980s and beyond. As a result the challenge of replication and spread remains for 
most of the economy, even in relatively successful developing countries.  
 
There have been two broad types of policy responses to the market failures 
constraining growth in poor countries, and the governance for growth debate has to be 
understood in this context. The first and more traditional response was to address 
specific market failures with interventions that created incentives or compulsions to 
move the outcome closer to what a more efficient market may have achieved. For 
instance, subsidies to investors may help to compensate for temporary backwardness 
and the difficulty of raising private capital given market failures in capital markets. 
Indeed, interventions to correct market failures were very common in the 1950s and 
1960s as developing countries attempted to reverse their performance under 
colonialism. This strategy was in the end disappointing in many developing countries 
because the range of market failures which policy-makers tried to address were too 
broadly defined, and in most cases existing governance capabilities were not remotely 
sufficient to enforce the requirements for success with such a broad range of 
interventions.  
 
While there were some attempts to improve the governance capabilities required to 
effectively manage these interventions, these governance requirements were not 
sufficiently recognized at the time. In the absence of a sufficient effort to develop 
these governance capabilities, interventions to correct market failures often resulted in 
poor outcomes. In particular, infant industries refused to grow up, subsidies were 
captured by all manner of powerful groups with no contribution to production and 
public sector enterprises continued to underperform. Clearly, providing implicit 
subsidies was not enough without incentives and compulsions created by appropriate 
institutional design and governance capabilities that ensured that the intervention had 
the desired effect.  
 
A possible response to this experience would have been to conclude that perhaps the 
range of interventions needed to be scaled back to target critical market failures, and 
that appropriate governance capabilities needed to be developed to ensure the success 
of these interventions. Instead, the response from the late 1970s onwards was to 
abandon this strategy in its entirety. But the new strategy that gained growing 
credence was if anything even more ambitious as it sought to address market failures 
by making markets more efficient across the board. This began with liberalization as 
developing country states were persuaded to withdraw from activities that they were 
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not doing very successfully anyway. However, it was soon recognized that 
liberalization does not work too well in the context of the high transaction cost 
markets in developing countries, and reforms were needed to make these markets 
more efficient. And so governance entered mainstream policy discussions as part of a 
strategy to reduce transaction costs across the board. It was explicitly understood that 
the governance capabilities to be developed or strengthened were the ones necessary 
for the operation of efficient markets, not the capacities required to address specific 
market failures.  
 
The governance reform strategy that emerged in response was the ambitious ‘good 
governance’ strategy where a number of core governance capabilities are addressed 
which should in theory reduce market transaction costs and allow private contracting 
to proceed more efficiently. In theory, if these improvements in transaction costs were 
significant enough, the market failures that were preventing investment in new sectors 
in poor countries may disappear. However, our contention is that while many of the 
good governance reforms on which so much attention is being focused in developing 
countries are desirable in themselves, they are unlikely to be implemented to a 
significant degree in the near future for structural reasons that primarily have to do 
with underdevelopment rather than with the political will of the ruling coalitions in 
these countries (Khan 2007b). It is from this perspective that we argue that a different 
set of ‘growth-enhancing’ governance capabilities should also be pursued that may 
enable these countries to effectively implement specific strategies of investment and 
technology upgrading.  
 
We therefore distinguish between two broadly defined governance reform strategies. 
The first can be described as a strategy of promoting ‘market-enhancing governance’ 
(also known as good governance) focusing on improving general market efficiency 
and contract enforcement. We have argued that the historical evidence does not 
support the argument that poor countries that grew fast did so because they first 
achieved significant improvements in market-enhancing governance capabilities 
(Khan 2007b, 2007a, 2008b). The second is an alternative strategy of focusing on 
‘growth-enhancing governance’ capabilities that allow the resolution of specific 
market failures (Khan 2007a). The strongest support for the growth-enhancing 
governance route comes from the experience of the North East Asian rapid developers 
like South Korea and Taiwan, which are now widely recognized as having used 
significant interventions to overcome market failures to enhance investment and 
accelerate technology acquisition (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; World Bank 1993).  
 
However, it is also recognized that the handful of successful interveners had very 
specific internal administrative and political governance capabilities that most 
developing countries do not have (Khan 2000b). If growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities were defined in this ambitious sense of achieving capabilities to 
implement broadly defined interventions to correct market failures, it would be 
difficult to argue that countries with much less favourable initial conditions should 
attempt to attain these. However, there are two responses to this observation. First, 
obviously for countries with weaker initial conditions for addressing market failures 
the scale of intervention has to be less ambitious than that in the North East Asian 
countries. One reason for the disappointing performance of many developing 
countries with catching-up strategies was clearly that they had tried to do too much. 
Across the board protection and strategies of technology acquisition simply got 
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rapidly captured and became sources of inefficiency rather than reducing market 
failure. Secondly, the types of corrections for market failure that will work in 
particular countries may differ significantly depending on their initial political and 
institutional conditions. This is an even more fundamental point which is based on the 
observation that successful countries used many different strategies of correcting 
market failures, and strategies that worked in one country often failed in another 
(Khan 2008b). This makes it particularly important for developing countries to have 
some methodology for understanding what needs to be done and designing 
programmes that are more likely to work given their specific conditions. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. To explore the ways in which market 
failures can constrain growth and can be overcome through specific strategies, we will 
look more closely at the experiences of five developing economies that grew rapidly 
over the last 25 years. By looking at the characteristics of growth in these economies, 
we establish that growth was a product both of participating in global markets but in 
many cases was also dependent on specific responses to significant market failures. 
Business-government relationships operated in many different ways to address these 
market failures, and very often informal arrangements were very important. However, 
unlike the North East Asian countries which had significant governance capabilities to 
manage the interventions necessary for correcting market failures, we will see that in 
these second tier growth stories, the mechanisms through which significant market 
failures were addressed were often accidental and sometimes the outcome of 
interventions that had other objectives. This makes growth in many second tier 
countries very vulnerable to changes in conditions that alter the market failure or the 
political and institutional arrangements that allowed it to be partially or fully 
addressed. It also means that growth is patchy and partial even in successful second 
tier countries because systematic mechanisms do not exist to propagate growth into 
new sectors and regions, building on the success of the existing growth sectors. We 
hope that by examining these ad hoc solutions to growth constraints, we may acquire 
a better understanding of the governance requirements that second tier countries 
should aspire to attain. 
 
3. Five Growth Stories 
The Growth Commission report (2008) identifies 13 countries that grew at a rate of 7 
per cent a year or more for at least 25 years since 1950. All these countries are very 
diverse, including apart from the usual suspects in North East Asia, countries like 
Oman and Botswana where natural resources played a significant role and domestic 
non-mineral productive capabilities remain limited, Brazil where growth eventually 
collapsed in the 1980s and 1990s and Indonesia where growth has been shaky since 
the 1997 crisis. So clearly even 25 years of high growth is no guarantee that 
institutional and governance conditions are appropriate for achieving a transition to a 
high income economy of the OECD type where a relatively broad-based prosperity is 
based on the indigenous productive capabilities and competitiveness of its capital and 
labour.  
 
To focus on critical growth-enhancing governance conditions required for the rapid 
spread of productive capabilities across society, we examine growth processes in a 
number of rapidly growing second-tier countries. The economies we select are all 
high-growth ones but are economies that are not identified with strong governance 
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capabilities for accelerating the transition to a broad-based productive economy. In 
this sense, the second tier countries in our list differ significantly from the strategies 
and initial governance conditions of comparators in North East Asia which made a 
sustained and successful transition to high income status by developing broad-based 
domestic productive capabilities.  
 
Table 1 Income and Population in our Five Growth Economies 1980-2005 
GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 US$)
Population  
(millions)
GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 US$) 
Population  
(millions)
Tanzania .. 19 324 38
Bangladesh 230 89 400 153
West Bengal 243 54 554 84
Maharashtra 340 62 821 102
India 229 687 588 1095
Thailand 796 47 2494 63
1980 2005
 
(Sources: EPW Research Foundation 2003, 2007; World Bank 2008). 
 
The five economies we look at over the period 1980-2005 are Tanzania, Bangladesh, 
the states of West Bengal and Maharashtra in India, and Thailand. Table 1 
summarizes the relative development and populations of these economies and Table 2 
summarizes the growth rates achieved in different sectors of these economies. Our 
five economies were selected to achieve a diversity of characteristics in a small group 
of growing economies which we could examine using a comparative case study 
approach. All of them were in different ways removed from the capability 
development model of North East Asia. They were also different from each other in 
the types of strategies and business-government relationships through which specific 
market failures were addressed.  
 
The richest country in our group is Thailand, one of the countries included in the 13 
countries in the Growth Commission’s list. It is a country that was already a middle 
income country in 1980 and made significant progress since then, notwithstanding the 
1997 crisis. Yet its growth has recently been assessed as fairly vulnerable because of 
the slow spread of technological capabilities in the critical manufacturing sector 
(World Bank 2006). As Table 2 shows, industry and manufacturing have been the 
drivers of growth in Thailand. Industrial technology has moved higher up the value 
chain, with Japanese inward investment playing a significant role. However, the 
concern is that much of the new electronics and higher technology sectors have been 
more of the assembly type, using relatively unskilled labour, with value addition 
within Thailand being limited. The question for Thailand is how to sustain this 
upward movement up the value chain and to broaden the role of domestic 
technological capabilities.  
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Table 2 Comparative Growth Rates of GDP and across Sectors 1980-2005 
Growth Rates % Thai-
land
India Maha-
rashtra
West 
Bengal
Bangla-
desh
Tan-
zania
OECD World
GDP
1980-85 5.3 5.2 3.9 4.6 3.7 na 2.6 2.5
1985-90 10.2 6.3 7.4 4.4 3.4 na 3.7 3.7
1990-95 8.2 5.2 8.5 5.8 4.3 1.6 2.0 2.3
1995-00 -0.7 5.7 11.6 7.0 5.1 3.9 2.9 3.2
2000-05 5.3 6.7 9.1 6.8 5.3 6.3 2.0 2.8
1980-2005 6.0 5.6 8.9 5.8 4.4 na 2.7 2.9
1980-85 3.6 3.0 1.8 2.4 1.3 na 2.0 0.8
1985-90 8.7 4.2 5.0 2.2 1.1 na 3.1 2.0
1990-95 6.9 3.4 6.4 3.9 2.1 -1.6 1.3 0.8
1995-00 -1.7 3.9 9.6 5.4 3.0 1.4 2.3 1.8
2000-05 4.4 5.2 7.5 5.5 3.3 3.7 1.4 1.5
1980-2005 4.7 3.7 6.8 4.0 2.2 na 2.1 1.4
1980-85 4.3 3.4 0.8 6.2 2.8 na 2.7 1.5
1985-90 4.0 4.2 7.9 4.8 1.6 na 0.9 0.8
1990-95 -0.3 3.1 3.6 5.8 1.7 2.9 -0.4 0.6
1995-00 1.6 2.3 2.5 3.4 4.7 3.0 3.4 2.2
2000-05 1.9 2.4 -1.8 2.6 2.4 4.9 0.5 1.6
1980-2005 2.3 2.9 3.4 4.6 2.7 na 1.2 1.2
1980-85 6.7 5.9 3.4 2.2 5.5 na 1.6 1.4
1985-90 13.8 8.0 7.4 4.4 5.4 na 3.9 3.9
1990-95 10.9 5.9 5.5 5.1 7.2 -0.9 0.8 1.5
1995-00 -0.2 4.8 5.8 6.8 6.3 7.2 2.3 2.7
2000-05 6.7 7.2 4.1 4.4 7.1 9.2 1.3 2.0
1980-2005 8.0 6.2 5.6 5.2 6.4 na 2.1 2.5
1980-85 5.4 7.1 2.9 1.9 4.5 na na na
1985-90 14.5 8.1 8.1 4.6 4.6 na na na
1990-95 11.6 7.1 5.8 3.2 7.9 -0.3 na na
1995-00 1.7 4.3 6.0 7.3 5.5 5.3 na na
2000-05 6.9 6.7 3.5 3.8 6.5 7.7 1.7 na
1980-2005 8.5 6.4 5.8 4.5 6.1 na na na
1980-85 4.9 6.1 6.6 5.3 3.8 na 2.7 2.8
1985-90 9.7 6.9 7.1 4.3 3.5 na 3.6 3.6
1990-95 8.0 6.7 9.3 6.8 4.1 1.3 2.3 2.6
1995-00 -1.6 8.2 7.8 9.1 4.7 4.2 3.3 3.4
2000-05 4.6 8.1 9.0 9.9 5.5 5.9 2.3 2.7
1980-2005 5.5 7.1 8.0 7.1 4.2 na 2.9 3.1
Per Capita GDP
Services
Manufacturing
Industry
Agriculture
 
(Sources: Based on data from EPW Research Foundation 2003, 2007; World Bank 
2008). West Bengal and Maharashtra data begin in 1981.  
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In terms of levels of development, there is a significant gap between Thailand and the 
other economies in our list. Thailand’s experience is therefore interesting both in its 
own terms and also to help identify some of the problems that other second tier 
countries are likely to face in the future. Next in terms of prosperity come two 
relatively rich states within India. India is one of two countries (along with Vietnam) 
that the Growth Commission believes may soon join their definition of the high-
growth group. But India is a very diverse subcontinent and includes states that are 
very poor and growing slowly. We look at two Indian states, Maharashtra and West 
Bengal that have been relatively high growth states within the Indian Union during 
the growth spurt that began around 1980 and therefore some issues affecting the 
sustainability of India’s growth can be examined through a detailed examination of 
these states (Purfield 2006).  
 
The debate over the drivers behind India’s growth spurt since 1980 has focused on the 
relative importance of liberalization, macroeconomic conditions and shifts in the pro-
business stance of government (S. Ahmed and Varshney 2008). It has generally 
ignored the importance of the technological precursors to the growth spurt. We will 
argue that these historical technological capabilities that were developed in an earlier 
phase of industrial policy regimes played a critical role in determining the types of 
sectors that led growth in India, and the regions that particularly benefited. Looking 
for the technological capabilities which served as the precursors to growth is strongly 
supported if we shift our attention from the narrowly Indian debate to the fact that a 
growth takeoff happened across the Indian subcontinent, including in neighbouring 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, which also experienced a roughly 1.5-2 per cent growth 
acceleration around 1980. To explain this broader takeoff, we need to look at deeper 
capability development trends and changes in the political context which affected all 
three major South Asian countries at around the same time. 
 
Turning to the detailed story within India, the two states we look at provide two very 
different perspectives on the capability challenges and governance constraints within 
India. While Maharashtra has long been the premier industrial state in India, the 
slowing of manufacturing growth more recently highlights the challenges that may be 
faced by other Indian states where manufacturing is currently doing well but which 
are behind Maharashtra in terms of overall manufacturing maturity. The interesting 
fact highlighted in Table 2 is that in this most industrial of Indian states, growth 
during the post-1980 spurt was led by services and supported by agriculture. In 
contrast, West Bengal had suffered a long decline in the industrial prominence it had 
enjoyed in colonial times. In the 1980s when the communists consolidated their 
electoral power in the state, the state government’s strategy was to focus on 
agricultural reform and growth. As a consequence, its growth was driven in the 1980s 
by agriculture. But the state is currently attempting a transition to a growth strategy 
led by services and manufacturing as the prospects of further agricultural-driven 
growth are weak given the ecology of the region and the constraints faced by 
smallholding agriculture. But it has so far achieved relatively modest success, 
particularly in making a breakthrough in industrial growth. 
 
Next in our list of countries in terms of the level of development is Bangladesh, which 
is an interesting comparator with West Bengal (because of its geographical, social and 
cultural proximity) and interesting also as a comparator with India because it too 
experienced acceleration in its growth rate sometime around 1980. Unlike West 
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Bengal, growth in Bangladesh was driven from the outset by a strong performance in 
low-wage labour-intensive manufacturing sectors like garments. Against all 
expectations Bangladesh emerged as a major player in the global apparel market and 
began to diversify into its backward and forward linkages. In a 2008 
PricewaterhouseCooper report on the growth prospects of developing countries 
beyond the BRICs, Bangladesh was included in a list of 13 economies that were most 
likely to achieve significantly higher growth than the OECD countries over the period 
2006-50 (Hawksworth and Cookson 2008).  
 
Finally, the poorest country in our group, Tanzania, displayed significant growth in 
the 1990s. Growth figures for Tanzania are only available from 1990, but it appears 
that in line with a number of other African countries, recent growth only took off in 
the late 1990s assisted by the global commodity price boom and strong performance 
in commodity producing sectors. The Tanzanian economy allows us to explore a 
different set of governance and growth vulnerabilities in economies where 
commodities play an important role.  
 
It is important not to compare economies that are significantly different in terms of 
their populations because the economic and political opportunities and constraints can 
change significantly with population size. Our economies are all relatively populous 
ones. Tanzania is the smallest and Bangladesh the biggest in terms of population. The 
two Indian states are comparable in size to our other countries. Aggregate figures for 
India are also provided in Table 1 and Table 2. The diversity of India and the country-
sized populations of its major states justifies treating Indian states rather than India as 
a whole as the relevant comparators in comparisons of this type. However, the 
integration of Indian states into a bigger political and economic federation does make 
the two Indian states different from the others because they enjoy both specific 
advantages and disadvantages compared to the others.  
 
It is clear from the aggregate and sectoral growth rates shown in Table 2 that all our 
economies were converging ones as their growth rates were higher than the OECD 
average for GDP and per capita GDP growth. This is true for the entire period 1980-
2005 and for almost every five year sub-period for all of these economies. This 
picture is repeated when we look at agriculture, industry and service sectors within 
these countries. While the leading sector differed across economies, in every case the 
growth rate of every sector for each sub-period and for the 25 year period as a whole 
was higher than the OECD average for that sector. The cases we look at also had 
higher growth rates than the world as a whole for GDP, GDP per capita and for each 
sector over this period. However, we also know that convergence with the advanced 
countries represented by the OECD even over a 25 year period is not sufficient to 
remove poverty or to sustain growth into the future. Many developing countries can 
be in the converging group for significant periods without eventually making a 
transition to prosperity. Some of these countries will graduate into the ranks of high-
income OECD countries, but many more will eventually face problems and slow 
down or even fall back into the group of diverging countries. 
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Table 3 Conventional Good Governance Indicators for Sample Countries 1996 
Sample Countries Voice and Accountability
Political 
Stability
Government 
Effectiveness
Regulatory 
Quality Rule of Law
Control of 
Corruption
Bangladesh -0.23 -0.89 -0.64 -0.22 -0.77 -0.49
(Standard Error) 0.23 0.33 0.27 0.33 0.23 0.26
India 0.12 -1.12 -0.20 -0.01 0.29 -0.36
(Standard Error) 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.17
Tanzania -0.64 -0.31 -0.84 -0.06 -0.42 -1.10
(Standard Error) 0.23 0.29 0.27 0.33 0.23 0.26
Thailand 0.29 0.05 0.46 0.45 0.58 -0.31
(Standard Error) 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.17
Average for Sample Countries -0.12 -0.57 -0.31 0.04 -0.08 -0.57
Range of Sample Countries -0.64 to 0.29 -1.12 to 0.05 -0.84 to 0.46 -0.22 to 0.45 -0.77 to 0.58 -1.10 to -0.31
Developing Countries Unweighted 
Average -0.22 -0.30 -0.23 -0.05 -0.31 -0.28
Range -2.01 to 1.21 -2.90 to 1.05 -1.77 to 0.96 -3.13 to 1.29 -2.27 to 1.22 -2.09 to 1.29
High Income OECD Countries 
Unweighted Average 1.22 0.96 1.76 1.00 1.59 1.68
Range 0.50 to 1.59 0.15 to 1.37 0.81 to 2.43 0.35 to 1.58 0.70 to 2.08 0.58 to 2.30
(Source: Kaufmann, et al. 2008) The indicators for each category of governance are 
scaled to have a global mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.  
 
Since the performance of market economies depends quite integrally on governance 
structures (though not necessarily just market-enhancing governance structures), the 
sustainability of growth is likely to be integrally linked to the types of governance 
structures that are operating. Table 3 shows conventional governance indicators for 
market-enhancing governance in our five economies for 1996, the earliest year for 
which governance indicators are available from the World Bank. This year 
corresponds to a point roughly halfway through our period of growth 1980-2005. 
These indicators are aggregates of perception surveys looking at characteristics of 
governance that are significant from a market-enhancing governance perspective. If 
market-enhancing governance and market efficiency were responsible for the faster 
growth of these economies, we would expect these governance indicators to be 
significantly different from the developing country average.  
 
A comparison of our economies with others shows that in terms of conventional good 
governance scores they were not significantly different from the average developing 
country. We only report aggregate figures for India because comparable state level 
indicators are not available. The significant standard errors of these scores are also 
noteworthy because for most categories of governance, the scores of most of our 
growth economies are not significantly different from each other. Thailand as the 
most developed of our economies is a partial exception to this observation. Note also 
that although scores are available for subsequent years, it is not possible to compare 
the performance of a country over time using this data because the scores are 
normalized to have a global average of 0 every year. This means that a country’s 
score can change year to year with no change in its real governance performance 
simply because new countries have entered the data set or because the performance of 
other countries has changed. In any case, though not reported here, the picture that 
emerges when we look at scores in subsequent years for our growth economies is not 
significantly different from that of 1996. The information for 1996 is summarized 
below in Figure 1 to Figure 6. Only the horizontal axis is relevant in these figures. 
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The higher of the two boxes shows the range of scores for all developing countries 
and the developing country average, and the positions of our five economies within 
the developing country group. The lower box shows the range and average scores for 
advanced OECD economies. The global average for each indicator is 0 by 
construction. 
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Note: Tz = Tanzania, Bd = Bangladesh, Ind = India and Tld = Thailand. Scaled only along horizontal axis. 
Figure 1 Relative Good Governance Scores 1996: Voice and Accountability  
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Note: Tz = Tanzania, Bd = Bangladesh, Ind = India and Tld = Thailand. Scaled only along horizontal axis. 
Figure 2 Relative Good Governance Scores 1996: Political Stability  
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Note: Tz = Tanzania, Bd = Bangladesh, Ind = India and Tld = Thailand. Scaled only along horizontal axis. 
Figure 3 Relative Good Governance Scores 1996: Government Effectiveness  
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Note: Tz = Tanzania, Bd = Bangladesh, Ind = India and Tld = Thailand. Scaled only along horizontal axis. 
Figure 4 Relative Good Governance Scores 1996: Regulatory Quality  
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Note: Tz = Tanzania, Bd = Bangladesh, Ind = India and Tld = Thailand. Scaled only along horizontal axis. 
Figure 5 Relative Good Governance Scores 1996: Rule of Law  
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Note: Tz = Tanzania, Bd = Bangladesh, Ind = India and Tld = Thailand. Scaled only along horizontal axis. 
Figure 6 Relative Good Governance Scores 1996: Control of Corruption  
 
It is clear that on every aspect of market-enhancing governance our economies were 
significantly removed from the standards of good governance defined by advanced 
OECD economies. Moreover, they were not outstanding performers within the overall 
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developing country group as their scores were clustered around or below the mean 
developing country score. Given the standard errors reported for these scores in Table 
3, there are in most cases no significant differences in the good governance scores of 
these countries from the developing country average for that score. This observation 
is not surprising given the more general empirical characteristics of good governance 
scores of developing countries that we reported in Khan (2007b). Our growth 
economies can therefore be located in group 2 in Figure 7 which is reproduced from 
that earlier work.  
 
(Source: Khan 2007b) 
Figure 7 Governance Characteristics of Growth Economies  
 
The governance characteristics of the different types of growth economies in group 2 
are the primary focus of our investigation. We know that group 2 economies include 
many different types of growth stories, some more sustainable than others. Some 
converging economies have significant growth-enhancing governance capabilities that 
allow them not only to grow fast for a while, but to sustain this growth and spread it 
across the economy to make a sustained transition to prosperity. The North East Asian 
countries were examples of countries with such governance capabilities. Other 
countries may be in the converging group because they have some sectors or regions 
or minerals which produce globally competitive products and where business-
government relationships have either consciously or accidentally developed to solve 
particular problems constraining growth.  
 
The historical experience suggests that group 2 economies can display significant 
variability in their governance conditions and in the sustainability of their growth 
paths. The only thing that is clear is that developing countries do not in general solve 
the market failures that constrain their growth through good governance capabilities. 
In theory significant improvements in good governance characteristics may have 
helped to improve the efficiency of markets and thereby contributed to sustaining 
 18
growth. But in reality such improvements are structurally beyond the reach of 
developing countries which are significantly below upper middle income status. The 
cross-country empirical evidence strongly supports that conclusion (Khan 2007b, 
2008b) and the evidence provided for our five economies in Figure 1 to Figure 6 is 
consistent with this broader observation.  
 
The growth-enhancing governance capabilities which appear to trigger and sustain 
growth in group 2 economies are likely to be specific political relationships and 
institutional solutions that deliberately or accidentally address specific market 
failures. We need to understand these capabilities on a case by case basis to identify 
how they work and the specific vulnerabilities they face. But we can also identify 
broad types of problems that these capabilities address so that more general 
conclusions can be drawn about policy in these and other economies. 
 
The viability of the growth process for converging developing countries depends on 
the appropriateness of these arrangements for meeting evolving market failure 
challenges and the sustainability of these arrangements within the broader political 
settlements within their societies. In addition, in some societies growth in some 
sectors or regions may be viable, but there may be limited scope for spreading growth 
to other sectors or regions. Our aim in subsequent sections is to identify important 
characteristics of our growth stories to examine the mechanisms through which 
market failures constraining growth were overcome to identify possible vulnerabilities 
that may make growth uncertain or unsustainable in some or all of these countries. 
 
4. Growth-enhancing governance: An analytical framework  
Markets provide access to trading opportunities and therefore a growing economy 
must have reasonably well-working markets. But history as well as economic theory 
tells us that market access may not be of much use for a developing country if it does 
not have the capability to produce goods and services to sell in a global marketplace 
or even in its domestic economy. At the heart of development is the development of 
broad-based productive capabilities in a society. The inputs required for enhancing 
productive capability, namely machines and equipment and a workforce with the 
appropriate formal qualifications have often been the focus of economic theory and 
policy. But in reality, history is replete with examples of investments that fail and 
workers with formal education who remain unemployed. And in fact the fear that 
investments will fail to become productive is usually what constrains investment not 
the absolute scarcity of resources. Many developing countries suffer from capital 
flight and the outmigration of skilled workers. 
 
Much the more difficult element required for achieving competitiveness is the 
acquisition of effective technological and entrepreneurial capabilities to use machines 
and workforces effectively and to acquire competitiveness. These technological and 
entrepreneurial capabilities involve significant amounts of tacit knowledge that 
owners, managers and workers can only achieve through learning-by-doing and by 
putting in high levels of effort over time (Nelson and Winter 1982; Stiglitz 1987; Lall 
1992; Lall and Teubal 1998; Lall 2000a, 2000b). Consequently, an increase in 
investment in new productive capacity and in formal education is necessary but not 
sufficient for achieving growth or sustaining it. It is also necessary and perhaps even 
more important to acquire the technological and entrepreneurial capabilities so that 
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the country can rapidly make profitable use of new investments and keep acquiring 
new technologies.  
 
Most developing countries make relatively slow progress in ‘learning to learn’ these 
critical capabilities on an ongoing basis (Stiglitz 1987). This can be a critical problem 
slowing down their growth and can easily result in a spurt of growth driven by high 
levels of investment eventually becoming unsustainable in a competitive global 
economy. Indeed, in the absence of rapid development of these capabilities, the rate of 
investment will also slow down since new production facilities will not be profitable. 
In other words, the level of investment cannot be independent of the success of a 
country in acquiring new entrepreneurial and technological capabilities. While 
investment can assist in developing the capabilities to learn and to create the 
institutions and governance capabilities for sustaining learning, high levels of 
aggregate investment are not in themselves sufficient to ensure this. Since attaining 
these capabilities is hugely beneficial for society collectively, it is useful to ask why 
many developing countries find it so difficult to make sustained progress here. 
 
In general, when economies fail to achieve socially beneficial outcomes, we can 
classify the possible reasons for the failure in terms of different types of ‘market 
failures’. We use the notion of market failure as an organizational tool to classify 
different types of problems, and not to imply that markets are potentially self-
regulating if the causes of failures are removed. There are broadly two types of 
approaches to market failures. The first, more ambitious is derived from an 
identification of a theoretical benchmark of optimal market outcomes that a perfectly 
competitive market could achieve. Deviations from that benchmark are identified as 
market failures. The more ambitious approach is to try and make markets across the 
board more efficient by reducing transaction costs so that the optimal market can be 
more closely approached. This approach has many problems, some of which are 
identified in Stiglitz (1996). The market-enhancing approach to governance is in this 
tradition.  
 
The second more pragmatic and incremental approach to market failure is to identify 
possible incremental improvements in institutional arrangements to enhance social 
welfare. The incremental or partial equilibrium approach does not make any 
presumption that a theoretical perfect market would maximize global welfare and 
indeed argues that such a benchmark is based on implausible assumptions that hinder 
rather than help the construction of policy. The growth-enhancing approach to 
governance is in this tradition, and argues that the primary task of governance reform 
is to enhance governance capabilities of states so that they are better able to address 
specific market failures in developing countries.  
 
The incremental approach to market failure asks if there are likely economic activities 
which would enhance social output or welfare, and if there are, why individual 
contracting is not resulting in these activities being implemented. If an activity (like a 
new investment) raises net social output, in theory it should be possible for investors, 
workers, and others affected by the production to privately contract to set up the 
production and benefit. If they do not, then it is likely that there are specific 
transaction costs (including information costs and the costs of enforcing contracts) 
that are preventing private contracting and these are the sources of the specific market 
failures that we seek to identify. If specific policies can be identified which allow 
 20
some or all of these activities to take place then the market failure can be addressed 
even if in a partial way through these policies.  
 
Sometimes (misleadingly) these incremental responses to market failures are referred 
to as ‘second best’ responses in the literature. Second best is a technical term that 
refers to solutions that do not get the economy back to the theoretically optimal 
perfect market benchmark but are still an improvement on the existing situation. As 
we have already pointed out, the benchmark of an optimal market may not be a 
relevant one even for advanced economies and certainly not for developing ones. But 
the term second best is still widely used to refer to incremental improvements in 
social welfare in a context where the theoretical perfect market has not been achieved. 
 
As a large number of market failures can be identified, it is an empirical matter as to 
which ones are the most important in specific cases. Moreover, from a pragmatic 
perspective it is important to identify market failures that can be addressed rather than 
market failures which may be important in principle but for which no immediate 
solution can be found. The latter may be the case if the institutional and governance 
requirements for addressing particular market failures are themselves unachievable. 
Thus looking for failures of contracting and finding solutions is not just an empirical 
matter but also to some extent a matter of judgement and politics to identify important 
institutional and governance constraints that need attention and which can feasibly be 
addressed in that particular country to enhance or sustain growth.  
 
When societies respond to market failures in an incremental way, new income flows 
are inevitably created as a result of these responses. These are by definition rents, and 
the creation of rents induces further activity in the form of rent seeking that can 
subvert any potential correction of market failure. We define rents in this context as 
policy-induced income flows that would not exist in the absence of that policy. Rents 
can be potentially value and welfare-enhancing for society (if they are associated with 
policies targeting market failures) or the reverse (if they are associated with 
monopolies or excessive levels of redistribution) (Khan 2000a, 2007b). Whether the 
potentially beneficial effects of some rents can be realized depends in addition on how 
the rents are managed.  
 
The management of rents is important because all rents induce rent seeking. Rent 
seeking is the expenditure of resources by potential beneficiaries to influence state 
policies in particular ways. State policies, even potentially beneficial ones, always 
create rents and therefore induce rent seeking. Sometimes the rent seeking is 
damaging because it influences state policy-making in damaging ways or subverts 
policies. At other times rent seeking is benign and is the mechanism through which 
conflicting interests play out in the formulation of policy (Khan 2000b). The 
important point from the perspective of governance reform is that while the creation 
of some rents (like monopoly rents) triggers new market failures and lowers social 
welfare, other rents (like some government expenditures) may be a response to 
existing market failures and if properly managed can raise social welfare.  
 
Growth-enhancing governance capabilities can be understood as governance 
capabilities that enable states to manage vital corrections to market failures in the face 
of inevitable rent seeking activities. The solution cannot be to rule out rent seeking 
because that is impossible. The experience of East Asian countries is not that there 
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was no rent seeking and no attempts to influence the state, but rather the rent seeking 
was organized in such a way that vital corrections to market failures were not 
subverted (Khan 2000b). What is distinctive about East Asia is that very favourable 
initial conditions in terms of institutions and politics allowed them to manage the 
rents associated with ambitious catching up policies.  
 
Other countries with less favourable initial conditions failed to achieve the same level 
of success with similar policies. The failure of industrial policy in many developing 
countries at around the same time can be explained in terms of their weak (growth-
enhancing) governance capabilities to manage the rents that their policies inevitably 
created. The policy challenge for developing countries today is to learn the lessons 
from East Asia in a nuanced way. Since their political and institutional initial 
conditions are very different, as well as international conditions, trying the same 
policies will not work. However, a useful lesson to learn would be to develop 
appropriate growth-enhancing governance capabilities to implement specific 
corrections to market failures in an effective way. 
 
                             Major Market Failures Constraining Growth in Developing Countries
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Figure 8 Potential Sources of Major Market Failures in Developing Countries  
 
A number of important market failures that are widely recognized as important 
constraints for growth in developing countries are summarized in Figure 8. This is not 
an exhaustive list but lists some of the most important reasons why investments in 
new technologies may fail to take place, and in particular why the effort to acquire 
technological and entrepreneurial capabilities may fail. The different types of market 
failures are clearly closely related because if technological capability cannot be 
acquired, investments in machinery may become unprofitable. The success of East 
Asian economies in moving from poor to middle-income and even more significantly 
moving beyond middle-income to high income status was based on their capacity to 
systematically address significant market failures of these types.  
 
Liberal economists are likely to attach greater significance to the market failures listed 
in the lower half of Figure 8. Many of these refer to problems that may be directly due 
to the imposition of damaging restrictions on markets or the absence of well-defined 
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property rights. A focus on these market failures fits with a liberal perspective on the 
role of the state as a protector of free markets and property rights. Other market 
failures listed in the top half of the figure are more likely to be addressed by 
corrective interventions. However, the main difference between liberal economists 
and those who support corrective policy interventions is the degree to which they 
believe optimal market outcomes can be achieved by creating or approximating a 
perfectly competitive market. If a ‘first-best’ market can be achieved then the best 
strategy would be focus on that. This is implicitly the approach of the good 
governance or market-enhancing governance approach to governance reforms.  
 
However, the East Asian experience suggests that attempts to remove all market 
failures through systemic reforms that aim to make markets more efficient across the 
board are unlikely to be sufficient. This is because of the range of market failures that 
developing countries face and the limited resources they possess to satisfactorily 
address systemic problems such as weakly defined property rights or high levels of 
corruption. On the other hand we also know that incremental approaches to market 
failures also require implementation capabilities that we have described as growth-
enhancing governance capabilities.  
 
Market failures in Capital Markets  
i) Absence of credible risk-sharing institutions can constrain investment in new 
technologies and sectors. Developing countries suffer from significant contract-
enforcement problems that can exacerbate principal-agent problems particularly in 
capital markets. These problems can constrain investment in new technologies that 
require significant blocks of investment that are too big for individual entrepreneurs to 
raise or risk on their own. The problem for investors outside the firm (the principals) 
who may be willing to share the risk for an adequate return is that they cannot be sure 
that insiders in the firm like managers and workers (the agents) will act in their 
interests. Many investments in developing countries will only be profitable if the 
productivity and skills of workers, middle managers and suppliers can be raised 
sufficiently to be competitive in global markets. This in turn requires significant effort 
by workers and managers within the firm and the outcome is uncertain even if the 
effort is forthcoming.  
 
Outside investors are only likely to invest in risky ventures if they are assured that 
i) the firm will put in its full effort to improve productivity, ii) that it will declare true 
profits in the future if the firm becomes profitable and iii) it will pay outside investors 
their agreed share. They will also want the assurance iv) that there are mechanisms 
through which they can influence firm activity if things are going wrong and v) that 
they can withdraw their share of the capital if required. However, such contracts 
between outside investors and firms typically do not happen in developing countries 
because many or all of these promises are unenforceable. The market failure here can 
be traced to the difficulty if not impossibility of having credible and enforceable 
contracts in developing countries that shares the risks and returns between outside 
investors and firm insiders.  
 
As a result investors with capital do not invest in firms in developing countries except 
in relatively safe investments where workers and managers already have capabilities 
at or close to levels that make them internationally competitive. As a result, they tend 
to favour the simplest technologies where skills and capabilities required for 
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competitiveness are close to what are already available in the country. And equally, 
owners of firms are unlikely to absorb all the risk themselves either using their own 
capital (which may not be sufficient anyway) or using bank loans which ultimately 
pass much of the risk on to the borrowers through collateral requirements.  
 
The market failure in sharing risk is significant because it limits financing for 
investments in technology upgrading and upskilling the workforce. This constrains 
overall investment in developing countries because the number of sectors that are 
globally competitive or very close to global competitiveness is limited by definition. 
Investments in new sectors and technologies or in regions where capabilities are low 
are likely to be very restricted. At a deeper level, this important constraint on 
investment can be traced to poor contract enforcement, but if contract enforcement 
and transparency cannot be significantly improved through market-enhancing 
governance, alternative steps can be and have to be taken to enhance investments 
involving learning in new sectors (Khan 2000a).  
 
Incremental policies that can address these market failures include the provision of 
credit by development banks to sectors and at rates of interest that can induce 
investments in technology upgrading. It can involve different types of implicit risk-
sharing and cost-sharing by government in investments that can be replicated and 
create significant jobs but where the initial investments face levels of risk that cannot 
be accommodated by the existing risk-sharing institutions in the country. Relevant 
policies can include tax holidays, making available low-cost land or sharing the cost 
of labour training. In East Asian countries, given that they were operating before the 
WTO came in, there were more explicit subsidies such as on interest rates in South 
Korea or in licensing technologies to domestic firms in the case of Taiwan (Amsden 
1989; Wade 1990).  
 
We also know from the East Asian experience that these policies worked because 
appropriate (growth-enhancing) governance capabilities existed that ensured that 
moral hazard and other problems associated with such solutions were effectively 
addressed. If market failure in capital markets is addressed by governments sharing 
some of the risks, the government itself must have the capacity to withdraw its 
support if the firm receiving support does not perform. Governments absorbing risks 
implicitly create rents for firms because they get access to cheaper credit than would 
otherwise be the case. If policy is subverted by rent seeking activities such that poorly 
performing firms do not face a withdrawal of capital, the policy will fail because 
firms will not put in the effort to learn and improve their productivity. It is now 
widely recognized that East Asian success with different variants of investment and 
technology policies was based on the capacity of these states to withdraw support 
from firms that were failing to learn, thereby limiting the danger of moral hazard.  
 
ii) Missing institutions and incentives that result in low savings. The mobilization of 
domestic savings in developing countries is an important condition for sustaining high 
levels of investment and growth. Trust and contract enforcement are critical for 
setting up and extending banking structures. Given the general weakness of contract 
enforcement and the fragility of trust in poor countries, the mobilization of savings is 
unlikely to happen through private initiatives alone. In addition, private incentives for 
significant investments in banking infrastructure in remote or poor areas are likely to 
be weak. These are significant market failures that can hold back the mobilization of 
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savings. Without significant effort by developing country states the mobilization of 
savings is likely to be insufficient. This effort has typically included setting up the 
institutions and the governance capabilities for extending the banking structure and 
adjusting incentives for savers and banks. In South Korea banks were owned by the 
state throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In other East Asian countries states created 
incentives for private banks to invest in a banking infrastructure in remote areas by 
allowing banks to earn rents (Hellman, et al. 1997). These types of policy responses 
obviously also require very specific governance capabilities to prevent perverse 
effects as a result of moral hazard problems.  
 
iii) Restrictions on entry and exit, poor transparency and rule of law. It is possible 
that some types of contracting in capital markets are impeded by regulatory 
restrictions. These include regulatory restrictions that limit entry and exit into capital 
markets, absent or weak governance capabilities to enforce transparency by borrowers 
and lenders and weak contract enforcement. Liberal economists focus on these 
sources of potential market failure in capital (and indeed other factor) markets. 
Governance capabilities to enforce transparency and the rule of law are indeed weak 
in developing countries and this can help to explain why capital markets fail to 
provide significant investments for capacity building and technology upgrading.  
 
However, the liberal economics approach to addressing capital market failures has 
problems that we have already encountered in our review of market-enhancing 
governance in general as a strategy for ensuring growth conditions in developing 
countries. The requisite improvements in governance capabilities to enforce 
transparency across the board and a rule of law may be practically unachievable in 
most developing countries. In addition, capital markets have specific problems in 
developing countries where the general level of confidence may be fragile. Open 
capital markets may expose developing countries to excessive levels of financial 
fragility. In these contexts some regulatory controls on capital markets may be 
required for different types of reasons. Some regulations may indeed be creating 
unnecessary rents and rent seeking, but others may be relatively efficient policy 
responses to market failures that require specific governance capabilities for their 
management.  
 
Restrictions on capital markets may also be required to make other corrective policies 
viable. For instance, in a context of market failures preventing significant investments 
in technology upgrading and learning, development banks may be providing long-
term lending on moderate interest rates to upgrading sectors. But for this strategy to 
work, restrictions on capital mobility may also be required to prevent cheap money 
leaving the country in search of arbitrage options. East Asian countries had strict 
capital controls while they were catching up in the 1960s and 1970s. But they also had 
the governance capabilities to ensure that in these vital areas, corruption and rent 
seeking would not work to enable rich people to export their capital in contravention 
of the rules. In assessing which restrictions are indeed damaging and which are not, a 
holistic approach is required. Policy-makers and analysts need to assess whether the 
restrictions at issue are simply value reducing ones or are incremental responses to 
deeper market failures that cannot be feasibly addressed using market-enhancing 
strategies. 
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Market failures in Labour Markets 
i) Positive Externalities in Investments in Human Capital. When developing countries 
fail to attract investments despite significantly low wages, they are typically suffering 
from significant productivity disadvantages compared to their competitors. Low 
productivity can have many causes including poor formal education. But the 
experience of countries like the Philippines shows that higher levels of formal 
education are not sufficient for improving manufacturing productivity and that 
education on its own can have low rates of return in developing countries (ADB 
2007b: 317-38). Converting workers into competitive producers requires a significant 
amount of tacit knowledge that can only be acquired by on-the-job training for 
workers, managers, suppliers and others related to the production process.  
 
Firms that employ workers and managers who are not already productive enough to 
be competitive are implicitly financing learning-by-doing by accepting lower or 
negative profits. This is an investment for the firm that may pay off in the future if 
and when employee productivity rises through learning-by-doing. However, the net 
benefit the firm can expect is always going to be less than the social benefit because 
the firm will only capture benefits from trained personnel as long as they stay with the 
firm. In contrast, the social benefit of on-the-job training is embodied in the greater 
productivity of personnel even when they move out of the firm.  
 
Positive externalities are therefore likely when learning-by-doing is involved. These 
can be the source of market failure because if the firm gets less than the full return on 
its investment in training it can be expected to under-invest in training and upskilling. 
These positive externalities, together with the absence of appropriate risk sharing 
institutions in capital markets has traditionally been an argument for subsidies or other 
incentives for infant industries in developing countries. However, what has often not 
been understood is that responses to these market failures also require appropriate 
governance capabilities if poor results due to moral hazard and other problems are to 
be avoided. In South Korea incentives for learning were created through a number of 
mechanisms including subsidized credit for upgrading industries and temporary 
protection in domestic markets. In Taiwan, mechanisms included the state licensing 
new foreign technologies and providing them to relatively small domestic firms at 
implicitly subsidized prices. In both cases the relevant growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities existed to ensure that firms that underperformed did not continue to 
receive implicit assistance (Wade 1988; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990).  
 
ii) Restrictions on entry and exit into labour markets. As with capital markets, liberal 
economists point to entry and exit restrictions in labour markets as a source of market 
inefficiency that they argue should be addressed through labour market reforms. 
These market restrictions were typically introduced to protect labour from arbitrary 
hiring and firing decisions or to protect wages. In some circumstances these 
restrictions can indeed have contrary effects. In particular, excessive restrictions can 
have the effect of restricting employment growth and leading to the choice of 
excessively capital-intensive technologies by employers. These responses slow the 
spread of the benefits of growth to the unemployed poor. In addition, sometimes these 
regulations can even have deleterious effects of workers within the protected sectors 
because they can lead to employers using contract or short-term labour or 
subcontracting parts of the production process to the informal sector.  
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At the same time, some labour market regulations are clearly desirable to prevent a 
decline of employment conditions to levels that are socially unacceptable. This is 
particularly important in developing countries with large pools of unemployed labour 
where the bargaining power of labour is limited. Moreover, while getting rid of labour 
market regulations can have one-time positive effects on employment, it is an 
empirical question as to whether this will be sufficient to achieve strong growth given 
the significant market failures in capital and labour markets that constrain investment 
in new technologies and sectors. Finally, labour market regulations are not a purely 
economic matter. The maintenance of political stability and good employer-labour 
relations is politically desirable and in the long run feeds back into creating the 
conditions for sustained economic growth. Reform discussions in many developing 
countries focus excessively on labour market regulations despite the fact that 
comparative evidence across developing countries does not suggest that full labour 
market flexibility is either necessary or sufficient for sustained employment and 
productivity growth.  
 
Market failures in Land Markets 
i) High transaction costs in land markets. Investors in developing countries often find 
it impossible to buy contiguous plots of land close to infrastructural amenities. This is 
because of structurally high transaction costs in land markets, which is in turn 
traceable to poorly defined land rights, multiple claims on land, poor contracting 
institutions and often very fragmented land ownership. These are common problems 
faced by all developing countries though the specific problems may depend very 
much on particular historical circumstances. Transaction costs in land markets can 
frequently preclude the setting up of new economic activities or the expansion of 
existing ones except at very high cost. This in turn slows down economic transition, 
the introduction of new products and services and the expansion of successful 
activities rapidly to capture changing market opportunities. 
 
Transaction costs in land markets should not be confused with the price of land, 
though for the purchasers the difference may not be very obvious. The net effect is 
that the price of buying a piece of land effectively becomes so high that potential 
investors are put off. Potential investors find that to acquire a substantial piece of 
contiguous land through the market they have to deal with potentially dozens or even 
hundreds of potential sellers, many of them may have competing or overlapping 
claims which will require a long time to settle, and many smallholders can holdout for 
better prices when the deal is almost done. In some cases, there may be no formal 
rights at all; the land may formally belong to the state or to a community.  
 
The cost of establishing well-defined property rights in the market-enhancing 
governance sense, so that well working land markets could emerge is typically 
unrealistic. In reality, investors in developing countries have to deal with partially 
non-market processes to acquire land. This can range from state regulation in the form 
of compulsory purchase orders to acquire land for industrial development, the 
involvement of political actors or even mafias who acquire land in speculative fashion 
using their political power for onwards selling to actual investors, to business-
government relationships that are used to deploy political power to acquire land for 
particular investors. The particular mechanisms and their efficacy can vary 
significantly across countries, as well as the implications for growth.  
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The traditional response to the failure of land markets even in advanced countries has 
been to have some form of public purchasing policy for land. Often the acquisition of 
land for major infrastructure projects like roads begins with a public enquiry where 
alternative routes and fair compensation rates are discussed followed by 
compensatory purchase orders to acquire land for the project. In developing countries 
a much wider range of projects may require public land use legislation and assisted 
purchases. These public interventions are often the requisite policy responses to high 
transaction costs that cannot be immediately reduced by market-enhancing 
governance reforms like stabilizing property rights or improving the rule of law. Once 
again, implementing these strategies requires specific governance capabilities such as 
the ability to identify critical land use requirements, carry out land acquisition fairly 
and with acceptable levels of compensation for existing users and to ensure that the 
beneficiaries of land allocations use the land for the specified purposes. 
 
In the absence of these growth-enhancing governance capabilities, non-market land 
allocations are subject to serious risks. The possibility of a political capture of such 
policies by powerful groups, of inflicting social injustice on vulnerable groups whose 
land may be forcibly acquired at unacceptably low prices (or perhaps even with no 
compensation) and therefore the eventual possibility of serious conflicts are just a few 
of the obvious dangers. The institutional and political capacity to overcome these 
market failures is an important growth-enhancing governance capability that 
developing countries have in different measure.  
 
ii) Weakly defined property rights and rule of law. By definition market failures in 
land markets are due to transaction costs that are excessive because of weakly defined 
property rights and a weak rule of law. While this is not in dispute, the market-
enhancing governance programme of addressing these transaction costs by direct 
governance reforms that aim to make property rights better defined and improve the 
rule of law are unlikely to make a significant immediate impact in developing 
countries for reasons that were discussed earlier.  
 
Market failures in the Knowledge Market  
i) Absent rights over ‘discovery’ and other forms of learning. The creation of 
knowledge, particularly about how to achieve competitiveness is costly and risky and 
requires incentives. Thus while knowledge should be a public good at some stage, 
innovators in advanced countries are typically allowed to treat new knowledge as a 
private good for specified lengths of time. This creates rents for innovation, and in 
turn spurs investment in innovation from which society collectively benefits over 
time. This is typically achieved by creating property rights over new knowledge in the 
form of patents and other forms of intellectual property rights. However, in 
developing countries the critical knowledge is typically about learning about existing 
technologies and discovering what a country is good at doing (Khan 2000a). The 
investors who discover this knowledge are unable to reward themselves for this risky 
activity because this knowledge cannot be patented or protected with intellectual 
property rights in the same way (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003).  
 
The absence and indeed impossibility of defining property rights over discovery and 
learning means that although in principle a socially beneficial contract between 
investor and society could be made, this contract is not enforceable since the property 
rights are not recognized. This in turn results in insufficient investment in the critical 
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activity of discovery and learning in developing countries. Since this problem cannot 
be addressed by market-enhancing governance reforms, the only possible solution is 
to look for specific policy solutions. An example would be subsidies to investors in 
discovery and learning type activities in developing countries. All such strategies 
require the careful development of appropriate governance capabilities on the part of 
the state, an issue to which Hausmann and Rodrik do not give sufficient attention. In 
the absence of such capabilities, subsidies for learning are simply likely to be misused 
or captured by well-placed or powerful individuals in that society (Khan 2000b). 
 
ii) Weakly defined intellectual property rights. Just as in advanced countries, 
developing countries can also suffer from market failures due to the absence or weak 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. These property rights are relevant for 
investment in innovation and in the development of new products and processes. The 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, and by inference the protection of 
Schumpeterian rents is clearly of much greater relevance for advanced countries 
(Khan 2000a). However, some developing countries may have pockets of innovation 
and firms that are involved in the development of new products and processes. These 
areas will obviously be assisted if a reform strategy that improved the protection of 
intellectual property rights was successful. However, a downside of a global strategy 
of protecting intellectual property rights is that the option of rapidly copying existing 
technologies is drying up for many developing countries. The net benefit for 
developing countries of a stricter regime of global intellectual property rights is not 
clear (Stiglitz 2007: 103-32).  
 
‘Non-specific’ versus ‘specific’ policy approaches to market failure  
The discussion on market failure highlights significant differences in policy 
approaches to the problem. There is little disagreement that market failures exist and 
are significant in explaining growth constraints in developing countries. The liberal 
approach seeks to address market failures through generalized strategies that seek to 
make the market more efficient first by liberalization that seeks to remove restrictions 
on markets and secondly by developing market-enhancing governance to reduce 
market transaction costs. This approach is summarized in Figure 9.   
 
Good governance and investment 
climate reforms to reduce market 
transaction costs across the board
Non-specific ( liberal / market fundamentalist ) strategies to correct market failures: 
Avoids specific corrections because they create rents and encourage rent seeking
Liberalization extended to remove 
entry and exit barriers in all markets
(But the relationship between liberalization and growth is complex partly because
significant reductions in transaction costs through market‐enhancing governance may not be possible)  
Figure 9 Non-Specific (Liberal) Responses to Market Failures  
 
The main thrust of the liberal approach is that interventions to overcome specific 
market failures should be avoided as these create rents in particular markets and result 
in rent seeking efforts that may subvert the goals of the intervention. They also raise 
questions about the ability of policy-makers to identify market failures correctly. The 
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conclusion is that the risk of government failure is significant and therefore specific 
government interventions should be avoided (Krueger 1990). To avoid these problems 
the liberal approach suggests that markets should be made more efficient using a two-
pronged policy approach. The first prong is to push ahead with removing restrictions 
on markets using liberalization. The second prong is to make the overall market 
transaction costs lower using good governance reforms that are market enhancing in 
theory because they promise to reduce transaction costs. However, the very fact of 
poverty and underdevelopment means that limited resources are available to 
implement market-enhancing governance reforms which by definition target the entire 
economy and society (Khan 2007a, 2008b). In such a context to persist exclusively 
with this reform strategy in the absence of strong evidence is clearly a variant of 
market fundamentalism.  
 
In contrast, the alternative incremental approach to market failures recognizes these 
dangers but argues that there may be no effective or pragmatic alternative to 
improving the capacities of governments to deal with specific market failures. Indeed, 
even in very rich societies that can spend significant amounts on market-enhancing 
governance, the efficiency of markets is never high enough to preclude the need for 
all strategies targeting specific market failures. Thus, as a realistic proposition we 
have to also focus on the problem of how to devise specific strategies for overcoming 
particularly important market failures affecting economic performance.  
 
Potential Dangers
Inevitably changes income 
flows and creates ‘Rents’
State Capture 
problems when 
rents are 
created that 
have no 
economic 
justification
Social 
Injustice
and/or C
 
 
if the 
distribution of 
benefits is too 
skewed
onflict  Variable Growth 
Outcomes
Corrections of Specific 
Market Failures
Moral Hazard 
problems if 
incentives to 
correct market 
failures are 
misused
Mitigation of Potential Dangers depends on 
Growth-Enhancing Governance Capabilities 
 
Figure 10 Strategies for Addressing Specific Market Failures  
 
The work of Stiglitz and others has shown that not only are there major market 
failures in market societies, these can be widespread due to information asymmetries 
and other reasons (Stiglitz 1996). These asymmetric information problems alone 
mean that market societies require extensive rents to operate reasonably efficiently. 
Rents create incentives to improve on market outcomes in the presence of asymmetric 
information. Many of these rents such as reputation rents or efficiency wages appear 
spontaneously through private institutional arrangements. However, many significant 
market failures are not addressed spontaneously in the market, and here concerted 
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government action is required. At the same time, the correction of specific market 
failures does indeed face the problems of rent seeking and moral hazard that the 
liberal critique identifies. The major problems are summarized in Figure 10. 
 
Policy and institutional responses to deal with specific market failures inevitably 
change income flows of market participants and by definition create ‘rents’ defined as 
income flows that would not otherwise have existed in the absence of these policies or 
institutional responses (Khan 2000a, 2000b). Thus, the emergence of rents does not 
always signal distortionary policies that reduce welfare or growth prospects, but can 
also signal growth and welfare-enhancing policies that are addressing market failures. 
The problem is that there are therefore strong incentives to engage in rent seeking 
activities of different types to influence the type and allocation of rents in society. 
 
As Figure 10 summarizes, policies to correct specific market failures can result in a 
number of types of problems. First, there is a problem of moral hazard where policy 
creates some new benefits for some market participants but fails to achieve the 
desired policy goal. For instance, subsidies to assist training or making credit lines 
available to new startup companies to overcome capital market failures may simply be 
wasted without achieving the desired result. For this not to happen, governance 
capabilities of oversight and policy withdrawal are required so that the rents are not 
permanent and may be withdrawn if results are not achieved. The more narrowly 
defined the policy is, the more plausible it may be to develop the governance 
capability to administer the policy reasonably effectively. A second problem is the 
policy-making agencies of government may get captured by rent seekers who may 
engineer solutions to market failures that do not really exist, simply to benefit from 
the rents created as a result. Limiting these possibilities require governance 
capabilities for ensuring that state capture cannot reach damaging proportions.  
 
Finally, policy responses to market failures may be politically controversial because 
the solutions to market failures may benefit particular constituencies or groups. The 
same market failure can be addressed by many different policy approaches with 
different distributions of benefits. For instance, a negative externality can be 
addressed by taxing the emitter of the externality, by subsidizing the emitter not to 
emit, by regulatory limits on emission, or by creating property rights on the 
externality-generating activity. Each solution has different transaction costs and 
therefore chances of success, but more significantly, also has different distributions of 
benefits, even if the net social benefit of addressing the externality is the same in all 
solutions. What this suggests is that if the distribution of net benefits is excessively 
adverse for powerful or significant groups in society, or if they have significantly 
adverse welfare implications on marginal groups, then even if the policy enhances 
growth overall there may be resistance and opposition that in turn will have social 
costs in the form of conflict. Once again, success in solving specific market failures 
requires governance capabilities to ensure that the policies that are adopted do not 
have excessively damaging political consequences. The growth outcomes, satisfactory 
or otherwise thus depend both on the types of policies that seek to address market 
failures as well as on the governance capabilities that limit the possibility of 
government failures.  
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‘High-Capability’ versus ‘Low-Capability’ growth-enhancing governance  
As Figure 10 suggests, the type of responses to specific market failures and their 
outcomes will depend on the initial growth-enhancing governance capabilities of the 
society. If initial capabilities for growth-enhancing governance are strong, extensive 
and ambitious corrections of specific market failures are possible. East Asian 
industrial policies in the 1950s and beyond were variants of policy responses that took 
advantage of very fortunate initial endowments of growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities. The historical and policy literature for these countries is relatively well 
developed and some of the governance conditions that enabled spectacular success to 
be achieved in some of these countries are discussed in Khan (2000b). It is less often 
appreciated that even in second tier countries that are growing rapidly, and which 
have much weaker growth-enhancing capabilities, growth is necessarily underpinned 
by responses to specific market failures, but this time achieved in more ad hoc, 
informal and therefore more vulnerable ways consistent with less extensive growth-
enhancing governance capabilities.  
 
To simplify we make an exaggerated distinction between ‘high-capability’ and ‘low-
capability’ countries defined by their initial growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities. In reality of course there is a range of variation, not a simple binary 
distinction. In addition, there are a range of relevant governance capabilities here and 
countries cannot be ranked along a single vector of variation. Nevertheless, even in 
countries with lower capabilities for growth-enhancing governance (compared to the 
East Asian ones) specific market failures constraining growth and technology 
acquisition must consciously or otherwise have been addressed to sustain growth in 
contexts of very inefficient markets. Understanding these processes may help to 
identify useful growth-enhancing governance capabilities in the country. Some of 
these capabilities could be deepened and formalized. Others may have been based on 
the informal exercise of power and influence and may not be easy to formalize. But 
even in these cases understanding how market failures were addressed and potential 
government failures mitigated would help to design more formal and sustainable 
mechanisms in the future. And of course such an investigation may also identify 
institutional and political processes that resulted in the creation of damaging 
interventions and rents, which also need to be addressed.  
 
The experience of countries with strong growth-enhancing governance capabilities is 
relatively well understood. A number of countries, primarily in North East Asia, but 
to a lesser extent also including South East Asian countries like Malaysia, used a 
range of correctives for the types of market failures summarized in Figure 8. Their 
policy responses to market failures differed, but in each case they also had significant 
(growth-enhancing) governance capabilities to mitigate some of the risks associated 
with their particular strategies (Figure 10). The overall results were often little short of 
spectacular (Khan 2000b). However, many other countries that attempted very similar 
industrial policy responses fared less well simply because they did not initially have 
(and could not rapidly develop) the governance capabilities to manage the range of 
rents that were created through these interventions (Khan 1999, 2007a).  
 
This experience has all too readily led to an apparent consensus that responding to 
specific market failures is not advisable for most developing countries (World Bank 
1993). This conclusion, while being excessively pessimistic, had an element of truth 
to it since growth-enhancing governance capabilities are not very easy to develop. 
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Nevertheless, if market-enhancing governance strategies are unlikely to deliver 
significant results, there may be no alternative other than to try and strengthen at least 
some growth-enhancing governance capabilities in the second tier countries. Even if 
second tier countries cannot fully become like any of the East Asian countries, they 
can still learn the importance of some specific capabilities and thereby succeed in 
sustaining their own growth rates for longer.  
 
   Range of Growth-Enhancing Governance Capabilities                       High                      Low
Examples of Variants: 
i) Promotion of domestic infant industries 
and induced technology acquisition using a 
variety of instruments providing conditional 
targeted support: South Korea, Taiwan 
1960s-1980s.
ii) Proactive FDI strategies providing 
conditional incentives for investment by 
high-technology MNCs and technology 
transfer to domestic producers: Malaysia 
1980s.
Policy Implications:
Growth may be patchy  bypass 
much of society vulnerable
technical progress may reach a glass 
ceiling
develop governance 
capabilities 
With ‘low-capability’ governance, market 
failures often addressed in serendipitous 
ways by accidental alignments of productive 
opportunities, supportive business-
government relationships and governance 
capabilities.
 
, it may
, it may be  and 
. The challenge is for countries to 
learn from their experiences to extend these 
responses and 
in ways that will allow growth 
to deepen and continue.
Limited, ad hoc and informal strategies:
Limited policies targeting a narrow range of 
market failures. 
Strong growth possible for some time 
with less substantial growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities.
Examples of Variants:
i) FDI promotion and linked domestic 
capacity development based on specific 
incentives: Thailand 1990s, Vietnam 1990s.
ii) Technologically advanced domestic firms 
drive investment relying on informal 
business-government relationships for 
support: Maharashtra (India) 1980s on.
iii) Growth assisted by accidental global 
rents and enabling business-government 
relationships: Bangladesh (MFA and 
garments), Tanzania (resource rents, aid), 
Vietnam (USBTA and garments).
Ambitious catching up strategies: 
Broad-ranging formal policies targeting 
market failures to accelerate growth.
Outstanding results if growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities are high but 
poor outcomes if capabilities are low.
Policy Implications: 
Ambitious catching-up strategies only likely 
to be effective in the presence of significant 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities.
These capabilities require appropriate 
political and institutional conditions and are 
difficult to acquire rapidly. 
Without such capabilities, industrial policy 
responses can have disappointing results.
 
This was the experience of countries like 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in the 
1960s and 1970s.
 
Figure 11 ‘High-Capability’ versus ‘Low-Capability’ Responses to Market Failures 
 
This argument is summarized in Figure 11. The assumption that second tier countries 
grew simply by following more liberal economic policies and that they did not have to 
address market failures is implausible given the widespread observation of significant 
market failures in all developing countries. The difference is that in countries where 
initial growth-enhancing governance capabilities were weak, viable responses to 
specific market failures constraining growth turned out to be very different from those 
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in high-capability governance economies. Unlike industrial policy responses, the 
second tier countries generally did not have selective formal policies to accelerate 
growth and technology acquisition. Instead, the formal policy framework in second 
tier countries in general has been non-discriminatory and non-selective. Nevertheless, 
closer examination reveals very specific ways in which critical market failures were 
addressed.   
 
While ‘low-capability’ responses to specific market failures looked very different 
from those in high capability East Asian developers, without very specific 
configurations that deliberately or accidentally addressed important market failures, 
growth would not have been possible. Indeed, sustained growth is relatively rare in 
developing countries and many low capability countries either do not grow or enjoy 
relatively brief growth spurts. In some cases, the critical rents that allowed critical 
market failures to be overcome were accidental policy outcomes of global aid, trade 
or financial architectures. A very good example of this is the accidental effect of the 
rents created by the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) on learning and technological 
capability acquisition in the garment sector in Bangladesh, and a similar learning 
spurt in Viet Nam due to the US-Viet Nam Bilateral Trade Agreement of 2000.  
 
Important policy implications follow from our comparison of ‘high-capability’ and 
‘low-capability’ responses to the market failures constraining investment and 
technology acquisition. Clearly, for most developing countries, attempting to develop 
governance capabilities that would enable them to imitate one of the ambitious 
‘industrial policy’ responses of East Asia is probably not very feasible. But equally, 
when growth is triggered and sustained in low-capability countries through ad hoc 
responses to market failures, we expect the growth process to be more vulnerable. In 
these cases, critical market failures are often addressed in serendipitous ways, relying 
on accidental convergences between rent opportunities, business-government 
relationships and actually existing governance capabilities. As a result, it is not at all 
surprising that the growth process is much patchier in these countries, benefiting 
certain regions and not others, benefiting some sectors while leaving others behind, 
and so on.  
 
We would also expect growth to be much more vulnerable to disruption in second tier 
countries both because the growth challenges are changing and there are frequently no 
formal mechanisms for responding to new challenges. This is very likely to be the 
case if the initial conditions for growth were created through responses that were 
informal and perhaps accidental in the first place. Secondly the nature of the business-
government relationships may be changing independently in many cases because of 
ongoing changes in the underlying political forces in society. When this happens, the 
continuation of a particular response to market failure may become untenable even 
with no further changes in market challenges. Finally, the solutions that allowed a 
partial move up the technology ladder for some sectors or firms in a country may not 
be sufficient for more challenging capability adoption problems even for those sectors 
or firms. Thus, sudden glass ceilings may also emerge in the path of a country’s 
technology adoption strategy.  
 
The policy significance of this approach to governance reform is that by identifying 
how a country has been addressing at least some market failures, we will be able to 
open up a discussion about the types of institutional arrangements that could be 
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devised over time that would be better regulated and perhaps more formal, in the first 
place to spread these successes more broadly within these same societies. As we shall 
see, growth is very patchy in most second tier countries and limited to specific sectors 
and regions, and this reflects the arbitrary ways in which market failures constraining 
growth have historically been overcome in these countries.  
 
To develop reform strategies that are likely to be both implementable and effective, 
policy-makers would be helped by an understanding of the governance arrangements 
that have partially worked in the past to identify how associated governance 
requirements need to develop in parallel so that policy extensions do not fail because 
of a failure of management and implementation. An examination of the ways in which 
responses to market failures worked in second tier countries is therefore a useful way 
for policy-makers to understand and learn from their own success.  
 
An important caveat should however be kept in mind. Because countries have very 
different political settlements, defined as the distribution of power between the classes 
and groups within that country, their capacity to enforce and manage different types 
of corrections to market failures are also likely to be very different. Therefore we 
would expect feasible and effective strategies of incremental reform to be different 
across countries depending on their political settlements and other initial conditions. 
However, by applying a consistent methodology to a number of developing countries 
we can hope to identify patterns and types of responses across broad types of political 
settlements which may simplify research into subsequent groups of countries.  
 
In subsequent sections we will examine important aspects of the growth processes in 
each of our five growth economies. We will identify how significant market failures 
were addressed, and the vulnerabilities in the mechanisms through which conditions 
for triggering and sustaining growth were achieved. This background will set the 
scene for a detailed investigation of specific aspects of growth-enhancing governance 
in subsequent papers. 
 
5. Thailand: Rapid growth with lagging technological capabilities 
Thailand is by far the richest economy in our sample. In 2005 its per capita income 
was three times higher than the next richest economy, Maharashtra, and almost eight 
times higher than Tanzania, the poorest economy in our sample (see Table 1 on p. 11). 
It is also an economy that has developed rapidly relying to a much greater extent on 
liberal economic policies compared to most other East Asian economies. It is 
therefore a useful comparator for the rest of our economies where ambitious 
intervention policies were abandoned in the 1980s because of problems with 
implementing ambitious market failure corrections. Despite its higher per capita 
income, Thailand therefore has aspects of relatively low state capability in managing 
growth-enhancing interventions. Moreover, unlike many other East Asian and 
particularly North East Asian countries, Thai politics since the 1970s has been 
fractious with a gradual and halting transition to more open democratic politics over 
this period. This too makes it a useful comparator for our other economies, none of 
which have been successful in imposing effective forms of authoritarian rule.   
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Overview 
The turning points in growth trends in Thailand since 1950 are shown in Peter Warr’s 
classification (Warr 2005) reproduced in Table 4. We also know from our Table 2 (p. 
12) that while growth in agriculture and services in Thailand was high throughout the 
period 1980-2005, manufacturing has been the driving sector in the sense that this was 
consistently the fastest growing sector over this period. 
 
Table 4 Thailand: Phases of Growth 1951-2003 
Period Real GDP Growth 
Real GDP Growth 
per capita 
1951 to 1986 (Phase I) Pre-Boom 6.5 3.9 
1987 to 1996 (Phase II) Boom 9.2 8.0 
1997 to 1998 (Phase III) Crisis -6.1 -7.1 
1999 to 2003 (Phase IV) Post-Crisis 4.0 3.3 
Whole Period 1951 to 2003 6.2 4.2 
Source: Warr (2005) Table 1.1 
 
Till around the mid-1980s, Thai manufacturing growth was driven by policies that 
created new incentives for investments in risk taking in new sectors. A few large 
domestic conglomerates were the main beneficiaries, relying on close relationships 
with politicians to get access to rents and resources that drove this early growth. 
Intense competition between competing business-politics factions ensured that the 
clientelism involved was relatively competitive and primarily involved in delivering 
rents to emerging capitalist conglomerates. These features of the rent-management 
system of the time ensured that the market failures preventing the development of 
basic industrial capabilities were overcome without excessive waste, and a relatively 
dynamic capitalist sector emerged (Khan 2000b: 101-4; Phongpaichit and Baker 
2008: 267-9).  
 
By the late 1970s this rent management system began to face intense strains and 
began unwinding. An aspect of rapid Thai growth was the availability of plentiful 
natural resources that could be captured by emerging capitalist conglomerates in 
resource-using industries. When the supply of natural resources began to run out it 
became clear that the institutional compulsions for productivity growth within the 
conglomerates had not been that strong, and this pattern of growth began to reach its 
limits. This coincided with a reduction in US interest in and aid to Thailand with the 
end of the Vietnam War and the effects of the oil shocks. As in other countries, the 
exposure of weaknesses in early growth-enhancing strategies did not lead to an 
investigation of governance improvements that may have addressed these problems 
but rather in the adoption of a more explicitly market-oriented strategy. Under World 
Bank guidance, Thailand began a programme of liberalization of its trade regime in 
the early 1980s, incentives were created for export-oriented manufacturing in the mid-
1980s and by the late 1980s restrictions on international capital flows were relaxed 
making foreign capital inflows easier (Phongpaichit and Baker 2008: 4).  
 
The economic boom that followed from the mid-eighties till the late nineties in 
Thailand was driven by a combination of existing Thai conglomerates getting access 
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to cheap foreign capital as well as investments by foreign investors in joint ventures 
with Thai partners. The relocation of significant production facilities in Thailand was 
assisted by the fortuitous developments that led to the Plaza Accord of 1985. This led 
to the revaluation of the yen against the dollar and led to a significant Japanese 
interest in setting up offshore production in South East Asian countries like Thailand 
which had achieved an industrial base and also had low wages and a currency tied to 
the dollar. Clearly, the shift to a more liberal trade and capital regime led to an inflow 
of investments from foreign partners only because some domestic productive 
capabilities had already developed as a result of earlier strategies. But the political 
economy which had allowed Thai conglomerates to get access to rents and grow in 
the earlier period failed to provide effective governance to ensure that these resources 
were always used productively. As these governance capabilities did not improve, the 
underlying problem eventually affected the new capital flooding in. 
 
The influx of capital and technology led to a boom with very high growth rates for a 
decade after 1985. But weaknesses in governance capabilities also led to a significant 
amount of speculation and bad lending. The boom of the 1980s and 1990s was 
followed by the financial crisis of 1997. While the East Asian financial crisis had 
important exogenous causes, such as a slowdown in global demand for East Asian 
exports, the shock revealed in an exaggerated way a number of weaknesses in the 
Thai model of economic growth. Export orientation and liberalization had not 
addressed the problem of how to raise productivity and competitiveness within the 
domestic conglomerates in Thailand. In the restructuring that followed, Thai 
conglomerates sold out very systematically to their foreign partners and this led to a 
much more significant presence of foreign capital in Thailand’s corporate sector 
(Niyomsilpa 2008; Wailerdsak 2008). The new corporate sector that emerged after 
1997 was one where the presence of domestic capital in high-technology sectors was 
significantly reduced, with their focus shifting to less risky areas such as suppliers to 
multinationals and the service sector (Phongpaichit and Baker 2008).  
 
The underlying theme in the Thai growth story is therefore the unsatisfactory 
performance of domestic Thai corporates in raising their productivity and global 
competitiveness. The crisis of 1997 shook out a lot of domestic capital from sectors 
where they had failed to acquire competitiveness. While growth in the 2000s returned 
to the pre-boom growth rates, this was now a very different type of growth. 
Thailand’s new growth strategy abandoned the attempt to create a dynamic domestic 
capitalist sector using specific policy instruments such as local content ratios and 
ownership laws. Instead, the new strategy after 1997 became one of becoming an 
attractive base for foreign direct investment and responding to the needs and 
requirements of primarily foreign investors in Thailand’s new growth sectors like 
automobiles and electronics (Phongpaichit and Baker 2008: 267-73). 
 
The new approach raises new types of questions about the vulnerabilities Thailand 
may face in the future. First, as Japanese economists have pointed out, while Thailand 
has achieved the agglomeration economies that have attracted Japanese and other 
direct investment, there appears to be a ‘glass ceiling’ preventing the absorption of 
technical capabilities that would allow the economy to break free of dependence on 
foreign technological leadership (Ohno 2006: 14-17). Clearly if this glass ceiling 
cannot be broken through there will be a limit to potential income growth in a middle-
income country based solely on being a manufacturing outpost for the assembly of 
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designs coming from more advanced countries. At some point the transition to an 
economy that does its own creative technological leadership has to be contemplated 
because most of the value-added in modern production comes from ownership of 
designs and brands. This raises questions about the types of market failures that may 
be constraining that transition in Thailand.  
 
Policies/Rents Governance Outcomes/Vulnerabilities
Rapid growth of large 
domestic conglomerates in 
relatively low technology 
manufacturing: Dramatic 
growth (particularly 1960s 
onwards) in low-tech
sectors where learning 
periods were short.
But competitive clientelism 
also damaged autonomy of 
critical agencies: by the late 
1980s and 1990s the Bank of 
Thailand, the  NESDB and 
other agencies became 
targets of ruling factions.
Governed by Competitive 
Clientelism: Access to rents 
was relatively competitive 
because of competition 
between patrons in politics.
Entry of new clients could not 
be permanently blocked and 
together with hard budget 
constraints for individual 
factions ensured that clients 
knew that assets had to 
become competitive. A 
permanent stream of rents 
was not feasible. 
Some upgrading and 
diversification through 
conditional support 
particularly over 1980-97
Examples include diesel 
engines 1980-85, cathode ray 
tubes 1985 onwards.
But growing politicization of 
agencies in a context of 
cheap capital imports limited 
development of these 
capabilities. BOI moved to 
support firms independent of 
nationality by mid-1980s.
Negotiated through active 
business-government 
dialogues and regulated by 
international agreements 
such as WTO and FTAs
FTAs and WTO limit 
capability of governments to 
induce learning-by-doing in 
new sectors by creating 
temporary rents. Governance 
focus shifts to ensuring 
quality of skills in formal 
education.
Rapid growth of FDI in 
assembly operations where 
agglomeration economies 
already exist
Automotive sector success 
story but ownership of 
technology and bulk of profits 
is foreign.
Growing challenge of 
increasing domestic value 
added. Country vulnerable to 
relocations of foreign capital. 
Domestic populist backlash is 
a continuous danger.
Requires specific 
technocratic and political 
(growth-enhancing) 
governance capabilities
Effective technocratic 
capabilities existed in some 
agencies and there were 
moments of political support 
for such strategies even in 
overall context of competitive 
clientelism.
Rent allocation and rent 
capture to create domestic 
conglomerates, 1950-
Formal rents based on fiscal 
incentives, import and export 
controls, licensing and 
zoning laws.
Informal rents based on 
ability to negotiate terms on 
formal rents, and preferential 
access including to 
privatized assets, loans, 
licenses, natural resources 
and insider information.
Rent allocation by 
technocratic agencies like 
Board of Investment (BOI) 
to accelerate learning and 
technology acquisition, 
particularly 1980-1997
Examples are targeted BOI 
incentives for specific 
technology acquisition 
strategies including duty 
concessions, time bound 
entry barriers, local content 
conditions supported by 
specific incentives.
Non-discriminatory rent 
allocation to all technology 
providers including FDI, 
particularly 1997-
Abandonment of local 
content, local ownership and 
setting of national 
technology priorities.
Initially rents were provided 
by cutting tariffs and taxes 
but as these are bid down 
further incentives require 
difficult public investments in 
education and skills.
 
Figure 12 Governance and Growth in Thailand: Patterns and Vulnerabilities 
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Secondly, even if the policy objective is to enable Thailand to fully exploit the 
opportunities coming from its new position as a base for assembly operations for 
multinationals, it has to address the market failures and institutional constraints that 
limit the skill base of its workers and managers. Since multinationals are unlikely to 
take the risks of investing to the fullest extent in skills development because of the 
types of market failures discussed earlier, even a gradual move up the value chain 
through multinational investments requires government investments in training and 
skills development or other measures to overcome the relevant market failures 
(Brimble and Doner 2007; Phongpaichit and Baker 2008: 274-77). In each case, 
significant governance capabilities are likely to be required to enable the strategy in 
question to be effectively implemented (Ohno 2006).  
 
Figure 12 summarizes the recent experience of growth in Thailand by looking at three 
different types of intended and unintended policy responses to market failures in that 
country that are separately recognized in the literature as having played important 
roles in driving aspects of growth and technology acquisition. The next three 
subsections discuss these patterns of rent creation and the associated governance 
capabilities that assisted or hindered growth through investment and technology 
acquisition. This investigation also helps us to identify vulnerabilities in the growth 
patterns observed in Thailand. As the most advanced of our group of growing 
economies, these observations will also help to structure the discussion of growth and 
vulnerability in our other economies.  
 
Rent allocation and rent capture to create domestic capitalist conglomerates  
We know from historical observations that the availability of an investible surplus in a 
country and the formal availability of profitable production technologies from around 
the world are not sufficient to ensure the entry of domestic entrepreneurs into 
productive activities. Market failures in land, labour, capital and technology markets 
can prevent the transition of merchant and trading capitalists into productive activities 
(Figure 8). The most basic constraints in the path of a productive capitalist transition 
are the market failures that prevent the simplest technologies attracting capitalist 
investment. In these cases the relevant market failures are preventing even enterprises 
that would have been profitable immediately to access the land, labour and other 
resources that they need to set up in production at a price (including transaction costs) 
that is attractive for the individual capitalist investor.  
 
Historically at early stages of capitalist development, the emergence of the first few 
generations of firms has typically involved significant non-market transfers of assets 
and resources to productive firms, a process that Marx described as ‘primitive 
accumulation’. The non-market aspects of resource transfers in high transaction cost 
markets are necessary whenever market failures imply transaction costs that are high 
enough to prevent productive firms and investments emerging purely through market 
transactions. At the same time, non-market transfers or influences on market 
processes can also easily go wrong and result in very poor outcomes for production 
and productivity.  
 
The first set of policies shown in Figure 12 is related to the creation or capture of 
rents in ways that enable the initial emergence of potentially productive capitalists. At 
a general level, all these processes involve making extra resources available to 
potential investors using a variety of political mechanisms to overcome the obstacles 
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in the path of the resource agglomerations required to set up capitalist production. An 
initial thrust towards capitalist production could be based on rather crude rent 
allocation to already existing merchants and traders provided minimal governance 
conditions are present to limit excessive levels of moral hazard and capture of these 
resources by entirely unproductive groups. In common with other developing 
countries, Thailand displays significant non-market influences on asset and resource 
transfers as soon as its traditional economy is exposed to rapid processes of change in 
the early twentieth century. But here, in common with more successful transition 
stories, a significant productive sector rapidly emerges through these processes. 
 
Thailand’s transition to a modern middle income country began as late as the 1930s 
when the absolute monarchy was overthrown by a coup d’état. At that time Thailand 
had plenty of traders and merchants, mostly of Chinese descent, who were engaged in 
the global rice trade. With the partial exception of a few firms engaged in rice and 
timber milling, shipping, banking and cement, there was virtually no modern 
capitalism (Wailerdsak 2008: 34). In common with many other developing countries, 
the availability of a potentially investible surplus in the hands of a trading class and 
the formal availability of potentially profitable technology were insufficient to 
overcome the market failures that prevent the entry of domestic investors into 
production activities. Overcoming these market failures was not helped by the virtual 
free trade that Thailand had been constrained to follow for a century. Trade policy has 
historically been a cheap and simple way in which developing countries created rents 
encouraging potential investments in industry that were blocked in the absence of 
these incentives.  
 
Although Thailand was never formally a colony, the Bowring Treaty of 1855 with the 
British Empire had limited import duties to 3% of value and thereby effectively 
prevented any protection of domestic industries through trade policy. Between 1855 
and 1950 the growth rate of per capita income was estimated at a dismal 0.2% per 
year (Manarungsan 1989). This poor performance was similar to many other poor 
countries where colonial rule imposed virtual free trade policies in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. The military-bureaucratic elites who came to power through 
the 1932 revolution identified the need for industrial development and of import 
substitution as a mechanism to achieve that goal. However, there was no immediate 
shift in policy towards industry because of antagonisms between the Thai 
bureaucratic-military elites and the traders of Chinese descent who would be the 
beneficiaries of an industrialization drive. Nevertheless, the stage had been set for the 
gradual emergence of a long-lasting strategy of agricultural taxation and industrial 
protection through which modern Thai capitalism was to emerge (Phongpaichit and 
Baker 1997: 112-42).  
 
Thailand was fortunate in having significant endowments of arable land. As a result, 
agricultural taxation could play an important role in providing investible resources 
directly through savings and taxation and indirectly by easing the financing of 
discriminatory rents to support the industrial transition that began around 1950. The 
extensive land frontier also enabled Thailand to have access to foreign exchange 
through agricultural exports at an early stage of development. Initially Thailand was a 
significant agricultural exporter, with rice alone accounting for 50% of the value of 
exports in the 1950s. Agriculture itself grew at a very respectable 4% per annum over 
1970-1990, largely because of the availability of plentiful land rather than any 
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significant growth in yields (Siamwalla, et al. 1993). These agricultural characteristics 
enabled a significant taxation of agriculture and agricultural exports that financed and 
enabled a range of policies creating incentives for industrial investment (Siriprachai 
2007). By 1980, the share of manufacturing in GDP overtook agriculture, growing to 
22% compared to agriculture at 21%, and by 1985 manufacturing exports had 
overtaken agricultural exports (Phongpaichit and Baker 1997: Table 5.3 and 5.4). 
 
As in many developing countries at that time, the importance of inducing the initial 
investments in industry was widely recognized by governments and particularly 
military governments. Rent creation to trigger the initial transition was ‘organized’ 
through a number of formal as well as informal processes. Shortly after Field Marshal 
Sarit Thanarat took power in 1958, a series of formal policies were adopted that 
demonstrate implicit recognition of market failures blocking the entry of traders into 
production even if they were planning to adopt the most basic low-risk technologies. 
The Board of Investment (BOI) was established in 1959 to create incentives for 
industrialization using a broad range of tax and tariff concessions. A National 
Economic Development Board was set up (later renamed the National Economic and 
Social Development Board or NESDB) to draw up five-year plans and coordinate 
across sectors. The Investment Promotion Act of 1960 made it easy for investors, 
including foreign investors, to get access to land. Profit repatriation and protection 
from nationalization were guaranteed for foreign investors. Labour unions and strikes 
were outlawed (Phongpaichit and Baker 1997: 128). These policy interventions raised 
the potential rate of profit in a wide range of productive activities and by definition 
created rents for investors in these sectors. 
 
In addition to the formal policies, the political shift in the direction of a business-
politics rapprochement led to an equally important set of informal arrangements 
through which business clients of political patrons could expect access to additional 
rents. Clients could expect to negotiate the terms of formal policies and to have 
formal policies preferentially interpreted. As Warr (1993: 38) points out, BOI policies 
were often applied in a discretionary way and the incentives offered often differed 
among firms in the same industry. Businessmen with political connections could 
expect preferential access to privatized assets, government contracts, licenses, loans, 
land and natural resources and insider information about imminent policy changes and 
opportunities. These policies were not just incidentally important in Thailand. The 
biggest productive conglomerates emerged through these processes, and they have 
continued into modern times when their necessity is more difficult to justify. 
 
For instance, the owner of the largest textile conglomerate in Thailand in the late 
1970s, Sukree Photiratanangkun had begun life as the owner of a small fabric store. 
His transition to capitalist production began with his acquisition of a privatized 
spinning and weaving mill on preferential terms and being able to supply blankets to 
the army, both based on his contacts within the Sarit government (Doner and Ramsay 
2000: 158-9). In 2005, the richest man in Thailand in the Forbes list of global 
billionaires was the liquor magnate Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi. Son of a Chinese 
immigrant street vendor of fried mussels, Chaoren’s enterprising abilities and capacity 
to make deals with politicians makes his story one of the classics of dynamic 
primitive accumulation in Thailand (Treerat 2008). Even more famously, the future 
prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra would in the space of five years in the late 1980s 
go from having virtually nothing to become one of the richest entrepreneurs in 
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Thailand by leveraging insider contacts to his advantage in the booming 
telecommunications sector (Pathmanand and Baker 2008: 106-8). 
 
What is remarkable is that out of this formally unregulated rent seeking and rent 
creation based on murky patron-client networks, an emergent industrial capitalism 
entered basic technology sectors like textiles and drove industrial growth in Thailand 
at unprecedented rates in the 1960s and 1970s. It is also clear that these informal 
arrangements were not created consciously to address specific market failures. The 
interesting question is how these processes effectively if unconsciously addressed 
these market failures, albeit at considerable cost in terms of other unintended 
consequences and wastage. From 1963 to 1975 manufacturing output and 
employment quadrupled (Phongpaichit and Baker 1997: Table 4.2). Apart from 
agribusinesses processing food, there was growth in glass, cement, iron and steel, 
paper manufacturing and above all textiles.  
 
There were a number of formal and informal regulatory characteristics governing this 
rent creation system that can help to explain these relatively favourable outcomes. 
Even during periods of military governments, and particularly during the quasi-
civilian governments of the 1970s and beyond, patron-client politics in Thailand was 
characterized by intense competition between factions controlled by different patrons 
(Doner and Ramsay 2000; Khan 2000b: 101-4). The fragmented nature of Thai 
political competition was reflected in the 14 charters and constitutions that the country 
had between 1932 and prior to the 1997 constitution, none of which made it easy for a 
single political party to control government. Secondly, key macroeconomic agencies 
of the state, including in particular the central bank, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) were 
relatively insulated from factional politics. Initially at least, these agencies were able 
to resist patron-client politics from affecting monetary or exchange rate policy. 
Finally, autonomous redistributive factions were weak in Thailand. Unlike most other 
developing countries, Thailand had not been colonized and so powerful social 
movements had not developed that immediately engaged in redistributive politics.  
 
The combination of these characteristics of the governance environment had a number 
of consequences for the rent creation process enabling primitive accumulation in 
industry. First, although rents could be captured by or created for particular aspirants 
through their contacts with patrons, clients had no credible strategy to make any of 
these rents permanent. Rent recipients knew there would be intense competition from 
potential new entrants who could approach either their own patron or other patrons. 
The only way of ensuring income flows into the future would be to leverage the 
temporary advantage offered by the rent to invest in the productive venture and 
generate market profits rapidly. Profit generation was essential to reinvest in the 
patron-client relationship and thereby ensure that their patron remained loyal to them 
and could continue to dominate in the competition against rival patrons to assist the 
client with further rents in the future.  
 
Secondly, the absence of autonomous redistributive factions meant that businesses 
receiving rents had no bargaining power with their patrons apart from the return they 
could eventually offer them. If they could not rapidly generate profits from their 
investment their patron may look elsewhere for a better return or be superseded by 
other patrons with more lucrative clients. In countries where business clients could 
easily buy independent organizational power from powerful political factions the 
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calculations became more complex and inefficient producers were more likely to 
preserve their rents by politically blocking attempts by their patrons to re-allocate 
rents to others (Khan 2000b). A more detailed analysis of these conditions will follow 
in a subsequent paper on non-market transfers.  
 
On the negative side, Thai competitive clientelism had built-in instabilities that 
always threatened the capacity of this informal governance system to remain efficient. 
The dynamism of the system depended significantly on the inability of patrons to 
generate resources for themselves by influencing macroeconomic policy such as 
interest or exchange rate policy or by creating unassailable monopoly rents. As long 
as political patrons could only create temporary sectoral or firm level rents, the 
competition for these rents and the entry into new productive activities that they 
allowed was potentially very beneficial for a capitalist transition. This fine balance 
was not consciously created or maintained and began to be undermined by 
developments over time. 
 
First, by the 1980s, the growing political power of factions began to undermine the 
capacity of technocratic agencies to manage macroeconomic aggregates. Competitive 
clientelism had initially been characterized by an implicit deal between technocrats in 
the Bank of Thailand and other economic agencies on the one hand and politicians on 
the other whereby the technocrats managed the macroeconomy and the politicians 
allocated sectoral and firm level rents that were by necessity temporary. Christensen 
and Siamwalla (1993: 7) summed this up as follows: “The technocrats would not 
encroach on the sectoral and macroeconomic mismanagement which benefits the 
political masters, while the latter would allow the technocrats to keep control over the 
macroeconomy” (quoted in Doner and Ramsay 2000: 171).  
 
By the end of the Prem Tinsulanond government in 1988, these Chinese walls began 
to be undermined as new more robust politicians hired and fired technocrats to assert 
control over the economy in ways they thought were required (Rock 2000: 196-9). 
The outcome was not only that serious macroeconomic damage could be 
inadvertently inflicted, but also that ruling factions could attempt to capture much 
more significant and long-lived rents by using macroeconomic management, thereby 
upsetting both the dynamic incentives for profit-seeking by business clients and also 
raising the stakes in political competition.  
 
Secondly, the nature of political competition changed after 1997 due to a number of 
interrelated reasons. The failure of the political system to respond to the needs of 
domestic capital encouraged more business interests to directly enter politics and in 
the case of Thaksin Shinawatra to set up a political party that would eventually win 
power. A new constitution also emerged in 1997 as a result of strong social 
mobilization for democratization and against the powers of the shady military-
bureaucratic elites who traditionally wielded significant power in Thai politics. The 
new constitution was deliberately crafted to give primacy to elected political parties 
and to allow a single strong party to dominate parliament with strong executive 
powers given to the prime minister.  
 
This combination of factors had the unintended effect of encouraging an attempt at 
creating a monopolistic clientelist model by Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai party 
which used populist politics to win electoral power and centralized rent allocation to 
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enrich a ruling group of business interests to the exclusion of others. The tensions this 
strategy resulted in led to Thailand’s latest military coup in September 2006 (Chaiwat 
and Phongpaichit 2008). Not surprisingly, the 1997 constitution was abrogated and an 
interim constitution was promulgated in 2006, followed by a new constitution in 
2007. These dynamics will be discussed in detail in later papers but clearly since the 
late 1980s the conditions that ensured the rapid emergence of new productive 
capitalists through competitive clientelism began to be undermined.  
 
Rent allocation for learning and technology acquisition  
This first type of rent creation that we have discussed so far enabled variants of 
primitive accumulation. At least for a while, this type of rent creation can have 
positive effects in many contexts simply by overcoming the market failures that create 
high entry costs for entrants into productive sectors. However, other market failures 
are more difficult to address, including in particular those that constrain risky 
investments in learning when the productivity gap between the catching-up country 
and its more advanced competitors is significant. Here as we have argued there are 
more complex problems of positive externalities and principal-agent problems 
between outside investors in the firm and the management and workers of the firm. 
Overcoming these market failures once again requires temporary rents but here the 
conditions for effectiveness are more demanding. But without parallel success in 
learning and technology acquisition the initial entrants are likely to remain in basic 
technologies and be unable to respond to entry by lower tier countries.  
 
If temporary rents are created without discriminating across sectors, or are available 
for unpredictable lengths of time, these rents may still assist entry but self-selection 
by rational investors will ensure that entry happens primarily in sectors where the 
productivity gap with competitors is low. A low productivity gap is essential to ensure 
that entrants can achieve profitability relatively rapidly. Investors may then be able to 
survive if the rent is withdrawn. More importantly, if they have a reasonable chance 
of becoming profitable quickly they can invest in the political relationships that 
created these rents to generate further rents in the future. But to achieve entry into 
technologies and sectors where the gap with competitors is more significant would 
require a more concerted policy approach with a greater assurance that rents will last 
for a minimum learning period. And for this to work, there also has to be credible exit 
strategies for rent providers.  
 
The competitive clientelism in Thailand described earlier may give the impression 
that concerted policy action for technology acquisition would be well-nigh impossible 
in this context. Such concerted strategies were certainly difficult, but interestingly, not 
entirely absent in Thailand over the period we are interested in. In particular in the 
1980s during Prem Tinsulanond’s quasi-civilian government, economic agencies 
exercised considerable effort to promote technology acquisition. The country had by 
then already acquired a diversified base of basic technology industries and needed to 
upgrade into more value-generating industries where entry was constrained by 
significant productivity disadvantages. Technocratic agencies like the NESDB, the 
Bank of Thailand and the Finance Ministry had significant capabilities that had not 
yet been undermined by political appointments. And Prem’s military-backed 
government was less short term in its perspective and less constrained by political 
imperatives of having to deliver to coalition partners who may have had their own 
business clients to promote or protect.  
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Indeed some observers have detected technocratic capacities to make targeted policy 
interventions in Thailand from the early 1960s. The Commercial Banking Act of 1962 
promoted the growth of a small number of large domestic banks by limiting bank 
entry, limiting the operation of foreign banks and undermining informal credit 
markets. The effect was the successful expansion of a small number of family-owned 
commercial banks that further accelerated industrial growth by making credit 
available to Thai entrepreneurs (Rock 2000: 187). By the 1980s the BOI was 
implementing ambitious technology upgrading strategies. An example is a project 
with three joint venture firms to introduce the production of diesel engines for 
agricultural machinery in Thailand. Policy measures included rent creation using 
targeted import duties to protect domestic markets, reductions of duties for required 
imported raw materials, entry barriers into the sector to protect initial investors, and a 
four-year target for achieving 80% local content. The project was monitored 
throughout and protection was reduced for those firms that failed to meet the local 
content requirement at the end of the period (Rock 2000: 189-90).  
 
But by the mid-1980s the conditions for supporting domestic capital in technology 
acquisition were being weakened. The growing politicization of rent allocation 
created pressures within technocratic agencies to look to foreign technology providers 
and investors. At the same time exogenous changes in the global financial system 
following the Plaza Agreement of 1985 made Japanese investors very interested in 
countries like Thailand. Net inflows of FDI almost quintupled from the 1980-85 
annual average of 6.1 billion baht to 28 billion in 1988 and 45.7 billion in 1989, 
mostly driven by a huge increase in Japanese FDI (Phongpaichit and Baker 1997: 
Table 5.5). These levels were roughly sustained right through till the crisis of 1997. 
For reasons that will be discussed in the next subsection, FDI inflows accelerated 
even further after the 1997 financial crisis. These inflows and the interest particularly 
by Japanese conglomerates for joint ventures in Thailand had important effects on the 
incentives for technological upgrading by Thai capital. If Thai capital could make 
easy profits by going into joint venture partnerships with foreign investors, it was 
difficult to persuade them to undertake difficult and risky technology upgrading 
investments on their own with the types of rents that the technocrats could provide 
local investors.  
 
Changes in the global context therefore had significant (and eventually adverse) 
effects on the incentives of domestic capital. With hindsight we can argue that Thai 
growth-enhancing policies to counter these tendencies were inadequate. The 
significant increases in foreign capital inflows led to changes in BOI rules by 1986 
allowing it to offer incentives to foreign investors in export industries (Phongpaichit 
and Baker 1997: 151). Although initially this was intended to allow technical 
partnerships with domestic capital and encourage technology transfers, eventually this 
further weakened the possibility of implementing policies to develop domestic 
technological capabilities. As the role of foreign conglomerates increased in the Thai 
economy, so did their bargaining power. As a result, they were less willing over time 
to engage in discussions about technology transfer conditions that implicitly increased 
their costs of production. Indeed by 1994 BOI was allowing 100% foreign ownership 
of export-oriented ventures (Niyomsilpa 2008: 66-7) 
 
 45
In the early years of this transition, partnerships with foreign firms were 
technologically beneficial to Thai firms in terms of technology transfer and the 
development of local technological capabilities. In the late 1980s the BOI developed 
policies to deepen the capacity of Thai firms to produce cathode ray tubes (CRTs). 
The BOI worked with a major Thai company, the Siam Cement Group to lead the 
project, supported by the usual mix of fiscal incentives and entry protections and 
invited foreign partners to participate. Mitsubishi was selected as the foreign partner 
and Thai firms associated with the project rapidly progressed from assemblers to 
producers (Rock 2000: 190-1). However, the incentives for technological upgrading 
for Thai partners in many of the joint venture projects that were emerging were 
insufficiently strong. The tendency was for Thai partners to be engaged in a 
supportive and supplier role to the foreign assembler. The weakness of the Thai 
partners in these technology upgrading strategies became apparent in the aftermath of 
the 1997 financial crisis. The shakeup that followed led to the logical development of 
this strategy in a direction that formally abandoned attempts at creating a globally 
competitive but domestically owned Thai capitalist sector.  
 
Table 5 Thailand: Growth of Output and Productivity 
GROWTH RATES Pre-Boom 
1981-86 
Boom 
1987-96 
Crisis 
1997-98 
Recovery 
1999-2002 
Whole Period 
1981-2002 
All Sectors       
Output  5.46 9.50 -5.93 4.11 6.01 
Factor Contributions      
Capital Stock 3.22 4.80 1.81 1.04 3.42 
Labour 1.35 2.68 1.29 1.88 2.05 
Land 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
TFP 0.86 2.00 -9.03 1.17 0.54 
Labour Productivity 2.55 7.56 -5.83 3.36 4.21 
Manufacturing       
Output  5.80 13.19 -4.82 7.06 8.42 
Factor Contributions      
Capital Stock 4.11 7.44 3.21 1.59 5.08 
Labour 1.54 5.08 2.65 2.26 3.38 
TFP 0.15 0.67 -10.68 3.21 -0.04 
Labour Productivity 3.07 6.04 -7.65 2.44 3.33 
Investment Share 
(% of GDP) 28.3 38.4 27.1 22.8 31.8 
Source: Calculated from Warr (2005) Tables 1.3 and 1.4, and World Bank (2008) 
 
The data in Table 5 show some interesting patterns for productivity growth in the Thai 
economy and its manufacturing sector. Technical progress can be measured either by 
labour productivity growth or TFP growth. Each measure has advantages and 
disadvantages but TFP in particular has serious measurement and conceptual 
problems, which is why it is often a controversial measure. Calculations of TFP 
growth in Thailand are particularly problematic and the results vary across studies 
because of inadequate data on factor shares. But the ranking of TFP growth across 
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periods in Table 5 is consistent with the ranking across studies in the survey of 
available TFP studies on Thailand by Bosworth (2005).  
 
For the economy as a whole, both labour productivity growth and TFP growth rates 
were highest during the boom of 1987-96. In the second growth phase of 1999-2002 
both labour productivity and TFP growth rates recover but are lower than before. In 
the second period both labour productivity and TFP growth rates are around a half 
that achieved in the earlier period. A somewhat different picture emerges for the 
manufacturing sector. As with the economy, labour productivity growth is highest 
during the 1987-96 boom and is only about a third of this rate during the recovery of 
1999-2002. But TFP growth in manufacturing is almost negligible in the first period 
because of the very rapid growth of capital stock. TFP growth is considerably higher 
in the second period in the manufacturing sector largely because of a much slower 
growth of capital stock.  
 
This evidence suggests that till the 1997 crisis the policy interventions of the Thai 
state had a greater effect in sustaining high rates of investment in manufacturing, 
thereby achieving very high rates of labour productivity growth. The significance of 
the low TFP growth rates in the pre-crisis manufacturing sector is open to 
interpretation. Clearly, much of the growth in manufacturing at this time was 
extensive growth based on a rapid expansion of a relatively low-tech manufacturing 
base. There were successful examples of technology upgrading and new technologies 
were continuously being introduced but not very rapidly or aggressively. Many of the 
relatively high-tech investments by foreign investors (for instance in automobiles) 
took place towards the end of this period and many production units were not 
operating at full capacity when the 1997 crisis struck. A combination of all these 
factors could explain why the average labour productivity in the manufacturing sector 
was rapidly growing as new firms set up in the sector, while the slow growth of TFP 
could be capturing the relatively slow technical upgrading within existing firms and 
low capital utilization in some new high-technology projects. The interpretation of 
low TFP growth is however problematic and the Thai TFP figures are particularly 
sensitive to assumptions made about the shares of capital and labour in the economy, 
the corrections made to factor quality, and the appropriate weights to use for 
aggregating the contributions of labour and capital (Bosworth 2005). The change in 
the pattern of growth and productivity after the 1997 crisis is the subject of the next 
subsection. 
 
Non-discriminatory rent allocation to technology providers  
The 1997 financial crisis was a watershed in the development of Thai growth and 
governance strategies. The combination of the first two processes outlined in Figure 
12 had by the 1990s resulted in a fairly diversified if moderately low-tech 
manufacturing base. But the growth and governance strategy was beset by internal 
problems that made it difficult to sustain the move into higher technology sectors. 
These internal problems, together with the shift of Japanese and other international 
investors towards South East Asian countries like Thailand in the late 1980s had a 
very significant effect on the viability of these strategies given the limited political 
capability of Thailand to evolve viable internal responses to these challenges. Instead, 
by the mid-1990s, higher technology investments in Thailand were driven by joint 
venture investments with foreign, largely Japanese conglomerates.  
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Initially, Thai firms did very well in the new arrangement, becoming actively 
involved as joint venture partners with Japanese technology providers. In addition, 
they benefited significantly as first and second tier suppliers and in many cases this 
resulted in significant technology acquisition by Thai companies2. But there were 
inadequate incentives and support for the development of Thai technical capabilities 
in these sectors, and indeed the incentive was for Thai companies to be rent-mediators 
enabling the entry of FDI seeking to take advantage of incentives offered by BOI to 
joint ventures and the agglomeration economies in Thailand, given the relatively 
deeper development of a manufacturing base in Thailand compared to most other 
South East Asian countries. The gradual eclipse of Thai capital in high-technology 
sectors was radically accelerated by the financial crisis of 1997, after which the third 
strategy of rent allocation shown in Figure 12 begins to emerge as the dominant one. 
Instead of using rent allocation to accelerate learning and technology acquisition by 
domestic capital, the BOI strategy begins to transform into one of non-discriminatory 
rent allocations to any technology providers, who happen increasingly to be foreign 
ones, and abandoning local content and ownership requirements and the attempt to 
define national technology priorities.  
 
The dynamics behind this transition are best illustrated by the most successful sector 
to develop out of this emerging partnership with Japanese capital: the automotive 
sector (Niyomsilpa 2008). Although Thailand had been trying to encourage a 
domestic automotive industry since the 1960s, it was only with Japanese joint 
ventures in the 1980s that the sector made significant progress. But even in 1996, the 
last normal year before the crisis, total production was around 600,000 units, almost 
entirely (>97%) for the domestic market. The 1997 crisis led to a significant structural 
break in policies and structures. The BOI was forced to rapidly abandon local content 
requirements and ownership requirements, and less productive Thai capital was 
forced to rapidly sell out their shares in joint venture enterprises to their erstwhile 
foreign minority partners, becoming either minority partners themselves or moving 
out of the industry altogether. Fortunately for Thailand, the sunk costs of Japanese 
investors in the automotive industry were large enough for them to decide to take a 
major stake in Thailand and buy out their joint venture partners in a context where the 
economy appeared to be facing a meltdown. The buyout of Thai capital in this and 
other high-technology sectors in the immediate aftermath of the crisis explains why 
net FDI flows to Thailand increased in 1997-99 compared to the earlier years, before 
falling back to relatively low levels of net inflows by 2002-03 (Warr 2005: 32-6). 
 
The results were dramatic. By 2006, barely a decade after the crisis, the Thai 
automotive sector was producing almost 1,250,000 units, 44% for the export market. 
It had become the single largest sector in Thai manufacturing, employing over 
100,000 workers, accounted for 8% of total exports and Thailand had shot up to fifth 
place in world rankings for production of commercial vehicles. The only ‘problem’ 
was that this was no longer a Thai sector. Five multinationals (four Japanese and one 
American) controlled 98% of the Thai automotive sector, and even of the 200 first-tier 
part suppliers, only 20 remained in Thai hands (Niyomsilpa 2008: 61). Only a decade 
ago, there were several hundred domestic firms playing a dominant role in the sector, 
                                                 
2 First tier suppliers manufacture parts that are directly used in the assembly of the final product (say 
cars). Second tier suppliers supply sub-assemblies and parts to first tier suppliers, while third tier 
suppliers provide replacement parts. The technical sophistication and quality control requirements are 
typically in a declining order across these tiers.  
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both as first-tier part suppliers but more importantly as joint venture partners in the 
core manufacturing processes.  
 
As we have seen, the transition to a new rent strategy had been happening gradually 
anyway, with a growing involvement of Thai technology policy-making with 
strategies to attract FDI into specific high-technology sectors. This was the direction 
in which learning rents were being deployed by technocrats from the mid-1980s 
onwards. At the same time, the incentives for domestic capitalists to engage in 
productivity improvement and technological capability development became weaker 
after the significant increase in the availability of foreign capital and joint venture 
participation in the mid-1980s. To make matters worse, the politicization of rent 
allocation began to affect the efficiency with which learning rents could be managed 
and this also affected the capability of technocratic agencies to allocate selective rents 
to domestic capitalists to achieve technology upgrading. The transition to a different 
rent strategy was therefore happening anyway, but was dramatically accelerated by 
the 1997 crisis.  
 
The crisis forced Thai policy-makers to respond rapidly to enable a fire sale by Thai 
owners of joint venture companies most of whom became technically bankrupt 
immediately after the crisis broke. To enable significant Japanese investment in a core 
high-technology sector like automobile production, policy-makers had to make rapid 
changes to the regulatory and policy framework. In particular, incentives in the sector 
had to become non-discriminatory across domestic and foreign owners, local content 
conditions had to be lifted to allow Japanese conglomerates to achieve regional 
specialization across South East Asian countries and foreign ownership restrictions 
had to be lifted across the board (Doner, et al. 2005; Niyomsilpa 2008: 69-77). Thai 
players who remained in the industry did so as suppliers, and in most cases slipped 
down into second or third tier supplier status.  
 
These changes had important consequences for the policy-making framework and the 
types of rent strategies that Thailand and its BOI could henceforth support. The price 
of allowing foreign conglomerates define Thailand’s place in global production 
networks meant that the country would have to fit into global locational strategies of 
conglomerates. This in turn required achieving free trade relationships with countries 
in which the conglomerates had located other parts of the production process, so that 
bodies could be made in one country, transmissions and brakes in another, and 
engines and designs imported from Japan. Not surprisingly, Japanese conglomerates 
became major policy players in Thailand, pushing for the implementation of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and a free trade agreement (FTA) with Japan. 
Under AFTA, tariffs on automotive exports with ASEAN countries were reduced to 
between zero and five per cent. The FTA with Japan was finally signed in 2007 and 
enabled imports of steel and auto parts from Japan for processing and assembly in 
Thailand. These policy changes made perfect sense from the perspective of Japanese 
conglomerates seeking to rationalize their regional production bases and enabling 
them to specialize parts of the production process in particular countries. However, 
these agreements essentially removed the capability of future Thai governments using 
trade policy as an instrument to develop domestic technological capabilities in other 
sectors or areas, or even within the Thai automotive sector.  
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Thailand was remarkably successful in adopting the new policy approach to 
technology partnership with foreign conglomerates. Non-discriminatory rents were 
rapidly conceded by the Thai side in the form of concessions on tariffs identified by 
conglomerates. These areas were identified by foreign conglomerates themselves in 
line with their own regional specialization plans (Niyomsilpa 2008: 77-81). On the 
positive side of the ledger, the relatively strong governance capabilities Thailand 
displayed in engaging in policy dialogue with foreign conglomerates (who also 
rapidly learnt how to operate through political patrons), and its ability to deliver on 
agreements on trade and investment policy meant that Thailand was an important 
beneficiary of the regional specialization strategy of global production conglomerates, 
especially Japanese ones. On the negative side, Thailand lost almost all policy 
autonomy in terms of the second type of national technological capability 
development strategy.  
 
Does it matter? This is a vastly important question not just for Thailand but for poorer 
countries developing with similarly weak growth-enhancing governance capabilities. 
On the one hand, Thailand’s quick responses in promoting the third strategy of rent 
management enabled it to attract a significant amount of FDI in the aftermath of a 
financial meltdown. Even though profit repatriation significantly reduces national 
value added, substantial domestic value addition took place through employment and 
the development of domestic supplier capabilities, even if in lower value-adding 
second and third tier supplier positions. On the other hand, it is important to 
remember that Thailand attracted Japanese multinationals as a location for automotive 
and electronics production because of more than two decades of domestic capacity 
building using rent strategies for domestic technological capability building. It is not 
clear where the next pockets of domestic capabilities are going to come from to attract 
the next wave of multinational investment. This is a particularly important question 
for poorer developing countries who are abandoning domestic capacity building at a 
much earlier stage than Thailand. The consequence may be to attract multinational 
resource extraction and basic assembly companies but not much else. 
 
Table 5 tells us that post-1997 Thailand enjoyed slower labour productivity growth in 
manufacturing despite the growth in exports in higher technology manufacturing 
products like electronics and automobiles. Manufacturing also apparently enjoyed 
much higher TFP growth compared to the pre-1997 boom period. This TFP figure can 
make sense if we remember that significant investments had been made in the pre-
1997 period in large-scale production facilities such as for automobiles and 
electronics but scale economies were only achieved in the post-1997 period with the 
expansion in output and exports. This could explain the higher productivity growth in 
the manufacturing sector as a whole, given the significance of these growth sectors. 
But the lower labour productivity growth is consistent with a lower rate of growth of 
investments in the second period in the manufacturing sector as a whole and the 
slower expansion of the manufacturing sector as a result. Given the limited number of 
sub-sectors within manufacturing where Thailand would be globally attractive for 
multinationals, it is understandable why the earlier rate of growth of manufacturing 
may be difficult to sustain in a new policy regime where sub-sectors have to be 
attractive ex ante for global conglomerates.  
 
Japanese industrial policy economists point out that the strategies that Japan and 
South Korea used to develop capabilities are no longer available to next tier countries 
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because of the restrictions set by the WTO and FTAs (Ohno 2006). The abandonment 
of all variants of the second type of growth strategy outlined in Figure 12 may be too 
premature. The challenges that many developing countries are likely to face in the 
coming years may make it imperative of re-visit the operation of the WTO and of 
FTAs that many developing countries have signed up to. Indeed apart from these 
internationally negotiated constraints there are possibly more important internal 
constraints that prevented Thailand and many other countries from effectively 
implementing technology upgrading strategies in the past. These too need to be 
examined and strategies of the second type need to be devised, even in limited forms, 
that are likely to work in particular political contexts.  
 
If these constraints cannot be overcome as many presume, then the only way in which 
a catching-up country can attract further technology transfer from multinational 
conglomerates is to provide non-specific implicit rents to any sector a multinational is 
interested in investing in. Once tariffs and taxes have been bid down, the only way to 
attract multinational investors from other countries competing for the same 
investments is through public investments in infrastructure and in the education of the 
workforce. These types of strategies are of course supported by the investment 
climate approach of the World Bank, but they also follow logically from a rents 
approach to technology development if we believe that the third type of policy 
approach (in Figure 12) is the only one available to developing countries. The hope 
then would be to use public investments in skills development and public goods to 
attract multinationals in particular sectors and thereby achieve significant economies 
of scale and clustering economies in these sectors. If successful, such a strategy would 
tie in particular stages of production to particular countries as part of the global 
production processes of multinationals. Eventually this may encourage multinationals 
to outsource more and more of their production processes to local producers.  
 
But as Ohno (2006) points out, even the two most advanced South East Asian 
countries, Malaysia and Thailand, have not graduated to the stage where domestic 
producers are developing their own design and production capabilities based on 
outsourcing by multinationals. The prospects of lower level developers to make it 
there are even bleaker given that their initial endowments of already achieved pockets 
of technological capability are significantly less developed than that of Malaysia and 
Thailand. The constraints faced by countries like Thailand in making the third 
strategy work better are not difficult to understand. The public investments in 
education that may make multinationals locate significant parts of their design and 
high value-adding production processes in countries like Thailand are difficult to 
achieve in the short run. In any case, many of the skills are of the learning-by-doing 
types that are difficult to impart in classrooms and design institutes. Developing 
countries following this strategy may then be in a catch-22 situation. Under this 
strategy, local production capabilities will only move up if the multinational moves up 
the value chain in its local production, allowing domestic producers to move into the 
spaces vacated. But the multinational will only move up if domestic producers can fill 
the gaps and local skills and management capabilities are available for the more 
difficult production and design processes. And these are unlikely to develop locally 
without learning-by-doing being organized for domestic capital.  
 
An important political consequence of the type of strategy that Thailand has pursued 
since 1997 is the emergence of political populism and anti-foreign feelings. Thailand 
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is one of the few countries in the developing world that was not colonized and 
therefore has had a better than average relationship with more advanced countries. 
But even here, the aftermath of the 1997 crisis and the failure of the Thai state to 
protect domestic capital resulted in a significant political backlash and the growth of 
political populism (Chaiwat and Phongpaichit 2008). Unfortunately for Thailand, the 
Thai Rak Thai party and its leader Thaksin Shinawatra did not use their massive 
popular mandate to evolve a different growth strategy for Thailand. Instead, Thaksin 
took the easy road and used his political power to carry out more selloffs of Thai 
assets, including a number for his personal benefit. The sale of his stake in Thailand’s 
biggest mobile phone provider AIS (Advanced Info Services) to Temasek of 
Singapore in 2006 involved using his executive power to change the remaining 
ownership restrictions in the service sector to enable the sale to take place, and further 
changing tax laws at the last minute to relieve his family of capital gains tax 
(Pathmanand and Baker 2008). This was the beginning of the end for Thaksin, but the 
forces unleashed after 1997 led Thailand to the brink of political chaos. This too has 
significance for other countries travelling the same road. 
 
As the most advanced economy in our sample, Thailand has faced challenges and 
choices about national technological capability development that are soon likely to 
affect some of our other catching-up economies. The debate about the importance of 
national capability development and the alternative of relying on foreign-owned 
companies for employment generation is one that is likely to be replayed in many 
catching-up countries in the near future. The shift in Thailand away from national 
capability development to technology acquisition by making the country attractive for 
FDI may have been initially driven by the low incentives of domestic capital to 
engage in serious technology upgrading and the politicization of the rent allocation 
process. But once the policy shift had taken place, the space for policy interventions 
to develop domestic technological capability became even narrower. Serious 
questions remain about some of the economic and political implications of relying so 
greatly on the profitability calculations and commitment of foreign technology 
providers. The implications of this strategy for technological upgrading in developing 
countries will be discussed in greater detail in a later paper.  
 
6. South Asia: Background to the growth acceleration of the 1980s  
The growth experiences of Maharashtra, West Bengal and Bangladesh in the 1980s 
illustrate important differences in the responses of different parts of South Asia to the 
challenges of more open economies. But all these economies also have some relevant 
similarities which it is useful to discuss before treating each economy separately.  
 
Overview 
All three South Asian economies experienced growth accelerations in the context of 
the general acceleration in South Asian growth in the 1980s. The scale of this 
acceleration is shown in Table 6.  
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Table 6 The South Asian Growth Acceleration in the 1980s 
Growth Rates % India Pakistan Bangladesh
GDP
1960-80 3.5 5.5 1.7
1980-90 5.6 6.1 3.6
1990-00 5.8 3.7 4.7
2000-05 6.7 4.9 5.3
1960-80 1.2 2.6 -0.8
1980-90 3.4 3.5 1.2
1990-00 4.0 1.2 2.6
2000-05 5.2 2.4 3.3
Per Capita GDP
 
                Source: Based on data from World Bank (2008) 
 
In India and Bangladesh the acceleration in GDP growth rates and per capita GDP 
growth rates was around 2% per annum in the 1980s compared to the two decades 
from 1960-80. In Pakistan, the acceleration was somewhat less significant at around 
1% in per capita terms and 0.5% in GDP growth rates. In Bangladesh and India, both 
GDP and per capita GDP growth rates creep up over the 1990s and beyond. In 
Pakistan the acceleration collapses in the 1990s partly because its economy was 
exposed to shocks from the worsening situation in Afghanistan. Growth begins to 
recover in Pakistan in the 2000s but faced new challenges in 2007-08 in the context of 
a difficult transition to democracy and a global financial crisis. 
 
If we exclude Pakistan’s performance in the 1990s and focus on the 1980s, it is clear 
that all South Asian countries enjoyed accelerations in their growth rates at about the 
same time. In the intense analytical and policy debate about the factors that triggered 
India’s growth acceleration, the comparative regional data is often ignored. Looking 
at the region forces us to look for explanatory factors that could explain a 
simultaneous acceleration in the three South Asian countries given that the content 
and sequencing of their gradual moves towards liberalization were very different. At a 
general level there is little doubt that growth in South Asia accelerated at a time when 
the industrial policy structures that had been established in the post-colonial period in 
these countries were collapsing. The conventional explanation of the growth takeoff 
has come almost exclusively from economists looking at India, and has therefore 
focused largely on the liberalization that began there in the 1980s (Acharya, et al. 
2003; Panagariya 2004; Virmani 2004a; Rodrik and Subramanian 2005).  
 
However, it is important to remember that this was not the first time in history that 
South Asia had adopted liberal market policies. Like Thailand and most other 
developing countries, India had suffered under colonial free trade policies with low 
growth, particularly in industry and the modern sector. The post-colonial strategies in 
all of the newly independent South Asian countries were therefore heavily influenced 
by implicit notions of market failures constraining development in poor countries. 
Both India and Pakistan (Bangladesh became an independent country in 1971) 
adopted different variants of domestic capacity building strategies. While South Asian 
catching-up strategies had not been as successful as those in East Asia, our argument 
is that the growth takeoffs across South Asia in the 1980s cannot be understood 
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without taking account of the limited and patchy but critically important technological 
and entrepreneurial capabilities that were developed through these strategies in the 
three decades prior to 1980. Moreover, the role of the state in mediating accumulation 
and primitive accumulation, in providing formal and informal incentives to accelerate 
investment were developed over this period. Many of the formal structures of 
intervention became impossible to implement by the 1980s across these countries, 
largely because of the growing fragmentation of politics. This allowed sectors and 
regions that had already developed capabilities to break free and drive growth by 
finding niches where their already developed capabilities had global competitiveness. 
This happened at around the same time across South Asia.  
 
This perspective helps us to develop an analysis of growth vulnerabilities and 
governance challenges in these economies that is significantly different from that 
coming from conventional analysts whose focus is largely on how to deepen 
liberalization. In particular, we will argue that the South Asian economies have very 
limited formal institutional and governance capabilities for developing new 
capabilities outside the sectoral and regional pockets where they have already 
emerged. This has resulted in unbalanced growth in terms of regional distribution, 
income distribution and sectoral specialization of growth sectors. This poses serious 
challenges for extending South Asian growth to the wider excluded population who 
no longer benefit from any specific, even partially effective strategies of capacity 
building and entrepreneurial support which are possibly the only mechanisms for 
ensuring the accelerated creation of broad-based national productive sectors. But we 
will also see that a variety of political and governance responses have emerged in the 
three South Asian economies we will look, with different strengths and weaknesses. 
An extension of this approach to other South Asian economies will further enrich 
these insights, and subsequent papers will place these responses in the context of a 
more general analysis of responses to market failures in second tier growth 
economies. 
 
The First Liberalization: growth with limited capabilities under colonialism 
It is important to understand exactly why the limited liberalization that happened in 
the 1980s and 1990s has such radically different effects compared to the liberalization 
that was forced by colonial rule. The difference in performance of the Indian 
subcontinent in the two periods is a dramatic illustration of the fact that free markets 
are not likely to magically help an economy if that economy has nothing to sell and 
the productivity gap is so vast that even a significant wage gap does not help. This is 
likely to be true in general for most underdeveloped areas even today. As we have 
discussed, significant market failures can prevent capability development solely 
through private initiatives and long-term private investments seeking to capture 
significant profits in the future by investing in capability development.  
 
In the late nineteenth century, British colonial rule introduced virtual free markets for 
India (consisting then of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). This meant the integration 
of India into global markets with almost no tariff protection for its domestic 
industries. In addition, British rule guaranteed the property rights of British 
metropolitan investors in India. Yet, despite free trade, low Indian wages, the 
effective protection of the property rights of British investors and the possibility of 
full repatriation of profits and capital, industrial investment in India from Britain 
remained very limited. Most foreign investment over this period was financed by the 
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reinvestment of trading and other profits made in India (Ray 1979: 14; Rodrik and 
Subramanian 2005). British investment in industry was almost entirely concentrated 
in the jute industry where India had a global monopoly rather than in areas where 
competitiveness had to be achieved through investment in technology and the 
upgrading of labour productivity. As in Thailand, free trade did not result in the 
emergence of domestic production capabilities. From 1860 to 1945, India’s per capita 
income grew at a derisory 0.5% per annum (Hicks, et al. 1989: 217). 
 
Indian merchant capital (dominated by the Marwari and Parsi communities) initially 
focused on trade and stayed away from industry. When the American Civil War 
disrupted supplies of cotton textiles in the late nineteenth century a cotton textile 
industry developed around Bombay (Ray 1979: 4). But by 1911, the industrial census 
recorded that there were only 7000 units throughout British India that employed more 
than 20 workers each, and more than a third of these did not use any mechanical 
power (Gadgil 1944: 121). A few major developments did of course take place. The 
giant Tata iron and steel plant at Jamshedpur was established and began production in 
1911, without any tariff protection, but not without critical government support that 
enabled production to commence. Given the global reach of the Tata conglomerate 
today, with stakes in iron and steel production, in the automotive sector and in 
software, it is interesting to recall how this Indian giant emerged to set up its first steel 
plant. In a context where there was no formal support to Indian capital, Tata’s 
relationship with the British Raj was an early example of how the political access of 
advanced sections of Indian capital even with a colonial state could sometimes (with a 
bit of luck in the shape of the First World War) result in industrial development.  
 
During the planning and construction phases, TISCO (the Tata Iron and Steel 
Company) received extensive government support in the form of geological surveys, 
reduced transport costs, access to land and water rights, simplified import 
arrangements for construction materials and an agreement that the government would 
buy 20,000 tons of steel rails annually for ten years at the landed import price (Morris 
1983: 589). Even so, Tata faced crippling financial costs while setting up and learning 
to produce in Jamshedpur. But Tata’s diplomatic and cooperative attitude to the 
government, and the needs of the colonial government during World War I eventually 
helped Tata develop into a giant (Ray 1979: 27). As Rothermund (2000: 55-6) points 
out, if it had not been for the war, the visionary strategy of Jamshedji Tata would 
probably have ended in failure and the man may well have been remembered as a 
reckless gambler. Tata was in many ways unique for this period in entering a 
relatively technologically advanced sector on the basis of a personal vision (but one 
that almost did not pay off despite critical government support). For the period as a 
whole, Bagchi (1972) provides estimates of private industrial investment in India 
from 1900-39 which show steady but not spectacular investment over this period, 
with little evidence of any acceleration. 
 
However, the state assistance that TISCO received was quite exceptional. This 
support (and the exceptional entrepreneurial and risk taking capacities of Jamshedji 
Tata) allowed Tata to establish itself in manufacturing in a context of significant 
market failures, high transaction costs and high risks facing initial investors. 
Industrialization was not one of the objectives of the early raj. Tariffs which had been 
allowed by British administrations in Canada, Australia and South Africa, and which 
played a crucial role in the development of industry in those countries, were expressly 
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disallowed in India on the grounds of the ‘Open Door’ policy. In the 1880s Indian 
customs revenues were only 2.2 per cent of the trade turnover, compared to 21 per 
cent for Brazil at the same period (Maddison 1971: 57). However, from the early 
twentieth century onwards, and particularly after the First World War and the growing 
penetration of India by Japanese textiles, the pressures of expatriate British capitalist 
interests in India finally began to succeed in getting the state to support industry. 
Some assistance to Indian industry eventually came in the form of tariffs, state 
purchase contracts, preferential infrastructure provision and interventions in 
commodity and labour markets, without which Indian industry had no chance of 
taking off (Bagchi 1972: 420-43). Under growing pressure from Indian capitalists, by 
1925, the average level of tariffs rose to around 14 per cent from a pre-war level of 5 
per cent (Maddison 1971: 57). 
 
How should we assess the performance of India under British free market policies? It 
is unfair to compare growth in the early part of the twentieth century with growth 
today because compared to the late twentieth century the earlier period was one of 
relatively slow growth in the world economy. The appropriate comparison of India’s 
performance is therefore with other contemporary developing countries. The most 
obvious comparator is Japan, which entered manufacturing at around the same time as 
India, but with much stronger government support for industry following the Meiji 
reforms. A comparison with contemporary Japan shows that the real weakness in 
India’s industrialization was not so much the aggregate investment or growth in this 
early period, but how sustainable it was in terms of meeting Japanese competition and 
later the competition from other emerging competitors. Effectively, the sustainability 
of growth depends on investing in technologies that have the potential of achieving 
high rates of productivity growth, and then succeeding in actually raising productivity 
using these technologies. Here, comparative studies on the performance of Indian and 
Japanese cotton textiles show that while in 1906 India supplied three-quarters of the 
Chinese yarn market, by 1914 Japan had grabbed the biggest share, and in another ten 
years had reduced India’s share of the Chinese market to under a quarter (Koh 1966: 
148). This devastating defeat in the single major Indian-owned manufacturing sector 
had far-reaching consequences for India’s subsequent industrial development.  
 
Thus, despite a few lasting success stories, the overall effect of free market policies 
imposed on India induced it to become in the main a provider of raw materials to the 
empire and a market for British manufactured products. India’s growth rates stayed 
well behind that of advanced countries resulting in divergence, meaning that the gap 
between Indian per capita incomes and those of advanced countries increased over 
this period. In 1873 India’s per capita income was around 25% of US per capita 
income at that time. By 1947, the very low growth rates in India had widened the gap 
and India’s per capita income was less than 10% of the US level (Clark and Wolcott 
2002: Figure 1). 
 
Capability development with dirigiste policies 1947-1980 
The economic history of the Indian subcontinent in the period of planning and 
industrial policies has been relatively well trawled in the literature. The ‘license raj’ 
has been extensively blamed for India’s ‘hindu rate of growth’ which Virmani 
graciously reclassifies as India’s socialist rate of growth (Virmani 2004a). But in fact 
if we look at the subcontinent as a whole over this period, both ‘socialist’ India and 
the ‘pro-capitalist’ Pakistan adopted very similar strategies of protecting domestic 
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industries and attempting to build up domestic technological capabilities. Their policy 
choices can be easily understood if we remember the dismal experience with 
industrial growth and development under the colonial free trade regime.  
 
Both countries achieved much better results in growth and industrialization in the two 
decades after independence than they ever had under colonial rule. In both cases a 
variety of instruments were used to provide implicit subsidies to enable the setting up 
of new firms and industries. But South Asian political economy prevented the degree 
of discipline in the management of implicit subsidies that would have allowed these 
ambitious strategies to deliver the types of results observed in North East Asia. 
Nevertheless, new technological capabilities, new capitalists and new entrepreneurs 
were created who could lead the growth accelerations observed across the Indian 
subcontinent from the 1980s onwards.  
 
Table 7 Dirigiste Growth in India  
 1901-30 1931-47 1952-67 1968-81 1982-91 1992-2001 
Agriculture  0.5 0.2 1.8 3.3 3.5 2.7 
Industry  0.9 1.2 6.3 4.1 7.1 5.7 
Services  1.6 1.7 4.8 4.3 6.8 7.6 
GDP 0.8 0.8 3.4 3.8 5.6 5.6 
Per capita GDP 0.4 -0.5 1.4 1.5 3.4 3.5 
Source: Acharya et al. (2003) Table 2.1.  
 
Table 7 shows the growth acceleration in India with the new policies that addressed 
some of the market failures that had constrained growth earlier. The growth of GDP 
was around 3 per cent higher in the three decades after independence compared to the 
previous fifty years. The jump in the growth rate of industry was even more marked. 
A very similar growth takeoff happened in Pakistan (including Bangladesh as East 
Pakistan) in the decades following independence using policies that were quite 
similar. We do not have separate figures for the growth rates of the parts of India that 
became Pakistan, so we can only compare Pakistan’s performance with the aggregate 
Indian one. Table 8 for Pakistan breaks down the 1950 to 1965 period into smaller 
segments and shows that the growth acceleration happened gradually in Pakistan. The 
acceleration in the growth of industry was however immediate. Table 6 also shows 
that for 1960-80 as a whole, Pakistan’s growth rate had outstripped India’s.  
 
Table 8 Dirigiste Growth in Pakistan (including Bangladesh)  
 1950-55 1955-60 1960-65 
Agriculture  1.3 1.4 3.5 
Industry  9.7 6.4 11.9 
Services  2.5 2.7 5.5 
GNP 2.6 2.4 5.3 
GNP per capita  0.2 0.0 2.7 
                     Source: Lewis (1969): Table 1. 
 
Protection and subsidies proved to be extremely effective in driving investment in 
sectors that had previously been neglected. Import substitution as a method of 
developing new capabilities was initially extremely successful in both India and 
Pakistan. Table 9 shows the dramatic growth of production in sectors like machine 
tools and chemicals. In Pakistan, the diversification was even more dramatic because 
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there was virtually no industry in the Indian territories that became Pakistan in 1947 
(Lewis and Soligo 1965; Papanek 1967; Lewis 1969). 
 
Table 9 Rapid Import Substitution in 1950s India 
(Percentage of domestic market supplied by imports) 1951 1971 
Iron and Steel 25 13 
Aluminium 73 4 
Sugar Machinery  100 1 
Machine Tools 90 30 
Sewing Machines  41 <1  
Bicycles 65 <1 
Nitro-Fertilizers 84 37 
          Source: Datt and Sundharam (1991: 339) 
 
In India, the Dutt Committee reported in 1969 that in terms of licenses awarded, the 
top 73 industrial houses accounted for 56% of the total proposed private corporate 
sector investment in machinery and 60% of its investment in capital goods (which 
includes buildings etc) (Datt and Sundharam 1991: 142). Despite the concentration of 
much of the implicit subsidies for learning in industry to a relatively small group of 
players, we also know that the management of these subsidies was poor. Subsidy 
withdrawal from underperforming industries and firms virtually never happened and 
that therefore productivity growth in the emerging new sectors was therefore going to 
be low (Kohli 1994; Khan 1999; Chibber 2003). Labour productivity and TFP growth 
rates in the 1960s and 1970s in India and Pakistan were indeed low (Khan 1989; I. J. 
Ahluwalia 1991; Bosworth, et al. 2007). When investment, particularly in new sectors 
and technologies is assisted through protection and subsidies, there is an allocative 
efficiency loss but the strategy can be justified if there is a productivity gain in the 
new sectors over time. If this dynamic gain is low, then the overall productivity gain 
for the economy may be low or even negative, even if firms are being set up in new 
areas and new technological capabilities are being acquired. Something like that 
seems to have been happening in South Asia in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
The Second Liberalization: capability-led growth acceleration 1980 onwards 
There has been an extensive debate in India about the causes of the growth 
acceleration around 1980. The problem was that the formal removal of rent-creating 
restrictions in the economy did not attain any significance till the 1990s, while the 
growth acceleration clearly occurred a decade earlier. To make sense of this puzzle, 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2004; 2005) argue that the reforms of the 1980s that 
triggered growth were pro-business rather than pro-market reforms, essentially 
signalling a shift in government attitude rather than a shift in policy. This attitudinal 
shift was apparently significant enough to unleash the animal spirits of investors, and 
their investment drive spurred the growth acceleration. In contrast, the mainstream 
consensus is that the acceleration in the 1980s actually began in earnest towards the 
end of the decade, that there was already some liberalization by that time, and that the 
growth spurt of the 1980s would not have been sustained without the deeper 
liberalization of the 1990s (Panagariya 2004, 2005; Virmani 2005; Kochchar, et al. 
2006; Rajan 2006; S. Ahmed and Varshney 2008).  
 
This debate misses or at least downplays some important aspects of the growth 
takeoff. The dynamics of what happened in the 1980s cannot be captured without 
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looking at some broader aspects of the political economy in which these changes were 
taking place. If we look across South Asia in the 1980s, governments began making 
pro-business and pro-market comments not just in India, but in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh too. In all these countries at about the same time there were similar 
hesitant movements towards liberalization and (unlike India) towards some 
privatizations as well. These moves were driven by a number of factors.  
 
First, the politics of clientelism had reached an impasse in all three countries by the 
mid-1970s. The growth in the numbers of clientelist factions and the strength of the 
redistributive demands coming from ever newer sections of the intermediate classes 
resulted in attempts at control using authoritarian populism that rapidly failed in all 
three countries. In India, Indira Gandhi’s Emergency of 1975-77 resulted in her 
surprise election defeat and the gradual transition towards weak coalition 
governments at the centre, a feature of Indian politics that is steadily deepening even 
today. In Bangladesh Mujibur Rahman tried to establish a populist authoritarianism 
by setting up a one-party state in 1975. His attempt was strongly resisted by many 
factions including some within his dominant party. These dissensions were the 
background to Mujib’s assassination by army officers many of whom had been 
freedom fighters. The country then witnessed a series of weak military governments 
and military-civilian governments till a transition to a weak and fractious democracy 
in 2000. In Pakistan similar events were unfolding with Bhutto’s attempts to stay in 
power with increasingly dictatorial methods, leading to his deposition by the army in 
1977. Here too, there was a brief interlude of a military government till 1988, which 
though relatively stronger than in Bangladesh was even less interested in maintaining 
the old system of control over the economy.  
 
The failure of all attempts to construct authoritarian populist regimes in South Asia in 
the mid-seventies marked the end of attempts by central governments to manage rent 
allocations in any systematic way. ‘Liberalization’ was less a series of policy 
measures and more the reflection of a change in the political settlement that ruled out 
focused rent allocation by the centre to emerging productive sectors. This transition 
did not mean the end of redistributive rent creation. On the contrary, the mobilization 
and competition over redistributive rents has steadily increased over time, resulting in 
a gradual increase in the intensity of political conflicts, political corruption and 
political violence across all these countries. The eventual announcements of 
liberalization, for instance about removing licensing requirements was in most cases a 
formal recognition of a reality where licensing had long since stopped being 
implementable. Hence it is not surprising that many of the effects of liberalization 
were observable long before the formal announcements, though the formal 
announcements did have additional effects in accelerating what was already 
happening.  
 
Secondly, the effects of the collapse of the politics that allowed even the limited 
attempts at centralized rent allocations would not have had any necessary positive 
effects if significant pockets of productive capabilities had not already emerged in all 
these countries. This was the significant difference of this round of ‘liberalization’ 
compared to the experience under colonial free trade. The importance of the 
capabilities created by the pre-1980 industrial policy regime and the subsequent 
performance of the Indian economy has been frequently recognized (Aghion, et al. 
2005; Rodrik and Subramanian 2005; Kochchar, et al. 2006). However, the 
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implications of the previous strategies of capacity development are often 
underestimated. It is clear that there is a strong relationship between the rent 
allocation strategies that created these pockets of capabilities and the success of the 
liberalization that followed. But if this is true, there are important implications for 
sustaining the growth that has been achieved over the last two decades and ensuring 
that this growth creates jobs for broader sections of the population and spreads to 
regions that have so far not participated in this growth. These implications will be 
further examined in our subsequent sections on Maharashtra and West Bengal.  
 
It is relevant that while the dominant entrepreneurs in every South Asian country had 
in the 1950s wanted protection and subsidies, by the 1970s, new classes of 
entrepreneurs had emerged who had accumulated enough and achieved sufficient 
productive capabilities to find the continuation of protection unnecessary and onerous. 
The regulatory structures were particularly onerous for productive entrepreneurs 
given the growing fragmentation of political clientelism in these countries and 
therefore the capture of more and more rents by all manner of unproductive coalitions. 
Thus, by the 1980s there were powerful coalitions of new capitalists in all these 
countries but particularly in India who were not only already operating outside the 
formal structures of rent creation that they no longer needed, but also felt positively 
hemmed in by rent-creating regulations that had become dysfunctional for them (Das 
Gupta 2007).  
 
By incorporating these two underlying factors it is possible to make more sense both 
of the strengths of the takeoffs that happened in South Asian countries as well as the 
vulnerabilities that their specific growth paths faced. We can explain why the sectors 
driving growth and the relative success of the post-‘liberalization’ growth strategies 
have been very different across different parts of the Indian subcontinent and even 
within India. The specializations of regions after liberalization have been very 
strongly related to the prior development of technological and entrepreneurial 
capabilities and not very strongly related to the distribution of factor endowments as 
economic theory may have led us to expect.  
 
A number of features that we can observe in the growth stories in South Asia are 
consistent with an approach that focuses on the prior development of capabilities as a 
critical explanatory variable for the subsequent growth experience of the region. First, 
there are significant differences in growth rates across regions within the subcontinent 
and these differentials are widening, rapidly increasing the gap between richer and 
poorer regions and states. This is consistent with a capability approach because the 
development of capabilities in the period prior to liberalization was itself patchy and 
regionally concentrated. Governance capabilities in South Asia for growth-enhancing 
corrections to market failures were weak from the outset. Even before the 
liberalization of the 1980s, the biggest beneficiaries of rent-creation strategies to assist 
investment and capacity development were firms and entrepreneurs who had 
favourable political connections, were located in areas where the state was investing 
for political or accidental reasons, or who could leverage prior capabilities and capital.  
 
The link between capabilities and the regional and sectoral pattern of growth is 
however complex, and will be developed in a later paper. Corporate conglomerates in 
India can obviously choose where they locate, particularly after the de-licensing of 
locational decisions. But the range of corporate capabilities and the labour skills they 
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can draw on are limited. Therefore, with deregulation there was a considerable 
amount of relocation by corporates, typically favouring some southern and western 
states in India, but this was at the expense of the regions the corporates moved out of 
or did not invest in. Many observers of this relocation (Besley and Burgess 2004; 
Aghion, et al. 2006) concluded that this was evidence of the importance of labour 
market regulations constraining manufacturing growth in India because the winners 
from deregulation were states with lower levels of protection for labour. Even if this 
observation is true, the small differences in labour costs could result in some amount 
of relocation that would temporarily help less industrially developed states that have 
almost the same levels of labour productivity and skills as the more developed ones. 
But a general weakening of labour protection and indeed a lowering of wages would 
not thereby necessarily result in an acceleration of productivity growth. And even 
without labour market protections, existing entrepreneurial and technological 
capabilities would not relocate to the really backward parts of the country where they 
were most needed.  
 
Secondly, a capabilities approach can explain the sectoral distribution of growth based 
on prior capabilities that were acquired in the past. The emerging specializations in 
these countries have less to do with factor endowments and the efficient choice of 
technologies by markets. For instance, the importance of high value-adding services 
in India’s growth story is well known. The skills underpinning India’s excellent 
performance in global services were a by product of previous expenditures in 
technical education that were closely related to the broader context of technology and 
capability acquisition. Thus India’s most dramatic success story could be said to be 
the direct result of ‘defective’ policies (Basu 2003), which created globally 
competitive capabilities in specific sectors. These defective policies included 
overinvesting in higher education and closing the economy to IBM and other 
multinationals in 1977, which allowed the development of skills in a public sector 
replacement to IBM. This public sector company, CMC, became an incubator of skills 
that later fed India’s software sector.  
 
If growth in populous South Asian countries is driven by specific manufacturing and 
service sectors that one way or another had already achieved international 
competitiveness, this has important implications for the regional and sectoral spread 
of growth. We shall see that many of the most important beneficiaries of market-
driven growth have been entrepreneurs and their employees who had already achieved 
competitiveness for accidental historical reasons specific to their sectors and 
economies. As a result, the sectors that were driving growth were specific to 
particular countries and regions, and competitive sectors were also regionally 
concentrated. Not surprisingly, one of the features of this growth spurt across South 
Asia has been the rapid worsening of income distribution as growth accelerated, 
suggesting that growth was largely being driven by a relatively small number of 
individuals, regions and sectors that had the capability to benefit from market 
opportunities (ADB 2007a: 49-59). These sectors greatly increased their incomes, 
leaving the rest rapidly behind. 
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Table 10 South Asian Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Product 1980-2003 
 1980-90 1990-2000 2000-03 
India Average  5.6 5.6 6.0 
Rich Indian States  5.7 5.8 5.9 
Poor Indian States 5.1 3.8 3.6 
Maharashtra  6.0 5.8 6.7 
West Bengal  4.3 6.7 7.1 
Bangladesh  3.6 4.7 4.8 
Pakistan  6.1 3.7 3.3 
Source: EPW Research Foundation (2003; 2007), Ahmed and Varshney (2008: Table 3) 
Note: Rich Indian states in this table are Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra and Punjab. Poor 
Indian states are Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Group growth rates for 
each period are weighed averages of state growth rates using state domestic products as weights. 
 
A striking demonstration of this is the gap between rich and poor states in India. Table 
10 shows the growth rates of GDP for South Asia since 1980. The group of poor 
Indian states have significantly underperformed compared to both the average Indian 
growth rate and that of the rich Indian states. In the 1990s and beyond, the poor Indian 
states performed worse than Bangladesh and only slightly better than Pakistan which 
was going through serious political crises. Table 10 also shows the performance of 
Maharashtra and West Bengal, the two high-growth Indian economies that we will 
look at in subsequent sections.  
 
Table 11 Divergence in South Asia 2000-2004 
Growth of Per Capita Income 
Country  1980–90 1990–2000 2000–2004 
Per capita 
income in US$ 
2004/05 
India National 
Average  3.3 4.1 4.4 653 
Rich Indian States 3.6 4.8 4.5 688 
Poor Indian states  2.6 1.8 1.8 280 
Bangladesh  2.2 2.7 3.7 436 
Sri Lanka  2.6 4.2 2.3 1031 
Pakistan  3.7 1.2 2.2 661 
Source: Purfield (2006: Table 2), ADB (2007a), (EPW Research Foundation 2003). Directorates of 
Economics and Statistics of Indian state governments, World Bank World Development Indicators.  
Note: Rich Indian states in this table are Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra and Punjab. Poor 
Indian states are Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Indian data for first two 
periods are of 1981-91 and 1991-2001. Grouped per capita incomes are population weighted. The 
national per capita income for India reported by ADB and the World Bank appears to be somewhat 
greater than would be consistent with figures for state per capita incomes from state governments. 
 
Clearly the gap between rich and poor states is rapidly growing, in contrast to the 
expectation that market driven growth should equalize incomes across an integrated 
economic territory through the free movement of labour and capital. Studies of 
growth rates in rich versus poor states in India show that the divergence in their per 
capita incomes is steadily increasing (Sachs, et al. 2002). In 1970, the richest state in 
India had a per capita income around 3.4 times that of the poorest state. By 2004 this 
ratio had grown to 4.5 and is growing all the time (Purfield 2006: 5). As Purfield 
(2006: 9) points out, India’s five poorest states account for 40 per cent of its 
population, while the five richest states are home to only a quarter of its population. If 
current trends in economic growth continue, as they are likely to in the absence of 
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radically different economic strategies, political strains are likely to emerge between 
richer and poorer states over economic strategies, redistributive strategies, the use of 
tax revenues, and migration. 
 
Table 11 shows available data on per capita incomes and growth rates. This data is 
consistent with the data on aggregate GDP, showing that in the 1990s the dispersion 
of growth rates of per capita incomes within India was greater than the dispersion 
observed between the major countries of South Asia. It is important to remember that 
many low growth states within India like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are the size of 
countries in their own right. Bangladesh, which is often considered to be a relatively 
poorly performing part of South Asia, was performing considerably better than some 
of the largest Indian states not only in terms of the level of per capita income but also 
in terms of the growth of per capita income in the 1990s and beyond. 
 
The rapid growth in the gap between rich and poor states within India is also shown 
graphically in Figure 13 for the 14 biggest states of India. The Gini coefficient is a 
measure of the degree of inequality in their per capita incomes. A higher value 
indicates more inequality. The figure shows graphically that the rapid growth in 
inequality appears to have begun in the 1980s at around the same time as the growth 
takeoff. These observations have policy significance from the perspective of current 
discussions about the types of economic integration that are appropriate for SAARC 
countries. Clearly being part of an integrated Indian union with ‘free trade’ as well as 
formally unrestricted movement of labour did not ensure that high growth rates were 
spread evenly. Moreover, factor mobility and market forces did not ensure that these 
growth rates got equalized over time through the movement of labour and capital 
between states. If anything, Table 10 suggests that the gap in the growth rates between 
rich and poor Indian states has been widening over the 1990s.  
 
 
Figure 13 Degree of Interstate Inequality in India (14 Major States) 
Source: ADB (2007a: Table 5.4) based on Ahluwalia (2000: Table 3). 
 
The most serious implication of a capability driven approach to the analysis of growth 
is that it points out that for all its weaknesses some basic technological and 
entrepreneurial capabilities were developed during the dirigiste period. But these 
capabilities were developed in pockets and the number of beneficiaries given the size 
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of the population was miniscule. After liberalization these entrepreneurs have driven 
growth, drawing on pools of skills and capabilities in the labour market that were also 
the inherited human capital from the past. However, liberalization did not result in the 
removal of all the relevant market failures. The entrepreneurs and regions driving 
growth had to develop new and evolving arrangements with politicians, bureaucrats 
and themselves to continue to address the market failures that affected them. The 
patterns of growth that ensued can be better understood by looking for these new and 
evolving arrangements and their implications.  
 
The fact that liberalization could not by itself remove potentially significant market 
failures that could slow down the acquisition and development of new skills has at 
least two types of implications. First, we would expect the ensuing growth to be 
driven by capabilities already developed, and therefore to be concentrated in regions, 
sectors and heavily dependent on high levels of human capital that relatively small 
sections of the population possess. But secondly, we would expect to see new and 
evolving strategies through which different pockets of growth deal with market 
failures. As a result, we would expect to see significant learning and skill 
development to be continuing within some of these pockets, particularly in firms with 
high technological capabilities and in firms with foreign technology partnerships. But 
we would expect the nature of this technology enhancement to benefit those who had 
already reached minimal levels of competitiveness and to be sensitive to the 
continuing resolution of market failures through a variety of formal but now 
increasingly informal mechanisms.  
 
The implications of both sets of consequences are consistent with the observation that 
large sections of the population may have very slow benefits trickling down to them 
despite very high growth rates at an aggregate level. This proposition is supported by 
estimates for the persistence of poverty across the Indian subcontinent, even though 
absolute poverty may be declining through different trickle down mechanisms. The 
Arjun Sengupta Commission Report (National Commission for Enterprises in the 
Unorganized Sector 2007) outlined what researchers like Barbara Harriss-White 
(2003) had been saying for some time, namely that the informal/unorganized sector 
accounted for something like 92% of the Indian workforce. The commission also 
estimated that 77% of India’s workforce had a per capita daily consumption of less 
than 20 rupees (roughly 50 US cents). Clearly, the constraint on broad based growth 
in countries like India comes from the productivity of much of the workforce (and the 
market failures constraining improvements in this productivity) rather than the high 
costs of labour. Indeed, there are significant pockets of poverty even within high 
growth and high per capita income states like Maharashtra. 
 
Productivity and FDI 
The growth acceleration of the 1980s was also associated with a productivity 
turnaround. Both the growth of labour productivity and of total factor productivity 
(TFP) displayed an improvement after 1980 compared to the previous decades. Table 
12 shows that most studies find roughly a 2 per cent increase in labour productivity 
growth and a 1.5 per cent increase in TFP growth rates after 1980. When labour 
productivity and even more so TFP growth rates are measured in a complex economy 
like India, changes in trends are likely to reflect the net effect of many different 
processes. Nevertheless, multiple concurrent measurements suggest significant 
changes in underlying processes in the Indian economy around 1980.  
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 Table 12 India’s Productivity Acceleration 
 Virmani  1951-80 1981-2004
 NDP per Worker
 TFP
     1.3           3.5      
     0.7           2.4
 Acharya et al.  1951-67 1968-81 1982-91 1992-2000
 GDP
 TFP
     3.8     3.4     5.3        6.5
     1.4     0.7     2.0        2.6
 Bosworth, Collins & Virmani  1960-80 1980-2004
 Output per Worker
 TFP
     1.3           3.8      
     0.2           2.0
 
Sources: Acharya et al. (2003: Table 2.2), Bosworth et al. (2007: Table 3) and Virmani 
(2004b: Table 1) 
 
These observations are very likely to be the result of a combination of labour 
shakeouts in existing establishments (possibly rather limited), the closing down of 
some unprofitable companies, the relocation of some production to alternative 
locations to allow changes in factor proportions, improvements in X-efficiency in a 
context of greater competition, better capacity utilization as a result of liberalized 
imports of spare parts and machinery, changes in product mixes and technologies 
particularly to take advantage of export opportunities, and the introduction of new and 
better technologies, sometimes through joint ventures and foreign direct investment. It 
is statistically very difficult to identify the importance of these various possibilities. 
Possibly all of these played a part to some extent.  
 
Thus the observed productivity growth is likely to be attributable to some allocative 
and X-efficiency gains that are likely to be step changes and unlikely to generate 
sustainable improvements in growth rates, as well as perhaps some new processes of 
technology acquisition, investment in new sectors and learning-by-doing that could 
result in lasting improvements in productivity growth. It is clearly of significant 
policy interest to be able to discriminate between short and long term changes in the 
rate of growth of productivity. While the data do not enable us to directly answer this 
question, we can address it partially and indirectly by looking at the evidence on 
technology upgrading and spillovers being achieved by joint ventures and FDI in 
India.  
 
India has enjoyed a significant increase in FDI after liberalization. According to 
Reserve Bank of India figures, from a negligible base in 2000, FDI had increased to 
almost 20 billion dollars in 2007. At the same time, however, outward investment by 
Indian conglomerates like Tata also increased dramatically to over 11 billion dollars, 
implying a net inflow of around 10 billion dollars. Nevertheless, the potential benefits 
of FDI are not just net increases in investment, but also new technology acquisition 
that may not otherwise have happened. In 2007 A T Kearney’s business surveys 
ranked India second only after China as the most desirable location for FDI globally. 
What did this inflow indicate about Indian competitiveness and growth prospects?  
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A number of studies on the effects of FDI in India support a capability-based analysis 
of the drivers of growth in post-liberalization developing countries. Siddhartan and 
Lal (2004) find that multinational investment can have positive spillover effects on 
the value-added per unit labour cost in domestic firms, but only if the initial 
productivity gap between the domestic and foreign firms was small. Where the 
productivity gap was initially large, the value-added per unit labour cost of domestic 
firms either declined or did not increase in the presence of foreign investment. Similar 
results are reported by Kathuria (2000) and Balasubramanyam and Mahambare 
(2003). These results are not at all surprising since we expect firms to absorb learning 
by observing and transacting with more advanced firms in their sector and then 
carrying out the appropriate investments in learning only if they already have 
significant technical and entrepreneurial capabilities. Balasubramanyam and 
Mahambare also point out that multinational investment in India has focused largely 
on sectors that already have significant technological capabilities, again as we would 
expect.  
 
Finally, although FDI in the late 1990s only accounted for 5% of gross domestic 
capital formation, the share of multinational affiliates in the sales of the organized 
private corporate sector in India is relatively high. At the end of the 1980s this share 
was estimated at around 23%. More recent estimates of the share of foreign affiliates 
over the period 1970-94 are between a third and a quarter of gross sales in India’s 
manufacturing sector (Balasubramanyam and Mahambare 2003: 51). The anomalous 
experience of Thailand with domestic capability development in a context of 
extensive multinational participation was discussed in Section 5. The presence of 
multinational affiliates can be positive or negative for domestic capability 
development and much depends on the initial capabilities of domestic firms in the 
same sector and their strategies of developing these capabilities further. Here there are 
some positive signs of capability development in India, for instance in the automotive 
sector which is important in Maharashtra, and which we will refer to in the next 
section. But in general, increasing domestic productive capacity across broader 
sectors is one of the most important challenges facing South Asian countries.  
 
7. Maharashtra: Industrial success and slowdown 
Some of the earliest modern industrial investments in India took place in areas in and 
around Mumbai (Bombay) in what is now Maharashtra. The first tax mill, the 
Bombay Spinning Mill was set up in 1854. Under the British, Maharashtra was part of 
the vast Bombay Presidency which at one time stretched as far north as Karachi in 
what is now Pakistan, and included the state of Gujarat. The modern state of 
Maharashtra emerged when Maharashtra and Gujarat split in 1960, as part of the 
linguistic reorganization of Indian states. Despite this, Maharashtra remains a very 
cosmopolitan state, with non-Marathi speakers accounting for 30 per cent of its 
population of roughly 100 million in 2005. In 2005 Maharashtra was also the richest 
state in India in per capita terms, with the exception of a number of very small states 
and territories like Goa, Pondicherry, Delhi and Chandigarh.  
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Table 13 Sectoral Shares in GDP Selected Indian States 1981-2005 
1981 1991 2001 2005
Maharashtra Agriculture 26.7 38.7 15.3 11.3
Industry 36.0 29.8 28.6 29.8
Services 37.2 31.6 56.0 58.9
West Bengal Agriculture 30.1 30.6 29.5 24.1
Industry 31.2 28.4 21.0 21.7
Services 38.7 41.0 49.5 54.2
Tamil Nadu Agriculture 24.3 18.8 16.3 12.3
Industry 35.0 36.7 32.3 29.3
Services 40.7 44.5 51.4 58.4
Gujarat Agriculture 37.3 27.85 14.9 15.3
Industry 30.4 36.37 40.6 42.1
Services 32.3 35.78 44.5 42.6
India Agriculture 34.4 29.6 23.2 18.3
Industry 25.6 25.8 25.3 27.6
Services 40.1 44.6 51.5 54.1  
Sources: EPW Research Foundation (2003; 2007), World Bank (2008). Figures are for shares 
of value-added in state gross domestic product at current prices. 
 
The state is also one of the most industrially advanced in India. However, as we can 
see in Table 2 (on page 12) the growth of industry has slowed down in the 1990s 
compared to a spurt of growth in the late 1980s, while the growth of the service sector 
has been accelerating. Table 13 shows that as a result, while Maharashtra still has a 
share of industry slightly higher than the Indian average, Gujarat has left it far behind 
in terms of the share of industry in State Domestic Product, and Tamil Nadu and a 
number of other southern states are likely to overtake it soon. But it is also interesting 
that with the exception of Gujarat, Indian states have displayed either flat or declining 
shares of industry in GDP over the 1980s and 1990s. Gujarat is an interesting outlier. 
Its significantly different performance could be either due to a very different internal 
set of formal and informal mechanisms for dealing with growth and market failure or 
simply a reflection of its significant petroleum and petrochemicals sector or some 
combination of both.  
 
Overview 
As the state where some of the first investments in India’s modern industrial sector 
began in the nineteenth century (the other being West Bengal), Maharashtra’s 
stagnant and even declining industrial share after liberalization is significant. Our 
assessment of the factors that may explain this trajectory will clearly be of interest for 
other less mature Indian states, but also for our general understanding of the 
challenges of learning and capability development in developing countries. 
Maharashtra and other Indian states that have rapidly grown in the post-1980 period 
have rapidly begun to resemble much more advanced countries in the characteristics 
of their declining industry shares and rapidly rising shares of their service sectors 
even though their per capita incomes are a fraction of those in the advanced countries 
they have begun to resemble.  
 
Maharashtra was one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Nehruvian industrial policy 
regime that operated till around 1980 in India. Maharashtra received a significant 
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share of industrial licenses, more than could be justified by its population or even its 
initial position in industry, particularly since one of the proclaimed goals of industrial 
policy was to achieve regional equity. Maharashtra’s experience was radically 
different from West Bengal which got a significantly smaller share of licenses and 
loans from industrial financing banks, starting from an initial position that was quite 
similar to Maharashtra. Clearly, even before 1980, the operation of Nehruvian policies 
did not just follow formal rules. An important part of the implementation depended on 
the specific business-government relationships in particular states, and therefore the 
commitment with which state governments pursued their interests with the centre. In 
addition, differences in the centre’s attitude to particular states could also make a 
difference. Business-government relationships are therefore an important part of the 
explanation of the different performance of Maharashtra and West Bengal between 
1950 and 1980.  
 
Underpinning the strong business-government relationships in Maharashtra were 
powerful business houses and their dominant entrepreneurs playing a leading role in 
financing politicians and parties on a long-term basis. The origins of these strategies 
can be traced back to the inception of the Indian national movement when leading 
Bombay-based capitalists played a key role in financing national political figures like 
Gandhi. This tradition continued through the industrial policy period and into the 
1980s, giving many Bombay-based businesses an advantage over others. Thus, there 
were similarities in these patterns of business financing of politics in Maharashtra and 
some aspects of business-government relationships in the competitive clientelism in 
Thailand. In contrast, the financial relationships between business and politics and the 
time horizons with which they operated were on a different scale in West Bengal, 
with correspondingly different outcomes.  
 
After 1980, these relationships continued and allowed Maharashtra to implement 
liberalization in a way that continued the provision of incentives to businesses in a 
context of long-term relationships. A number of significant high technology sectors 
like automobiles also began to develop rapidly during this period. But the extension of 
the industrial sector and the continuation of incentives to create new entrepreneurial 
entrants began to face a number of challenges. A fundamental problem began to 
emerge in the 1990s with the fragmentation of politics and the growing strength of 
populism as an alternative strategy for parties to mobilize electoral constituencies. 
The emergence of a Shiv Sena-BJP coalition government in 1995 marked a strategic 
shift in strategies of electoral competition using populist strategies.  
 
These changes in the political economy of the governance environment correspond 
with a slowdown in industrial growth rates in the state. Even though a number of 
manufacturing firms with significant technological and entrepreneurial capabilities 
had emerged in the state, the need for long-term and credible relationships with 
politics did not disappear. Our hypothesis is that even firms using highly skilled 
labour require methods of financing learning periods for many categories of workers 
as they continue to move to higher technologies. As the financing of industrial 
learning involving large groups of workers is risky, we can understand why in a more 
volatile political environment entrepreneurs would prefer to invest in service sectors. 
Enterprises using highly skilled workers in services are more likely to become 
competitive rapidly as long as skilled workers are available.  
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Policies/Rents Governance Outcomes/Vulnerabilities
Deepening Industrialization 
of Maharashtra 
Maharashtra gets a 
significant share of industrial 
licenses. 
High growth of all industrial 
sectors.
Affected by common Indian 
problem of disciplining 
learning rents 
BUT significant expansion 
of industrial base
Big business had long-term 
relationships of financing 
politics: As a result both sides 
could take a long-term pro-
industry view.
Growth Acceleration in 
Industry 1985-90
Driven by higher technology 
sectors like automobiles and 
pharmaceuticals.
Traditional parties split and 
less stable coalition 
governments emerge
Business less able to 
maintain long-term 
relationships with politics in 
this context.
BJP-Shiv Sena coalition 
government emerges in 1995 
signalling the emergence of 
new political patterns.
Shift of investors into areas 
where learning risks and 
other sources of market 
failures were lower
Rapid growth of high-valued 
services (financial services, 
software) and deceleration of 
industrial growth after 1990
Stable and long-term 
relationships between 
business groups and key 
politicians continue
But under growing threat from 
populist, nativist and 
exclusivist types of populism 
playing on persistent and high 
levels of poverty. 
Rent allocation to big 
business for learning on a 
significant scale 1950-80
Licenses, credit, limited 
amounts of industrial land 
allocated to investors.
Rent-creation for growth 
sectors continues after 
liberalization based on 
strong business-politics 
relationships 1980-90
Negotiation of incentives, 
formal policies, land, and 
implicit subsidies for 
technology upgrading 
continue.
Populist redistributive rent 
creation by fragmented 
ruling coalitions 1990-
Mobilization of intermediate 
class supporters using 
budgetary and off-budget 
rent creation.
Populist strategies of 
mobilization such as those 
based on Marathi 
nationalism.
 
Figure 14 Governance and Growth in Maharashtra: Patterns and Vulnerabilities 
 
Thus, the relationships between business and government that allowed manufacturing 
to be assured of long-term relationships of support began to change in the early to 
mid-nineties as the politics of Maharashtra began changing. Figure 14 summarizes the 
main types of rents and interventions over this period in Maharashtra, the governance 
conditions determining their effects, and the economic outcomes they were associated 
with.  
 
 69
An industrial policy winner 
At the time of independence in 1947, Maharashtra and West Bengal were virtually 
level in terms of their presence in the manufacturing sector measured in terms of 
numbers of factories and workers, though Maharashtra was ahead in terms of value-
added. This is shown in Table 14. In the subsequent period, Table 15 shows that 
Maharashtra’s performance in terms of getting industrial investment licenses far 
outstripped West Bengal and indeed all other Indian states. As other states began to 
industrialize under industrial policy, the shares of the two early starters would 
inevitably come down. Table 16 shows that the decline happens mostly for West 
Bengal, with Maharashtra’s share declining much less. Finally Table 17 shows the 
significant differences in underlying industrial growth rates between Maharashtra and 
West Bengal which produced these dramatic outcomes. While Maharashtra’s growth 
rates were close to the Indian average, it has to be remembered that Maharashtra at 
that time was already considerably ahead of other states, and by growing at the 
average rate it was virtually maintaining its share of Indian industrial production. 
 
Table 14 Registered Factories in Major Indian Provinces 1946 
 No. of 
Registered 
Factories  
Total 
Employees  
Percentage of 
Total 
Employees  
Value Added 
(Rs Crores) 
West Bengal 1218 509120 33.6 57.3 
Bombay 959 500267 33.0 87.7 
Madras 1244 144931 9.6 15.3 
UP 559 166763 11.0 21.7 
Bihar 316 93523 6.2 19.7 
Source: First Census of Manufacturing Industries in India, 1946, reported in Dasgupta (1998: 
Table 2). 
 
Table 15 Statewise Industrial Investment License Allocations 1956-66 
 License 
Applications  
Percentage of 
Applications  Licenses Issued 
Percentage of 
Licenses Issued 
Maharashtra 3645 25.9 2741 27.4 
West Bengal 2296 16.3 1649 16.5 
Madras 1263 9.0 970 4.7 
UP 1087 7.7 672 6.7 
Bihar 688 4.9 517 5.2 
Andhra Pradesh 487 3.5 332 3.3 
Mysore 420 3.0 327 3.3 
Source: Report of the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee 1969, reported in 
Dasgupta (1998: Table 3) 
 
Table 16 Statewise Employment and Value Added 1959-1978 
 % of Total 
Employment 1959 
% of Total Value 
Added 1959 
% of Total 
Employment 1978 
% of Total Value 
Added 1978 
Maharashtra 21.2 26.6 17.8 25.0 
West Bengal 23.1 23.2 15.0 12.2 
Gujarat 10.3 9.7 8.3 10.0 
Source: Figures from Annual Survey of Industries, reported in Dasgupta (1998: Table 4 and 
Table 17). 
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Table 17 Annual Growth Rates of Industry 1960-70 
 Basic Intermediate Capital Consumer 
Maharashtra 15.5 7.1 8.6 5.3 
West Bengal 0.9 3.8 1.2 2.3 
India 9.1 7.2 9.4 5.1 
Source: Based on Annual Survey of Industries, reported in Banerjee (1986: Table 2). In the 
Indian classification Basic Goods include the products of mining and quarrying industries, 
metals and chemicals and cement, Intermediate Products are products that are inputs into 
other industries, including yarns, jute sacking, tyres and leather.  
 
Maharashtra’s success in maintaining its rate of industrialization in all sectors of 
manufacturing deepened its technological and entrepreneurial capabilities throughout 
the industrial policy period. A key component of this was the supportive investment 
climate in the state, defined in terms of supportive business-government relationships. 
The significant success of business houses in the state in winning industrial licenses is 
an indicator of this relationship, given that the allocation of licenses was inevitably at 
least partially a political process.  
 
One factor that distinguished Maharashtra from states like West Bengal was the 
prominent role played by its early entrepreneurs in funding individual leaders of the 
Indian National Congress. The nationalist entrepreneur Dadabhai Naoroji who backed 
the Congress during the anti-colonial struggle exemplified this trend. Other 
entrepreneurs like the Birlas had close connections with Mahatma Gandhi. After 
independence these relationships between big business houses and the Congress 
continued. When Maharashtra and Gujarat became separate states in 1960, 
Maharashtrian chief ministers like Vasant Dada Patil and later Sharad Pawar 
maintained close long-term relationships with particular business houses such as Bajaj 
and Ambani. An important implication of this was that the electoral strategies of 
Congress leaders in Maharashtra could rely to a significant extent on donations from 
business houses. Initially, at least, politics in Maharashtra was therefore somewhat 
insulated from populist budgetary allocations and more responsive to the needs of 
business. 
 
Long-term relationships between business and politics can create favourable 
outcomes for both. Business can gain by having the confidence to invest long-term, 
and politics can invest in these investments by contributing implicit and explicit 
subsidies to overcome market failures preventing long-term investments. The danger 
of monopolistic or oligopolistic arrangements here were somewhat mitigated by the 
fact that by then Maharashtra already had a fairly diversified capitalist sector and it 
would not be credible for a particular business house to try and use political power for 
zero sum games against other houses.  
 
A number of institutions emerged during this period which continued to play a role in 
the 1980s and beyond. One was the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation 
(MIDC). One of its important functions was to provide land for small and medium 
enterprises. The corporation would acquire land and sell it to investors at a higher 
price, using the difference to develop infrastructure in the estates. Initially, the plan 
was to develop a few large industrial estates near urban centres like Mumbai, Pune, 
Nasik, Aurangabad and Nagpur. But the outcome was so successful that it was soon 
extended to every district town and eventually to every taluka town. It has so far built 
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229 industrial complexes on 60,000 hectares of land, and built 2423 kilometres of 
roads as part of infrastructure development for industrial development. It is one of the 
most successful industrial development corporations in India.  
 
The MIDC was effective not because it was free of patronage and corruption. On the 
contrary, the Chairman of the MIDC was always the minister of industries, and the 
allocation of plots and the fixing of lease rates, exemptions and so on were the subject 
of considerable patronage and corruption. Rather, the political leadership had an 
incentive to make MIDC work because their long-term relationship with capital meant 
that there was a realistic prospect of industrial growth in the state, and the 
development of estates and other incentives for investment were therefore credible 
strategies for politicians wanting to maximize their income over time.  
 
Implicit subsidies for industrial investments in the form of incentives were provided 
by the State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra (SICOM), set up in 
1966. Assistance to investors was provided in the form of investments and advances 
to projects which would otherwise not have been able to raise capital given capital 
market failures and the risks involved in learning in new industries. This too was an 
aggressive institution, rapidly expanding its scope of lending to industry. Its assets in 
1967 amounted to 30.3 million rupees, but grew rapidly to 412.4 million rupees by 
1973. In contrast, the equivalent organization in West Bengal, the West Bengal 
Industrial Development Corporation saw its assets growing from 3.8 million rupees in 
1968 to 45.9 million rupees in 1973 (D. Banerjee 1986: 70). SICOM was also charged 
with helping with the acquisition of land and infrastructure and providing other 
incentives to bigger investors who were outside the remit of MIDC.  
 
Growth acceleration after 1980 
The acceleration of growth in Maharashtra does not really become apparent till the 
mid-1980s. This was partly because the late 1970s and early 1980s were a period of 
conflict between the Congress Party in power at the centre and the gradual loss of 
power by Congress in the state. In 1978 the first non-Congress government of the 
Progressive Democratic Front under Sharad Pawar came to power, only to be 
dismissed by Indira Gandhi in 1980. A weak Congress government replaced this 
coalition, but Congress did manage to rule the state till 1995. Industrial growth in the 
early 1980s was also low because of the effects of the Bombay textile strike of 1981-
2. The strike went on to become the longest strike in India’s post-independence 
history. The defeat of the textile workers marked the transition of the state out of older 
technologies into newer ones. Most of the textile mills with which Maharashtra had 
begun its march to industrialization were now closed down. After the strike a mere 58 
mills remained in operation employing the last 20,000 workers in the sector (Katakam 
2005). But after all this, growth took off rapidly in Maharashtra in the mid-1980s, 
with a significant acceleration of manufacturing and industrial growth rates.  
 
A number of manufacturing sectors in higher technology sectors emerge as drivers of 
growth during this period. The heavily protected automotive sector in India had 
produced cars like the Ambassador for a long time with very limited product 
improvement. This changed in the 1980s, with the joint venture between Maruti 
Udyog Ltd and Suzuki in 1982, pushed through by the prime minister’s son Sanjay 
Gandhi. This opened the doors for foreign technology to be acquired by other Indian 
automotive producers, and in Maharashtra one of the main players was Mahindra and 
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Mahindra. This company had specializations in tractors and jeeps, but now began to 
upgrade its technology and introduce new models. Tata Motors also has significant 
operations in Pune, as did the industrial giant Bajaj Auto with its specialization in 
scooters and three-wheelers. Collectively, Maharashtra now produces around 30 per 
cent of India’s tractors, 70 per cent of its medium and heavy trucks and 90 per cent of 
three wheelers. In aggregate, 38% of India’s value added in automobiles is produced 
in Maharashtra. 
 
The automobile sector is one of India’s success stories and is achieving a global 
position in the production of cheaper cars. Technology acquisition has been driven by 
joint ventures and foreign technology acquisition but so far the kind of takeover by 
foreign capital that we described in Thailand has not happened in India. Partly this is 
because Indian producers in the automotive industry have acquired deeper 
technological and entrepreneurial capabilities. But paradoxically, the difficulty of 
negotiating informal political arrangements necessary for operating in a context of 
high transaction costs and significant market failures may deter majority foreign 
owned companies attempting to operate in India for some time in areas like 
automobiles where significant long-term learning and capability building issues are 
involved. This may be greatly to India’s advantage as it seeks to raise its 
technological capability.  
 
Although Maharashtra scores as a labour-friendly state in some classifications of 
labour market flexibility (for instance Aghion, et al. 2006), workers who came out of 
the textile strike would probably find it hard to believe this. It is hard to avoid the 
suspicion that this classification of Maharashtra was influenced by the fact that its 
industrial sector is shrinking and if this has to be explained by conventional economic 
theory, labour market flexibility is the most likely candidate. In October 2000 the 
state government of Maharashtra under pressure from business, proposed wide-
ranging revisions to labour legislation that would render them virtually useless for 
protecting workers. Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha, in his Budget Speech of 2001 
announced that the government would liberalize the use of contract labour and permit 
employers to dismiss workers and close down units employing up to 1000 workers. 
This led to another round of strikes in 2001, which resulted in a compromise where 
unconditional dismissals were allowed for firms employing up to 300 workers. In 
addition, the government liberalized contract labour laws under the Special Economic 
Zones Act of 2002, though this is still subject to judicial review.  
 
But the acceleration of industrial growth in Maharashtra between 1985 and 1990 
proved to be short lived. Over the next 10 years, despite the ‘labour market reforms’ 
and the substantial stocks of technological and entrepreneurial capabilities, industrial 
and manufacturing growth in Maharashtra decelerated.   
 
Political fragmentation, populism and the shift to services  
From the 1990s onwards, politics in Maharashtra started to become more fragmented 
and populist. There was a steady growth of nativist and communal politics, with 
parties like the Shiv Sena mobilizing Marathis against outsiders, and the BJP trying to 
construct a Hindu coalition. The success of these strategies was underlined by the 
formation of the BJP-Shiv Sena government in 1995. The emergence of these political 
strategies has to be understood in the context of what was happening in Maharashtra 
to poverty levels and the exclusion of large numbers from the benefits of growth over 
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these years. A negative consequence of the close cooperation between industrial 
capitalists and politicians in Maharashtra was that the development prospects of the 
majority of the population in agriculture and informal services were not addressed 
rapidly enough. Agriculture in particular performed very poorly. And within 
agriculture, resources, in particular water, were diverted into cash crops like sugar that 
were artificially protected and provided huge rents to politicians rather than to the 
broader population dependent on agriculture.  
 
Despite the fact that Maharashtra had one of the highest per capita incomes in India, it 
was a different story with respect to poverty. The estimates of poverty by the 
Lakdawala Committee for 1988 show that Maharashtra came ninth amongst the 
fifteen large states of India in terms of rural poverty, with 42 per cent of the rural 
population living below the poverty line. This compares with an Indian average of 39 
per cent. And given the much higher average per capita income of Maharashtra 
compared to the Indian average, the distribution of income within the state was clearly 
very unequal (Parthasarathy and Nirmala 1997: Table 1). A particularly gruesome 
aspect of this poverty was the phenomenon of farmer suicides which took on 
epidemic proportions in some parts of Maharashtra.  
 
The growth of populist politics in Maharashtra has to be understood in this context 
(Roy 2008). Persistent absolute and relative poverty allows political entrepreneurs to 
mobilize clients and electorates on the basis of redistributive promises and by 
identifying outsiders. The prisoner’s dilemma problem that can rapidly arise is that as 
soon as fringe political groups start doing this, mainstream parties have to rapidly 
match these promises to maintain their political support. Funding from big business 
may not be sufficient for mainstream parties to maintain their electoral strength and 
thereby resist making populist promises in such contexts. And once business delinks 
from the political process because the state budget and policy space are increasingly 
captured by populist programmes, they are likely to abandon the difficult but job-
creating investments in industry and shift towards less risky projects. These will be in 
sectors where learning periods are less long, which therefore require less consistent 
support from the state, but which by definition also create fewer jobs. There is some 
indication that in aggregate, entrepreneurs in Maharashtra were shifting towards a 
new less desirable equilibrium of this type during the 1990s. 
 
The shift towards services in one of the most industrially advanced Indian states with 
extensive clustering economies, technological capabilities and entrepreneurial skills is 
an important puzzle that we need to explain. We have also seen that as far as the 
formal sector working class has been concerned, the state was willing to play hardball 
in terms of labour market flexibility reforms that were progressing in the direction 
business wanted.  
 
The long-term trend in all countries as they make a developmental transition to 
prosperity is for their agricultural sector to begin to decline as a share of GDP almost 
immediately, and for the shares of industry and services to increase. But as the 
country reaches upper middle income levels, the tendency is for the share of industry 
to begin to decline. The share of the service sector however continues to increase as a 
share of GDP. This is because when industry becomes productive and mature, the 
relative prices of its products fall compared to services. Thus, at high levels of per 
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capita incomes, the growing share of services in an economy is an indicator of 
prosperity (Rowthorn and Wells 1987).  
 
However growing Indian states have started their ‘de-industrialization’ at very low 
levels of income and this trend has accelerated in the 1990s. The interesting thing is 
that this is true for most of the relatively advanced states of India regardless of their 
per capita incomes. For instance, the declining share of industry is true for both 
Maharashtra, the richest state in per capita terms, as well as for relatively poorer but 
also rapidly growing states like Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. If we compare 
Maharashtra and Karnataka, the two states respectively began to display a declining 
share of industry at per capita income levels that were around a quarter or a fifth of 
the level at which more advanced countries had begun to ‘de-industrialize’ (Kochchar, 
et al. 2006: 36). Is this a problem? The answer depends on the factors we believe 
could explain the anomalous performance of sectoral shares in India compared to 
previous global experience.  
 
One argument could be that the rising share of services simply reflects changing 
relative prices of manufactured and service sector products in the same way as in 
more advanced countries. But this is simply not the case because the falling share of 
industry in rapidly-growing Indian states is not a purely nominal price phenomenon 
with the underlying real rate of growth of industry being sustained. Rather the 
declining share of industry in the 1990s in Maharashtra was clearly due to the real rate 
of growth of industry slowing down (Table 2 on page 12). Another view coming from 
Kochhar (2006: 28) is that the growth of services in rapidly-growing Indian states 
reflects the high-skills driven growth path that these states appear to have adopted. 
These skills are clearly not industry-specific because the structure of industry within 
these states is also rapidly changing. Rather the skills in question appear to be 
embodied in the high human capital of sections of the workforce, which allows rapid 
changes in sectoral choices in line with changing opportunities.  
 
From this perspective, the emergence of service sector-driven growth in high-growth 
Indian states could simply reflect sectoral choices that maximize profits using highly-
skilled labour (Kochchar, et al. 2006: 24). The latter argue that greater liberalization 
of labour markets may not change this trajectory for the high-growth states, but may 
enable low-growth states in India to grow using labour-intensive technologies. For the 
high-growth states, their policy response is to try to increase the supply of skilled 
labour, by greater investment in high-quality education. There are several problems 
with this diagnosis from the perspective of our approach to growth and governance.  
 
First, the shift from manufacturing to services in the higher-growth Indian states is not 
neutral in terms of effects on employment, poverty reduction and possible backward 
and forward linkages spurring spread effects in the broader economy. This is true 
even if manufacturing was initially relatively capital-intensive to begin with. Even 
relatively capital-intensive manufacturing creates much greater levels of employment 
than most types of highly-skilled services. This is because in manufacturing, the 
highly-skilled labour is usually complementary with less skilled production line work. 
But in services using skilled labour the production line is typically also relatively 
skilled. Compare for instance automobile production with its ancillary employment 
generation with software development or financial services. Even more so, the 
backward and forward linkages of manufacturing are likely to have greater multiplier 
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effects in most cases compared to services. Thus, when high-growth developing 
economies shift their skilled labour allocation from manufacturing to services there 
are likely to be effects for broader employment generation and poverty reduction. 
 
Secondly, the assumption in much of the post-1980 literature on India that after 
liberalization market failures have been either negligible or that it has not been 
necessary to address the remaining ones is misleading. The evidence suggests that 
high growth in manufacturing in Maharashtra required strong business-government 
relationships even after liberalization. When these began to break down, the focus 
shifted to projects where ancillary learning by less skilled workers was less important. 
Our hypothesis (summarized in Figure 11 on page 33) is that liberalization only 
changed the mechanisms, both formal and informal, through which business and 
politics consciously or otherwise addressed market failures. How effective these 
mechanisms were determined the types of investments and sectors that were viable.  
 
Finally, the argument that a relaxation of labour regulations would at least help the 
poorly performing parts of the Indian Union is also problematic. Even low technology 
manufacturing require periods of learning-by-doing. The experience of Bangladesh 
with its successful entry into garment manufacturing is useful in this respect and will 
be discussed in a later section. What that suggests is that even for entry into these 
labour-intensive types of manufacturing, poorer performing areas of the world need to 
develop specific governance capabilities.   
 
8. West Bengal: The limits of an agrarian growth strategy   
Like Maharashtra, West Bengal was one of the pioneers in Indian industrialization. 
Some of the very first industries set up by British capitalists in the 1850s were in what 
is now West Bengal, with George Acland’s jute spinning company going into 
production in 1855 (Morris 1983: 567-87). By the beginning of the First World War, 
there were 64 jute mills in operation employing almost 220,000 people. Bengali 
capitalists found entry difficult but not impossible and the industry continued to use 
British supervisors and managers far longer than say the cotton textile industry 
developing in Bombay. British entrepreneurs also set up the Bengal Iron Works 
Company in 1874 and the Bengal Iron and Steel Company (BISCO) in 1889.  
 
By 1931 Bengal had the biggest concentration of modern factory employment in 
India, significantly ahead of Bombay (Morris 1983: 648-9 Map 7). In 1939 Bengal 
accounted for 28.7% of the industrial workers in British India, while Bombay, which 
at that time included the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra accounted for 23% of 
industrial workers (Dasgupta 1998: Table 1). From that position of dominance, West 
Bengal’s share of Indian industrial production was down to 20.5% in 1961, 14.4% in 
1970 and reached a low of 4.7% in 1996 (A. Banerjee, et al. 2002: 4203-4; 
Raychaudhuri and Basu 2007: Table 8).  
 
But as we have seen in Table 2 (p. 12), by the 1980s, West Bengal had also emerged 
as one of the rapidly growing states of India. In the 1980s, growth was driven by 
agriculture and small-scale and informal sector firms. From the mid-1990s, the ruling 
Left Front government evolved a much more pro-active policy of promoting large-
scale industry in the state, and the challenge is to develop the business-government 
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relationships that will make this work in the context of the strong agrarian base of the 
Left Front.  
 
Overview 
The license raj period up to 1980 was particularly bad for West Bengal for reasons 
that are contested in the literature. The standard answer that West Bengal fell behind 
because of more aggressive unions does not fit the evidence when we look at figures 
for strikes and labour militancy in more successful states like Maharashtra and 
Gujarat. West Bengal may also have been disadvantaged by specific policies like 
Freight Equalization which wiped out the comparative advantage of eastern states that 
were located on or close to iron ore and coal deposits. But a deeper and politically 
more sensitive problem for Bengal was the dearth of Bengali capitalists. Its large-
scale industrial base was largely owned by non-Bengalis, in particular Marwaris. But 
unlike Maharashtra, non-indigenous business did not develop long-term financial 
links with politics and politicians. The distance between politics and business in West 
Bengal may have trapped both sides in a prisoner’s dilemma with business reserving 
its options by diversifying outside the state, and government developing alternative 
constituencies to protect itself from reliance on an alliance with potentially footloose 
outsiders. This may explain why West Bengal’s industrial decline began long before 
the Left Front first took control of the state in 1967. Not only did West Bengal get a 
smaller share of licenses than other industrially advanced states throughout the 
licensing period, business houses located in West Bengal often used their licenses to 
invest elsewhere. 
 
The growth takeoff of the 1980s was led by agriculture. The power base of the Left 
Front was in the rural areas, and while the focus of a lot of the literature has been on 
land reforms, the political relationship between the state and the surplus farmers also 
allowed public funds to be pumped into assisting agrarian investment. The very high 
growth rates had very good effects on poverty reduction, but in a densely populated 
rice growing agriculture, the scope for sustained growth was limited without 
significant investments in irrigation and perhaps some consolidation of land into more 
viably-sized farms.  
 
By the early 2000s the limits of agrarian growth appear to have been reached. The 
state government announced a new industrial policy in 1994 that was explicitly 
supportive of big investments in industry, and added further incentives in 2000 for 
mega projects. Haldia Petrochemicals which came on stream in 2001 was an 
important mega-project success for the government. The scale of investment projects 
implemented in the state from 1991 to 2006 began to approach Maharashtra, though it 
remained significantly lower than in Gujarat (Raychaudhuri and Basu 2007: Table 
19). But the debacle over Tata’s proposed car plant in Singur and the proposed 
chemical hub at Nandigram revealed serious fissures in the leadership’s pro-business 
stance given its core constituencies, some of whom began to be mobilized by the 
opposition to block these investments. 
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Policies/Rents Governance Outcomes/Vulnerabilities
‘De-industrialization’ of 
West Bengal 1950-80
West Bengal gets a smaller 
share of licenses and 
financing compared to its 
competitors but its 
contribution to Indian industry 
shrinks even more rapidly as 
domestic business relocates. 
Growth of small scale and 
low productivity 
manufacturing.
Affected by common Indian 
problem of disciplining 
learning rents 
PLUS specific state 
problem of weak long-term 
relationships with big 
investors who are often 
non-Bengalis
Big investors lack confidence 
in long term commitment of 
political process to incentives 
for industrialization.
Rapid agricultural growth 
for a decade
Agricultural yields and output 
increase but hits ceilings due 
to unfavourable population 
density, very small size of 
farms, and poor 
infrastructure.
Strong executive support 
but conflicts emerge with 
parts of the Left Front’s 
power base 
Weakness of Bengali capital 
continues to obstruct the 
development of a politically 
powerful domestic industrial 
constituency. 
Opposition’s ability to 
mobilize disaffected 
intermediate classes makes 
political price of big business 
policy potentially very high.
Rapid growth of industrial 
approvals in moderately big 
projects and 
implementation of at least 
one mega project in Haldia 
Petrochemicals in 2001
Haldia’s success balanced by 
failures in Singur (Tata Nano) 
and Nandigram (chemical 
hub) in 2007-08 when 
opposition parties 
successfully mobilize parts of 
the Left Front constituency. 
Clarity of policy weakened.
Disciplined mass party 
organization operating 
through  system 
of decentralization
panchayati
Effective targeting of rents 
and asset redistribution to 
core constituencies of small 
and medium peasants. 
Motivated by electoral 
calculations of ruling Left 
Front, which remains 
electorally unbeatable over 
this period.
Rent allocation to big 
business for learning but 
with limited dynamism 
1950-80
Licenses, credit, limited 
amounts of industrial land 
allocated to investors.
Rent allocation and 
redistribution of land in 
agriculture to benefit small 
and medium peasant 
constituency 1977-1990
Ceiling-surplus land 
redistributed, sharecroppers 
registered, agricultural 
subsidies distributed to 
target recipients through 
decentralized government.
Significant Policy Shift to 
Big Business: 1994 
Industrial Policy
Subsidies and incentives for 
big business plus extra 
incentives for mega-projects 
after 2000.
 
Figure 15 Governance and Growth in West Bengal: Patterns and Vulnerabilities  
 
Figure 15 summarizes the different types of rents and policy processes describing 
West Bengal’s economic performance over the last few decades. Each process is 
related to specific outcomes that depend not just on the type of rent and the market 
failure it was addressing, but also on the governance requirements and actual 
capabilities. The subsequent discussion then addresses these processes separately.  
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Falling behind during the license raj 
The general problems of Indian industrial policy in terms of imposing discipline on 
business and limiting moral hazard problems associated with corrections to market 
failures have already been discussed in Section 6. Here we look at specific problems 
that affected West Bengal differentially. The problematic business-government 
relationships that characterized industry in West Bengal can be read off from the 
dramatic decline in the state’s industrial status during the license raj period. In other 
words, not only did the state suffer from the general problem that many subsidies and 
investments provided by the industrial policy system provided less than optimum 
results, it was also getting less than its share of licenses, and its industrial growth rate 
slumped. There is an argument that the decline in the state’s industrial fortunes began 
in the 1970s when the Left Front governments were in power (Raychaudhuri and 
Basu 2007). But in fact, the state’s industrial problems long preceded the Left Front 
victory. Between 1956 and 1966, before the Left Front took power, West Bengal 
received 16.5% of licenses from the centre, compared to 27.4% for Maharashtra 
(Dasgupta 1998: Table 3). As Table 18 shows, the allocations of finance to West 
Bengal by state financial institutions over this period were also significantly lower 
than its potential competitors. 
 
Table 18 Comparative Allocations of Finance to West Bengal 1950s and 1960s 
 % of ICICI allocations 
1955-65 
% of IFCI allocations 
1960-70 
% of IDBI allocations 
1964-76 
Gujarat 13.3 8.7 12.7 
Maharashtra  36.7 18.9 20.4 
Tamil Nadu 10.3 11.7 12.5 
West Bengal  8.8 10.8 7.8 
Notes and Sources: ICICI = Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India, IFCI = Industrial 
Finance Corporation of India and IDBI = Industrial Development Bank of India. D. Banerjee (1986: 
Tables 31-33). 
 
To some extent these figures could be reflecting a bias of the central government 
against West Bengal. There was also some effect of the policy of freight equalization 
which ensured that steel, coal and cement would be delivered between any two points 
of the country for the same rail cost. This had the effect of dampening West Bengal’s 
comparative advantage given its proximity to some of the most important iron ore and 
coal deposits in the country. But while these factors may have exacerbated the rate of 
West Bengal’s industrial decline, they are unlikely to have caused this on their own. 
Analysts have looked at other possible explanations, such as differences in 
productivity between West Bengal and other states, infrastructure availability and 
labour militancy, but the differences between West Bengal and other states in terms of 
these indicators are not consistent enough to explain a persistent underperformance 
that began at a time when West Bengal was the dominant industrial base in the 
country (D. Banerjee 1998). A plausible explanation has to incorporate the role of 
business-government relationships in the state, independently of labour militancy, 
which was just as serious in other states that did better (Dasgupta 1998).  
 
Clearly, the relationship between big business and government in the state was not 
one where politicians could assure business of a long term commitment to deal with 
emerging problems. One indication of the state’s priorities and core constituencies 
well before the Left Front government took power is that state finance corporations in 
West Bengal as of 1975 did not finance any private industrial estates unlike state 
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finance corporations in Gujarat and Maharashtra. And by 1975 West Bengal had five 
industrial estates set up by the state government, compared to 44 in Maharashtra, 47 
in Gujarat and 29 in Tamil Nadu (D. Banerjee 1986: 65). In a land-scarce state, 
constructing industrial estates requires taking on peasant constituencies to support an 
industrial one. One clue to the difficulty of developing such a relationship in West 
Bengal is provided by the specific ownership structure of West Bengali industry.  
 
In Maharashtra regional capital was always better represented though as we have seen 
Maharashtrian capital was not necessarily Marathi but included Gujaratis who had 
close political relationships with the state. In contrast, industrial capital in Bengal was 
till the 1950s significantly owned by the British. When the British began to leave, 
many of these firms were sold to Marwari capitalists who did not have close financial 
relationships with West Bengal’s politicians. Since Marwari capital had very limited 
historical links with Bengali politicians and parties, this made it difficult for Bengali 
politicians and parties to commit themselves to industrial policies that would have 
primarily benefited Marwari capital. And as a result, Marwari capital, even when 
headquartered in Kolkata, did not commit themselves to a regional concentration of 
their investments in their home base, which was the pattern of business houses 
elsewhere. The significant observation is that all this was true long before the victory 
of the left parties or the labour militancy of the late 1960s. The latter was more 
plausibly the effect rather than the cause of a long history of industrial decline.  
 
For instance, the largest Marwari group in West Bengal, the Birlas, applied for 601 
licenses during the period 1956-66, but of these only 178 were for West Bengal 
(Dasgupta 1998: 3057). If the confidence of these groups in West Bengal was low, 
there is also a possibility, though difficult to substantiate, that profits made in West 
Bengal were invested elsewhere. In contrast, investments by other regional business 
houses appear to have been more regionally concentrated. For instance, investments 
of Gujarati business houses (like Mafatlal, Walchand, Sarabhai, Kasturbhai, 
Kilachand) were concentrated in the Maharashtra-Gujarat belt, and southern houses 
(like Chidambaram, Iyengar, Chettiar, Ramkrishna) were primarily in the southern 
belt. But Marwari business houses headquartered in Kolkata (Birla, Bangur, Modi, 
Goenka, Sahu Jain) rapidly diversified into Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya 
Pradesh and Bihar (D. Banerjee 1998: 3074). By 1996, of the 42 biggest 
conglomerates in India, only one, Goenka, had a significant share of its activities in 
West Bengal (D. Banerjee 1997: 56-7). If the political relationship between 
government and business matters for the ways in which market failures are addressed, 
the ownership structure of West Bengal’s industry could explain not just an important 
part of some of its problems in the past, but may remain an important problem for the 
present. West Bengal today has to compete with states with strong relationships with 
domestic capital such as Tamil Nadu and Gujarat (Pedersen 2001). 
 
Agriculture-led growth in the 1980s 
The growth acceleration that happened in the 1980s was initially entirely agriculture-
led. Strong explicit political relationships between West Bengali politicians and big 
industrial capitalists had never existed, and the Left Front did not change this in the 
1980s. This does not mean that close relationships between business and politicians 
never existed, but these were mostly short-term relationships such as politicians 
colluding with particular businesses during labour conflicts and lockouts. The long-
term relations that may have led to coordinated plans for land acquisition, 
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infrastructure development, and formal and informal subsidies were not in evidence. 
On the other hand, the Left Front was enormously successful in developing a mass 
base in agriculture, drawing in small and medium peasants and sharecroppers in a 
massive and disciplined political organization. This consolidation was helped greatly 
by the adoption in West Bengal in 1973 of the Panchayati Raj Act, which created a 
decentralized governance system that could be used to allocate funds to specific 
beneficiaries right down to the village level. This allowed the left parties to build 
loyal constituencies that could be counted on to sustain them in electoral politics. 
Secondly, the Left Front began a series of land reform measures that eventually had 
significant effects on agricultural growth. 
 
It began by simply implementing land reform laws that were already of the statute 
books but never enforced. The Left Front began to enforce these rules. It also passed 
legislation for higher crop shares for sharecroppers and security of tenure. The latter 
was to be enforced through a registration of sharecroppers, the so-called Operation 
Barga. There is no question that these measures were associated with a significant 
acceleration of agricultural growth in the state (see Table 2 on p. 12). There is, 
however, considerable debate about why this was the case. Land redistribution alone 
could not explain this significant acceleration because only around 6.5 per cent of 
cultivated land in the state was redistributed since the late 1960s, and of this only 3 
per cent was redistributed by the Left Front government that took power in 1977. And 
the total land under sharecropping at the time of Operation Barga was only around 
seven per cent. (Gazdar and Sengupta 1999: 66-7). A more satisfactory explanation 
would also account for the effect of the Left Front being able to direct subsidies and 
resources to surplus farmers (who were also their supporters), to enable a significant 
increase in investment in tube wells, fertilizers and other inputs (Dwaipayan 
Bhattacharya 1999; Gazdar and Sengupta 1999). The supply of agricultural kits and 
credit to peasants is also found to be significantly positively related to agricultural 
productivity growth during this period (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2007). In this sense, 
the Left Front was using developmental rent allocation to small and medium peasants 
to accelerate growth, knowing that land redistribution alone would not suffice. And 
indeed many surplus farmers in the Eastern Indian context are in an absolute sense 
rather poor.  
 
At the same time that these changes were happening, large-scale industry was doing 
rather badly. The loss of confidence of big business in the state government became 
more serious and many large corporates began to locate their headquarters outside the 
state. Big business that moved out at this time included Lipton, Brooke Bond, 
Hindustan Lever (collectively renamed Hindustan Unilever), a host of Tata Group 
companies, Philips, Bata, Britannia, Reckitt Benckiser (then Reckitt & Coleman), and 
Organon, the only multinational pharmaceutical company in Kolkata. As large firms 
moved out their place was taken by smaller and lower technology firms. Between 
1977 and 1990, the number of registered firms in West Bengal increased from 5837 to 
8960 but total employment remained virtually unchanged (Raychaudhuri and Basu 
2007: Table 14). This indicates that when some big firms for instance in the 
engineering sector moved out their skilled workers opened smaller-scale and lower 
technology firms to fill some gaps in the market. The limits of these agriculture-
priority policies began to become apparent by the late 1980s. The growth rate in 
agriculture slowed down, and as a result the growth rate of state domestic product also 
slowed down.  
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Challenges for a new pro-big business Left Front 
In 1994 the Left Front government announced a new industrial policy that was now 
explicitly weighted to attract big business investments to the state. It welcomed 
foreign technology and investors, committed itself to upgrading the industrial 
infrastructure and strengthened a single window service for investors under the West 
Bengal Industrial Development Corporation (WBIDC). The WBIDC as a whole was 
overhauled and a party heavyweight and MP, Somnath Chatterjee was appointed its 
chairman. In 2000, this was followed with an even stronger set of incentives for 
mega-projects. Apart from subsidies for capital costs, special incentives were 
announced for projects above 2.5 billion rupees.  
 
With the election of Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharya in 2001, the new policy 
received political support at the highest level, marking a significant shift from 
agriculture to industry. There were some significant improvements under the new 
policies. The value of industrial investment projects implemented between 1991 and 
2006 were comparable to Maharashtra, though they were still less than half those in 
Gujarat (Raychaudhuri and Basu 2007: Table 19). A significant success of the new 
policy was Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd (HPL), a 10 billion rupee project, primarily 
producing polyolefins. It came onstream in 2000, commissioned in a record time of 
36 months, with a West Bengal government stake of 51.7%. The project was already 
generating profits by 2004 and has significant potential downstream linkages. 
 
Two other significant projects fared less well. A proposed chemical hub in Nandigram 
and the much advertised Tata Nano project in Singur were both abandoned because 
the Left Front government had not prepared its core constituency sufficiently. The 
land acquisitions for these projects were mishandled in their presentation and political 
handling, resulting in opposition parties using grievances to block these projects. 
Tata’s withdrawal from Singur in 2008 is likely to leave a negative impact on the 
state’s project of developing a new pro-industry constituency and investor confidence. 
The experience highlighted the importance of constructing constituencies in advance 
of significant policy shifts, and also the high potential costs of delivering to business 
in a context of a political settlement where intermediate classes have been 
significantly mobilized and empowered. The types of market failure corrections that 
the West Bengal government can carry out in the future will clearly depend on the 
political constituency it can build to support these policies.  
 
The contrast between Maharashtra and West Bengal is an interesting one. In the 
former business initially had strong long-term relationships with politics which 
became unsustainable because politics did not deliver sufficiently to broader 
constituencies. Politics became fragmented and difficult to negotiate for business 
interests. In West Bengal a disciplined political party did deliver to broader 
constituencies but found it difficult to connect with business interests to solve critical 
market failures. Clearly, sustained solutions to market failure require both. The Left 
Front is increasingly aware of this, but their problems would have been much easier if 
a Bengali capitalist class had existed in strength. It may be this is an important gap 
that needs to be addressed if a sustainable political settlement in support of 
industrialization is to be constructed. 
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9. Bangladesh: Growth with low-technology exports  
Bangladesh was carved out of the eastern hinterland of Bengal which had virtually no 
industry in 1947. Unlike West Bengal which was significantly industrialized at that 
time, East Bengal was almost entirely an agrarian economy growing rice and jute. 
Even the jute grown in East Bengal fed jute mills located near Kolkata in West 
Bengal. The incorporation of East Bengal in the new state of Pakistan was a mixed 
blessing. There was some industrialization prior to the independence of Bangladesh in 
1971, but once again, the agrarian surplus of East Bengal was financing 
industrialization elsewhere, this time in West Pakistan. A sustained growth spurt 
emerges only after 1980, but the previous history created some of the conditions 
sustaining this growth. In particular, the new politics created opportunities for 
primitive accumulation by Bengali elites with close connections with political power.  
 
Overview 
As in the rest of South Asia, the fifties and sixties in Bangladesh were a period of 
catching up under ambitious industrial policies. But the specific feature of Bangladesh 
was that these policies initially benefited mostly non-Bengali entrepreneurs in what 
was then East Pakistan. The distributive conflict against non-Bengali capital was one 
of the drivers that led to the emergence of Bangladesh. The previous history of state-
led development and the experience of state-created capitalists in the past meant that 
the newly independent country began life with the new political elite very conscious 
of the potentially lucrative uses of political power.  
 
The departure of Pakistani capitalists in 1971 initially led to the nationalization of 
large swathes of industry and services. This was the prelude to an intense period of 
primitive accumulation as nominally state-owned assets were transferred to private 
hands through the political process. This was also a period of considerable violence in 
Bangladesh, with armed freedom fighters demanding economic incorporation. Mujib 
was assassinated in 1975 when he tried to set up a one party state to impose some 
order on a politics that was becoming increasingly fractious. This was followed by a 
series of coups, counter-coups and considerable violence in the army barracks.  
 
The violence took about a decade to die down. In the meantime considerable primitive 
accumulation took place as state assets and inflows of aid financed the emergence of 
new elites who began looking around for productive uses for their acquired wealth. 
The emergence of new capital would not by itself have been sufficient to drive a 
growth spurt without another fortuitous accident, the Multi-Fibre Arrangement or 
MFA. This international accident created temporary rents and incentives for 
investment in learning in the garment industry. The effect was positive because MFA 
did not allow a permanent dependence on rents simply because they could not be 
expected to last forever. And the terms of these rents could certainly not be 
significantly manipulated by domestic political mobilizations.  
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Policies/Rents Governance Outcomes/Vulnerabilities
Rapid growth of medium-
scale capitalists after 1980s
Competition between factions 
produced a relatively broad-
based primitive accumulation.
But aggressive primitive 
accumulation also source of 
intense political instability.
Ability of state institutions to 
implement growth-enhancing 
policies weakened by 
factional competition.
Attempts at centralized 
political control always 
defeated by competitive 
clientelism: 
Competitive clientelism 
weakly institutionalized in the 
post-1990 democracy, but 
vulnerable to attempts at 
monopolization, as in the 
Emergency of 2007-08.
Formal policies to upgrade 
technology generally not 
successful
Factional politics constrains 
endogenous monitoring and 
credible threats of rent-
withdrawal necessary for 
sustaining growth.
Growth policies only 
successful when policies are 
very narrowly defined and 
aspects of rent-withdrawal 
are exogenous (eg MFA).
Effective because of strong 
support for the sector by 
the executive and a supply 
of entrepreneurs emerging 
out of primitive 
accumulation
MFA created a time-bound 
set of rents that could not be 
prolonged through domestic 
political processes. 
The executive had the 
capacity to engage in focused 
institutional innovations with 
significant effects.
Rapid growth of garments 
sector 
Unprecedented growth rates 
achieved by garments sector, 
supporting a creditable 
growth rate for the industrial 
sector as a whole.
But extensions based on this 
experience required to 
achieve technological 
upgrading and movement up 
the global value chain.
Technocratic capabilities 
weaker since 1971 and 
political environment 
unfavourable for rent-
creation that is solely 
intended to be growth-
enhancing 
But occasionally institutional 
arrangements can emerge if 
political support is strong: 
examples include bonded 
warehouses and back-to-
back LCs for the garments 
sector in the early 1980s.
Ongoing asset and rent 
capture by emerging 
propertied classes  1971-
Significant acceleration of 
primitive accumulation by 
Bengali elites after 1971, 
continuing with lesser 
intensity after 1975.
Driven by the use of political 
power to capture or 
influence the granting of 
government  contracts, land, 
bank loans and subsidies.
Rent allocation to 
accelerate learning and 
technology acquisition 
since the 1950s but with 
poor results
Examples include subsidized 
credit allocation by industrial 
banks up to the 1980s, tariff 
protection, subsidies for 
export promotion.
Fortuitous learning rents 
for garment sector created 
by MFA in the 1980s
Quota rents created by MFA 
had significant if fortuitous 
effects for technology 
acquisition in the garments 
sector.
 
Figure 16 Governance and Growth in Bangladesh: Patterns and Vulnerabilities 
 
The conditions that allowed the emergence of the garments sector need to be 
understood because the replication of this very simple technology acquisition is by no 
means assured in other sectors if we do not understand the fortuitous conditions of 
capital availability and the simple and credible learning rents that were necessary for 
the acquisition of even these very simple technologies. The replication of these 
accidental conditions through deliberate yet limited governance capability 
development is a necessary precondition for the replication of these successes and 
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their extension within these economies. Figure 16 summarizes the most important 
governance and growth challenges facing Bangladesh, as well as their role in 
explaining the growth performance of the country.  
 
The fifties and sixties: Accumulation with limited success in learning 
Early growth in Pakistan was financed largely by the trading profits of Gujarati 
Muslim merchants who settled in West Pakistan. The Korean War boom left large 
surpluses with these traders, and when a foreign exchange crisis hit Pakistan in the 
early fifties, the state imposed import controls which made domestic production 
extremely profitable. The early import substitution was primarily in textiles, generally 
of low capital intensity. Unlike the Indian case discussed in Section 6, import 
substitution in Pakistan thus began without any fanfare or planning but the evidence is 
that there was rapid import substitution that soon exhausted easy growth opportunities 
(Papanek 1967: 1-74). 
 
Though the state did not yet have the resources to actively channel subsidies to 
industrialists, the imposition of import controls amounted to a hidden subsidy. 
Papanek reported that profits of fifty to a hundred percent a year were not uncommon 
in the early to mid-fifties (Papanek 1967: 33). Apart from the perception of the 
importance of industrialization, personal contacts also existed between the ruling 
Muslim League leadership and a small number of traders, dating back to the pre-
partition days. 'Nation Building Companies' like the Mohammadi Steamship 
Company and Habib Bank Limited had been established by these traders in India in 
alliance with the Muslim League, and they provided obvious candidates, when 
individuals or companies had to be offered industrial projects (J. Rashid and Gardezi 
1983: 1-8). 
 
Apart from incentives in the form of higher prices in the domestic market, the 
government also directly absorbed the risks of setting up new projects by doing 
startups in the public sector. A month after independence in 1947 from Britain, an 
industries conference was convened where various forms of assistance were offered to 
businessmen but the response was very poor. Partly as a result of this disappointment, 
in 1952 the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was set up, with the 
objective of setting up and divesting working enterprises to risk-averse owners in the 
private sector. Four members on its board came from the leading monopoly houses, 
and the first head of the Corporation, an enterprising public servant named Ghulam 
Faruq, went on to become one of the leading industrialists of the country. The 
relationship between business and government was therefore close to say the least, 
and the levels of accumulation and growth in the industrial sector were 
commensurate. 
 
Also established in the early years were the key financial institutions that would 
finance investments by unknown new entrepreneurs in new industries that did not yet 
have a track record in the country. These were the Pakistan Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation (PICIC) and the Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation 
(later Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, IDBP) which were to assume great 
importance in later years (Alavi 1983: 46-50; Amjad 1983: 235-50).  
 
The military takeover of 1958 allowed very concentrated allocations of resources to 
the large-scale manufacturing sector. A small number of monopoly houses that 
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happened to be controlled by non-Bengalis became the backbone of the investment 
boom of the sixties in both wings of Pakistan. From 1958 to 1970, PICIC allocated 
44.7 per cent of its loans to thirteen monopoly houses, and even the IDBP, which 
concentrated on loans below 2.5 million rupees, allocated 31.9 per cent to thirty 
monopoly houses between 1961 and 1970 (Amjad 1982: 51). Although these two 
institutions allocated about a fifth of total investible resources, leading businessmen 
from the monopoly houses were represented on the boards of all the state financial 
institutions and the Boards of Directors of other monopoly houses (Amjad 1982: 30-
60, 1983: Table 9.7). By the late 1960s, the top 18 business groups controlled 35% of 
industrial assets while the top 44 controlled around 50% (Amjad 1982: 47). 
 
A system of exchange controls also emerged ensuring multiple rates of exchange, so 
that importers of capital goods could import at an overvalued exchange rate but could 
export at an effectively lower exchange rate due to various export bonuses. But since 
export bonuses were not available for agriculture, this ultimately represented a 
subsidy from agriculture to industry. A differentiated structure of quantitative import 
restrictions and tariffs was also imposed. Growth in the late fifties and early sixties 
was further aided by buoyant world markets and a steady flow of aid.  
 
Table 19 shows growth rates in different sectors between 1950 and 1980. This is the 
period that precedes our main period of interest after 1980 when formal attempts at 
industrial policy were largely abandoned. We have already seen growth rates for the 
1980 to 2005 period for all our economies in Table 2 (page 12). The earlier growth 
proved to be unviable, largely because many of the higher technology firms that were 
being supported never graduated to self-sufficiency. Perhaps more of them may have 
if given more time, but political crises led to the abandonment of these strategies by 
the late 1970s. The important point for us is that this earlier growth for all its 
limitations created conditions for the subsequent growth in complex ways that needs 
to be understood. Even allowing for the statistical magnification caused by the 
initially tiny base, industrial growth in the first spurt was rapid from the mid-fifties to 
the mid-sixties, even in the relatively less dynamic East Pakistan.  
 
Table 19 Growth in East Pakistan / Bangladesh 1950-80 
 Manufacturing  Industry  Agriculture  
1950-55 9.5 11.5 2.4 
1955-60 8.5 8.6 0.3 
1960-65 10.6 17.4 3.2 
1965-70 5.3 7.7 2.8 
1970-75 -9.8 not available  not available  
1975-80 5.1 5.9 3.3 
Sources: Alamgir & Berlage (1974 Apdx C Table 4, Apdx 14-A), World Bank (1984; 
1986) 
 
This success led some observers, such as Gustav Papanek, a Harvard Advisory Group 
economist working on Pakistan, to publicize Pakistan as a new model of growth 
(Papanek 1967: 2). With the benefit of hindsight, the weakness of Papanek’s analysis 
was that this acceleration of growth depended on the state’s ability to direct vast 
quantities of resources into the hands of a tiny capitalist class during the late fifties 
and early sixties. The early results of growth in Papanek’s statistics concealed the fact 
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that these accumulation strategies were based on a very vulnerable political settlement 
and did not reveal the limited capacity of the state to govern these subsidies to ensure 
that productivity growth was rapid enough to make the investments viable. 
 
First, as in India, the state’s governance capabilities for limiting moral hazard 
problems were not sufficient given the scale of the strategy. The result was that even 
by the late sixties, new enterprises set up a decade ago had not graduated to the point 
where they could become globally competitive without protections and subsidies 
continuing. The popular perception therefore was that this was a strategy for enriching 
privileged groups. The second weakness, closely connected to the last, was the failure 
to develop a broad-based Bengali capitalist class (in East Pakistan/Bangladesh). The 
weakness of the Bengali bourgeoisie is reflected in Table 20 since much of the growth 
in industrial investments in East Pakistan initially took place through a growth in the 
public sector, peaking at 53 percent of total investments in 1968.  
 
Table 20 Industrial Investment in West and East Pakistan 1961-71 
(Million Rupees in Constant 1960 Prices)
 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
West Pak 852.94 846.15 757.05 1062.50 1221.43 1087.96 987.16 1013.79 916.87 1061.36 
%Public    
Sector  
5.1 3.9 15.6 3.2 9.8 10.8 10.9 11.6 8.3  3.2 
East Pak 205.99 459.42 332.21 382.30 450.21 390.00 477.02 799.81 796.84 700.88  
%Public 
  Sector 
21.7  13.8 29.8 24.3 24.3 25.0 24.8 53.0 50.7 45.7 
 
All Pak 1058.9 1305.6 1089.3 1444.8 1671.6 1478.0 1464.2 1813.6 1713.7 1762.2 
 
            Source: Amjad (1982: Table A.9) 
 
Nevertheless, the very limited growth of a Bengali industrial bourgeoisie began in this 
period. At the time of independence in 1971, one study found sixteen major Bengali 
business houses, each with assets of more than Rs. 25 million, and with combined 
assets of nearly Rs. 700 million (S. Baranov, cited in Sobhan (1980: 15)). The bulk of 
the nascent industrial bourgeoisie was, however, small to medium entrepreneurs. 
Excluding the large jute and textile industries, state financial institutions funding the 
establishment of enterprises had, by 1971 given over 3000 loans to Bengalis, most 
below Rs. 400,000, helping to set up around 1300 units (Sobhan and Ahmad 1980: 
64-5). A much bigger group of Bengali lower middle classes felt totally excluded by 
these policies and their response to independence was to engage in a massive 
acceleration of primitive accumulation through which a new Bengali capitalist class 
was to emerge after a decade.  
 
Socialism and primitive accumulation in the seventies 
The political break of 1971 created a new relationship between upwardly mobile 
Bengali elites and the state that had never before existed in East Bengal. The 
departure of the Pakistani capitalists initiated a new set of pressures on the state for 
another round of primitive accumulation but this time the beneficiaries were local. 
This has significant implications for the nature of primitive accumulation and the 
political economy of different patterns of primitive accumulation will be discussed in 
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a later paper. The takeover of the assets of the West Pakistani capitalists by the state 
resulted in an immediate increase in the state's share in modern industry from 34 per 
cent to 81 per cent. But even this was not enough for the core support base of the new 
political order. The Presidential Order of March 1972 brought in addition, previously 
Bengali-owned factories in the jute, cotton and sugar sectors into public ownership. 
This raised the public sector’s share to no less than 92 per cent of the assets of modern 
industry with a corresponding increase in the economic resources and jobs the state 
could allocate to its core lower middle (intermediate) class constituency (Sobhan and 
Ahmad 1980: Table 10.1; Murshid and Sobhan 1987: 3-4). 
 
Employment in the public services witnessed a dramatic expansion. At the time of 
liberation in 1971, there were 450,000 employees of all grades in the public services, 
of which only 320 were officers at the level of Joint Secretary or above. By 1973 total 
employment in the public services had increased to over 650,000, with officers in the 
higher grades increasing to 660 (World Bank 1984: 109). Some of this growth was 
due to the change in coverage from the inclusion of new industrial units within the 
public sector which brought their administrative staff within the ambit of the public 
services. But the number of white collar staff in Bangladesh's small industrial sector 
would only account for a fraction of the increase. 
 
The political party in power was a coalition of clientelist factions who now used their 
political power to enrich themselves (Umar 1980; E. Ahmed 1986: 27). Nurul Islam, 
an economist in the Planning Commission at that time describes some of the 
processes which lay behind this change: “By 1974 there were a number of factors 
which had contributed to an accumulation of surplus funds in private hands. For one 
thing, high profits were earned in domestic and import trading activities, including 
illegal trade such as trade in contraband goods and in smuggling jute and other 
exportables across the border. Since these transactions were illegal, the risk premium 
was high and hence profits, once realised, were high. In addition, many residential 
buildings and trading or commercial enterprises, abandoned by Pakistanis, were 
illegally occupied by private persons. The ‘caretakers’ of such commercial 
enterprises, hastily appointed by the government in 1972 immediately after 
independence, made large fortunes through the undeclared sale of assets. Moreover, 
there were gains to be obtained from rental or sales proceeds of the abandoned houses 
which were illegally occupied by private persons. Those who had accumulated 
financial resources were pressing the government to commit itself to a more 
substantial and permanent role for private enterprise in the economy of Bangladesh” 
(Islam 1979: 225-6). 
 
This accelerated primitive accumulation was not conducive for economic 
performance. An assessment of 1970-1975 is difficult because of the very real 
disruptions caused by the war, and the short life of the regime. Productivity in 
manufacturing was on average less than 50% of the level reached in 1970 and real 
wages in manufacturing, around 60% of their 1969/70 level (World Bank 1978: Vol. 
II Annex I.6 p. 173, 1984: Vol. II Table 9.12 p. 118). The state could not of course 
remain insulated from the political consequences of the collapsing economy. In 
addition, ironically, the primitive accumulation was itself creating a constituency 
which would eventually support the military in its attempts to create an environment 
more appropriate for investing their ill-gotten gains in industry.  
 
 88
By 1974, pressure from the new ‘capitalist’ class resulted in a revision of the 
government’s ‘socialist’ industrial policy. The ceiling on private investment was 
increased from two and a half million to thirty million takas. Partnerships with foreign 
private investors were allowed, and the moratorium on nationalization was increased 
from ten to fifteen years. The new military government of General Zia that took over 
in 1975 began a slow process of denationalization. Between 1976 and 1983, a total of 
217 public sector enterprises were wholly or partially sold to the private sector or 
returned to their former Bengali owners from whom they had been nationalized 
without compensation in the aftermath of liberation.  
 
However, significant denationalizations only began under the regime of General 
Ershad. Under the New Industrial Policy adopted in 1982, denationalizations of large-
scale public enterprises were given priority. In the face of substantial and growing 
political opposition, the government divested 110 large units in little more than a year, 
including jute mills that had previously been owned by Bengalis, after which the 
programme continued at a slower pace (World Bank 1984: 149). The privatizations 
were supported by international agencies, but in effect they had a very limited impact 
on the economy. The large-scale enterprises that had been created under the Pakistani 
industrial policy of the sixties had never achieved full global competitiveness. When 
they were nationalized in the seventies they built up additional and vast liabilities on 
their books because of over-employment, looting and mismanagement. This did 
nothing to help their future viability as enterprises when they were gradually 
privatized in the eighties. The new owners took over the liabilities as well, wrongly 
believing that political arrangements could be worked out to sustain subsidies into the 
future. Some of the privatized firms limped on and were lucky to become moderately 
profitable. Many eventually closed down, particularly in the jute and cotton textile 
sectors.  
 
The net effect of the Pakistani industrial policy as well as the accelerated primitive 
accumulation that happened in the immediate aftermath of independence did not take 
the country to a significantly higher technological level. Rather, the main effect was 
to achieve the creation of a new moneyed class through a process of primitive 
accumulation that began in the fifties. By the mid-1980s, Bangladesh had a potential 
small to medium capitalist class who had accumulated relatively significant blocks of 
capital. There were by now at least hundreds of individuals who could if called upon 
raise $100,000 or more of capital in the form of land, liquid capital or collateralized 
bank loans for investment. These individuals began to look around for simple 
technologies to invest in, now as economic entrepreneurs. It was at this stage that a 
lucky accident had a significant impact on Bangladesh’s prospects. 
 
The MFA and the acquisition of garments technologies 
The growth of the ready-made garments industry in Bangladesh has often been 
presented as a vindication of the success of free market policies combined with the 
virtual absence of labour market protections in Bangladesh. But in fact investment 
even in the simplest of technologies involves significant risks for domestic investors 
who have no idea of what production in a globalized production network entails. Nor 
is it viable for foreign firms to invest in upskilling labour in a poor economy in low-
margin low technology industries unless there is some cost-sharing and risk-sharing 
for the foreign firm. This is after all why all global production does not rapidly shift to 
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the poorest countries. A combination of factors made this transfer of technology 
feasible for Bangladesh in the early 1980s.  
 
An important component was the emergence of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) 
in 1973 as an agreement administered by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). MFA set bilaterally negotiated quotas on developing countries for textile 
and clothing exports. In addition, it was fortuitous that just at that time a potential 
investor class had emerged through the industrialization efforts and primitive 
accumulation described in the last two sections. Finally, Bangladesh had an ‘investor-
friendly’ regime that saw the importance of underwriting foreign investments in the 
sector by informal support at the highest level. The emergence of the garment sector 
provides a good example of the ad hoc ways in which market failures have been 
addressed in second tier countries like Bangladesh (Figure 11 on p. 33). Nevertheless, 
the replication of this success to other sectors requires a better understanding of the 
conditions that made the garments takeoff possible.  
 
The MFA restricted exports from existing developing country textile and clothing 
producers on the business of quantitative quotas. For countries that did not have any 
textile and clothing industries, like Bangladesh, there were initially no quotas (Goto 
1989). This obviously created incentives for established producers who suddenly 
found themselves quantity-constrained to relocate to countries that did not have 
quotas. But developing countries that did not have a textile and clothing sector were 
clearly relatively poor countries which particularly suffered from market failures 
affecting technology acquisition and learning. To attract investors from more 
advanced countries who wanted to relocate, developing countries had to offer 
something more than just their quota-free status. After all, many poor countries were 
quota-free but only a very few benefited from MFA. Bangladesh was one of them and 
its success has to be explained in terms of specific mechanisms through which these 
market failures were addressed.  
 
By the late 1970s, domestic primitive accumulation had created numerous potential 
investors for a sector like garments where the efficient scale of investment was in 
most lines at most in the hundreds of thousands or low millions of dollars. The agent 
of change in Bangladesh’s transition was a joint venture between a retired 
Bangladeshi civil servant turned entrepreneur, Nurul Quader Khan, and a South 
Korean multinational, Daewoo. The joint venture set up Desh Garments in 1979, a 
partnership where the Bangladeshi partner provided capital and arranged government 
support for a new potentially risky investment, and the South Korean multinational 
provided the training and technology transfer. That a retired civil servant from 
Bangladesh could sit across the table with a global multinational and offer credible 
equity cannot be understood outside the context of the primitive accumulation that the 
country had just gone through. Daewoo’s calculations were straightforward. 
Bangladesh’s access to US and other markets through MFA was an attractive business 
proposition but they would probably not have been willing to take all the risks of 
investing in Bangladesh without credible commitments from the developing country.  
 
Equity participation from a joint venture partner provided part of this commitment, 
but perhaps even more important was the explicit support provided by President Ziaur 
Rahman to the project. President Zia’s support appeared credible because he took the 
initiative in linking up Nurul Quader with Kim Woo-Choong, the chairman of 
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Daewoo. His support assured the South Koreans that unexpected problems would be 
dealt with or at least addressed. And in fact, political support at the highest level 
ensured that relatively small but critical institutional innovations like the back-to-back 
LC (which allowed Bangladeshi producers to borrow from local banks using export 
orders as collateral) and the bonded warehouse (which allowed complex customs 
duties on imported inputs to be avoided) were quickly introduced.  
 
Desh was remarkably successful. Between 1981 and 1987 its export value grew at an 
annual average of 90% (S. Rahman 2004). But the learning that was unleashed by this 
single project was remarkable. By the end of the 1980s, of the 130 people who were 
first trained by Desh in Daewoo’s factories in South Korea, 115 had become 
entrepreneurs and set up their own garment firms! From virtually a zero base in 1980, 
by 2005 there were around 3500 active firms in the garments sector employing 
upwards of 2 million people (World Bank 2005). Primitive accumulation continued to 
be an important source of entrepreneurial supply. In a survey carried out in 1993, 23% 
of garment factory owners responded that they had originally been civil servants or in 
the army (Quddus and Rashid 2000). We can assume that many others had close 
contacts with politics and had made their initial capital through political processes.  
 
Table 21 Bangladesh Garments: Growth Rates of Dollar Exports 1985-2006 
Year Woven Knitwear Total Garments Dollar Exports Growth Rates
1985-1990   45.9 
1990-1995   24.1 
1995-2000   14.3 
2000-01   11.7 
2001-02 –7.1 –2.5 –5.7 
2002-03 4.3 13.3 7.2 
2003-04 8.6 29.9 15.8 
2004-05 1.7 31.3 12.9 
2005-06 13.5 35.4 23.1 
Sources: (based on  Mlachila and Yang 2004: Table 1; World Bank 2005: Table 1). 
 
The rapid emergence of Bangladesh as a garment exporting country is shown in Table 
21. Exports grew at double digit rates for more than two decades. By the early 2000s, 
the sector accounted for around 70% of Bangladeshi exports. By 1985, such was the 
success of the Bangladesh garment industry that Ronald Reagan negotiated quotas for 
Bangladesh under the MFA. Though Bangladesh continued to benefit from 
preferential treatment, particularly in European Union markets, effectively, the first 
five years of quota protection were enough to trigger a major shift in the country’s 
fortunes. This result had many contributing factors but they include, first, the MFA 
which provided substantial temporary rents that served to induce learning in a context 
where the rent-free wage-productivity differentials between Bangladesh and other 
countries had proved to be insufficient to induce the absorption even of this relatively 
simple technology (Khan 2000a).   
 
The MFA worked as a system of accidental learning rents because it provided 
relatively moderate rents that were part of an arrangement that was formally 
recognized as being temporary. Bangladesh had its own quotas by 1985, and from 
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very early on it was clear that most producers could not rely on the continuation of 
these arrangements for too long (M. A. Rashid 2006). In addition, Bangladesh had a 
favourable political regime able to make small but critical institutional innovations to 
support a project that had political support at the highest level. And finally, it worked 
because the country had at that time a supply of potential entrepreneurs who were 
close enough to the entrepreneurial capabilities required for this technology, and who 
had access to capital from earlier strategies of political accumulation. The emergence 
of the garments industry, together with less dramatic successes in a number of other 
sectors like pharmaceuticals ensured that industry has been steadily growing as a 
share of GDP in Bangladesh, shown in Table 22. 
 
Table 22 Bangladesh: Sectoral Shares in GDP 1980-2005 
1980 1990 2000 2005
Bangladesh Agriculture 31.6 30.3 25.5 20.1
Industry 20.6 21.5 25.3 27.2
Services 47.8 48.3 49.2 52.6
    Source: (World Bank 2008) 
 
The history of garments in Bangladesh has important implications for other countries 
hoping to achieve growth through low-technology labour-intensive investments. It 
shows that the critical triggers for this takeoff were not market liberalization on its 
own, but a specific set of corrections for market failures that can be better understood 
in terms of the framework set out in this paper. Moreover, this has implications for 
Bangladesh too as it attempts to move higher up the value chain. Much of its growth 
so far has been at the lower ends of the value chain, even though there is evidence of 
growing backward linkages and diversification. By 2005, roughly 45% of export 
value was value added in the domestic economy due to growing backward linkages in 
spinning, weaving, dyeing and accessories (Debapriya Bhattacharya, et al. 2002; 
World Bank 2005; M. N. Ahmed and Hossain 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, on the whole, the Bangladesh garment industry operates at the lower 
end of the global value chain. For instance, the average per kilogram price of its 
knitwear exports to the European Union in the early 2000s is around half that of India 
or China, and around one third that of Turkey (M. Rahman 2004). Within this product 
basket, when we compare unit prices of Bangladeshi exports with that from other 
countries, Bangladeshi prices are comparable to its competitors, suggesting that its 
lower wages do not give it any significant advantage over competitors. Bangladesh’s 
wage rates in the garment industry are also known to be one of the lowest 
internationally and the lowest amongst its regional South Asian competitors (M. N. 
Ahmed and Hossain 2006: Figure 4).  
 
Taking these facts together, it follows that Bangladesh has the lowest value-added per 
employee amongst the major garment exporting countries, but it is competitive 
because it has one of the lowest wages and salaries per employee (Mlachila and Yang 
2004: Table 9). Mlachila and Yang’s figures show that around 1997-2001, 
Bangladeshi value-added per employee was less than one-fifth that of China, and 
about a third of that of India. Bangladeshi wages and salaries were a quarter of China 
and just over half the Indian average. Recent trends in wages across countries suggest 
that these ratios are unlikely to have changed very much. It is also true that wages and 
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conditions in the garments industry have become a growing source of friction between 
management and workers. In 2007 and 2008, garment industry workers were involved 
in strikes and confrontations for higher wages despite the state of emergency declared 
by the interim caretaker government.  
 
These observations suggest that Bangladesh concentrates on a low-value product mix 
in its export basket, and even within that low-value product mix, its competitiveness is 
based on low wages that compensate for its lower productivity. This allows 
Bangladesh to sell low-value products at the same price as its competitors, most of 
whom can afford to pay somewhat higher wages. This situation is precarious not only 
because there are other low wage countries trying to enter this market, but also 
because the low wages of Bangladeshi garment workers cannot be taken as a given, 
particularly given the mobilization of garment workers over the last several years 
demanding higher wages and better conditions. Both moving up the value chain into 
higher value-added products and raising productivity are critically important for 
Bangladesh. The challenge for countries like Bangladesh is to learn from these 
successes and to focus on the types of market failure corrections that may be required 
to assist sectors like the garment sector to move up the value chain.  
 
The story of the garment industry’s success tells us that market failures in capital and 
knowledge markets were overcome through very specific policy and governance 
arrangements. The blocks of capital required for the next stage of upgrading are much 
larger and primitive accumulation cannot be relied upon to provide these investments. 
A survey of the garment sector in 2007 revealed that the available terms of financing 
were an important constraint to technology upgrading in the sector (Khan 2008a). 
Banks were willing to lend but the fixed return and collateral requirements deterred 
investors who were not sure about the length of time learning would take. And profit 
sharing investors were deterred by poor contact enforcement. This is an example of 
financial and knowledge market failures that require specific solutions if industrial 
growth and productivity improvement are to be sustained.  
 
Our interpretation of the causes behind the rapid growth of the garment industry in 
Bangladesh also casts doubts on the argument that Bangladesh’s success was based on 
cheap labour and labour market flexibility. It is true that Bangladesh scores much 
higher than India on labour flexibility (it is easier to fire workers compared to India) 
and indeed both Pakistan and Bangladesh score higher than India on the overall 
ranking of ‘Doing Business Conditions’ of the World Bank. But the specific 
mechanisms through which the garment industry developed suggests that cheap and 
flexible labour by itself did not help Bangladesh very much before the market failures 
constraining investment in a new sector were overcome. Moreover, the persistence of 
cheap and flexible labour has not helped investment in the next stages of the value 
chain and low wages have remained low, with important consequences for poverty 
reduction and for social stability. The implication for other developing countries must 
be that low wages and labour market flexibility are not sufficient for a manufacturing 
takeoff to happen. There are significant market failures even in the adoption of simple 
technologies that need to be addressed. And if the market failures impeding 
technology acquisition can be systematically addressed, very low wages and 
excessive labour market flexibility may not even be necessary conditions for a 
manufacturing takeoff.    
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10. Tanzania: Growth led by natural resources and aid 
The poorest of our economies is Tanzania. It was originally the former British colony 
of Tanganyika which became independent in 1961. In 1964 it merged with the island 
of Zanzibar, and the new country became Tanzania. As colonies Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar were less developed even compared with other East African countries like 
Kenya and Uganda. Kenya had the most developed colonial industrial structure in 
East Africa, owned by large European and Asian minority communities and 
multinationals. Uganda was not as industrialized but had a larger educated elite and 
better infrastructure (Wangwe and Arkadie 2000: 67). In contrast, large parts of the 
mainland rural population of Tanganyika had not settled into sedentary agriculture. 
There had been a few experiments with plantation farming under colonial rule, but 
they had not been very successful. Modern industry was almost non-existent. 
However, independent Tanzania had a very successful period of state-building under 
Nyerere and his successors. It has recently graduated into a high growth economy 
around 2000 but its growth is particularly vulnerable as it is to a considerable extent 
based on a few mineral exports and inflows of aid.  
 
Overview 
Shortly after independence, Tanzania adopted Five Year Planning, in line with most 
developing countries of the time. But here the almost total absence of an indigenous 
capitalist economy of any size made it possible to move towards a more complete 
state control of the economy. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 committed the country 
to an attempt to construct socialism using central planning. It also prohibited its 
leaders from any association ‘with the practices of capitalism or feudalism’. The idea 
was to achieve an economic transformation of the country based on socialist 
principles and with strict limits on private sector accumulation.  
 
Attempts were made to industrialize using planning and public sector ‘parastatal’ 
companies. A transformation of agriculture was attempted through villagization that 
sought to convert a migrant rural population into a sedentary one farming on 
collective principles. None of these experiments were particularly successful. When 
Uganda’s Idi Amin invaded in 1978 the war precipitated an economic downturn that 
eventually led to the adoption of liberalization strategies in the mid 1980s. However, 
some achievements of the Nyerere years were significant. The construction of a one-
party democracy and the adoption of a single language, Kiswahili gradually converted 
a fragmented tribal society with multiple religions and languages into a relatively 
united nation with relatively low levels of internal strife compared to many other 
similar countries (Mkapa 2008).  
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Policies/Rents Governance Outcomes/Vulnerabilities
Some industrialization 
1967-78 but reversed after 
1978 Uganda invasion and 
external shocks
Disciplined party and 
aversion to private 
accumulation in Ujamaa 
period meant there were very 
few black African elites who 
could become potential 
capitalists when socialism 
began to be rolled back.
Disciplined one party state 
but inclusion of all 
managers within state-party 
meant disciplining of 
performance would be 
weak
In fact, experiment did not last 
long enough to test if the 
disciplining of non-performers 
was possible
Rapid growth of mining 
sector and some growth of 
manufacturing and utilities 
particularly with foreign 
participation
Significant imbalance in 
sharing mining rents with 
foreign investors.
Slow growth of manufacturing 
despite  very small base.
Governance reforms aimed 
at donor community such 
as PFM, commitment to 
anti-corruption, progress 
on multi-party democracy
Efficient service delivery in 
health and education may not 
be sufficient for achieving 
sustainable growth path.
Significant growth in public 
spending on health and 
education
High GDP growth rates 
sustained by public spending 
but questions about whether 
aid at these levels can 
continue. 
Expectations of aid financed 
spending can have damaging 
political and economic effects 
if aid is suddenly suspended.
Arms length formal 
relationships with business 
but informal relations 
probably based on 
suspicion and short term 
rent sharing 
Rent sharing in mining 
weighted towards investors
Key challenge of developing 
dynamic black African 
capitalist sector not 
addressed.
Ujamaa Socialism: Rent 
allocation to public sector 
for learning and collective 
development 1967-1985
Industrial development 
through public sector 
‘parastatals’. 
Agricultural development 
through villagization and 
collective farming.
Liberalization and 
Privatization 1985-
Privatization of parastatals 
primarily benefited foreign 
investors.
Significant growth 
contribution of gold mining 
due to attractive rent sharing 
opportunities for foreign 
investors.
Significant aid rents 
financing social spending 
1990-
High rates of growth of 
public spending 
arithmetically add to growth 
rate and could raise social 
productivity in the long run 
through health and 
education.
 
Figure 17 Governance and Growth in Tanzania: Patterns and Vulnerabilities 
 
The liberalization had moderate effects on manufacturing and less so on agricultural 
growth rates, but did allow multinationals to seek to develop Tanzania’s significant 
mineral resources. Liberalization was also happening simultaneously with a 
significant increase in aid inflows that allowed for an increase in government 
spending in social sectors. This too had an effect on growth by supporting 
construction, expenditures in health and education and demand expansion more 
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generally. From an unenviable position of negative growth of per capita income in the 
early 1990s Tanzania achieved positive per capita income growth in the late nineties, 
and a further acceleration after 2000 which gave it a growth rate of per capita income 
from 2000 to 2005 that was higher than the global average (Table 2 on p. 12).  
 
Despite this very creditable success, the relatively slow growth of manufacturing and 
agriculture points to problems. The slow growth of manufacturing based on 
indigenous ownership in particular suggests there are fundamental factors preventing 
the development of an indigenous African capitalism in Tanzania. Unlike the brief 
period of socialism in Bangladesh described earlier, Tanzanian socialism was 
different in that it did not induce an indigenous primitive accumulation to anything 
like the same extent. On the contrary, Tanzanian socialism was rather orderly in 
comparison, reflecting the very different histories that had brought about public 
ownership and planning in the two countries. But as a result, an African capitalist 
class with the capital and enterprise to start investing even in basic technologies like 
garments still does not exist on a broad enough scale. And the development of this 
class will require significant political effort to address the market failures in land and 
capital markets that prevented the emergence of such a class in the past.  
 
Ujamaa Socialism and the missing Tanzanian capitalist class 
Nyerere’s definition of an African socialism was summed up in his concept of 
Ujamaa derived from the Swahili word for ‘extended family’. The Arusha Declaration 
adopted Ujamaa as the conceptual foundation of the state. Acquisition and personal 
accumulation were discouraged, and development was to be attained through 
collective advancement. These principles did not have any significant effect on an 
African capitalist class simply because it did not exist to any substantial degree. 
However, it did have a discouraging effect on the Asian business class, and the post-
Arusha nationalization of banks, urban property and most commercial services led to 
increased Asian emigration. But in the absence of formal policies of promoting the 
development of a new African capitalist class, or significant informal policies of 
capturing assets by the new political elite, the development of an African capitalism 
remained constrained. At the same time, weak incentives and technical skills meant 
that African development through public enterprises was also constrained (Wangwe 
and Arkadie 2000: 67-70).  
 
Ujamaa was a system of rent allocation through protection and nationalization that 
was addressing a set of market failures that many other developing countries were 
trying to address at that time. If Tanzania’s economic development had been 
constrained by capital and information market failures preventing the development of 
infant industries, temporary protection may well have been justified. But as we 
discussed in Section 4, these strategies are only effective if governance capabilities 
can be developed to minimize moral hazard and rent capture problems. We have seen 
that in other second tier countries where these governance capabilities were weak, 
similar policies nevertheless led to some development of technological capabilities 
and the accumulation of capital by protected individuals that led to forms of capitalist 
growth when these systems of protection broke down. In Asian countries, a variety of 
relationships subsequently developed between emergent capitalists and the state. The 
distinguishing feature of Tanzania and some other African countries was that the 
starting point was less developed and the infant industry policies lasted for much 
shorter periods, so that when the break with state-led development occurred in the 
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mid-1980s, indigenous African elites were not poised technologically or financially to 
take advantage of these opportunities to the same extent.  
 
A critical difference between Asia and Africa in this respect was that the African 
starting point was less favourable and the catching up policies lasted for a very short 
period of time. After the Arusha declaration of 1967, infant industry policies and 
planning only began in earnest sometime in the 1970s. When parastatals and 
marketing boards were first set up their initial performance was poor as we would 
expect. The problem was that these strategies had very little time to have either their 
intended effect or to set off unintended processes of accumulation within Tanzania. 
Idi Amin’s infelicitous invasion of Tanzania in 1978 that resulted in a costly war, 
followed by rising oil prices due to OPEC policies meant that the Tanzanian economy 
was in serious fiscal crisis less than a decade after the adoption of these policies.  
 
The economic performance of the country over this short period does not necessarily 
tell us very much about the likely trajectory it would have followed in the absence of 
shocks of this magnitude. We know that economic performance was not stellar, but 
we would not expect that given the structural problems, in particular the absence of 
any significant technological and entrepreneurial capabilities. Between 1965 and 
1980, the growth rate of GDP was 3.9 per cent, with agriculture growing at 1.7 per 
cent, industry at 4.2 per cent, and manufacturing at 5.6 per cent. But in the next five 
years, from 1980 to 1985, following the external shocks, the growth of GDP collapsed 
to 0.8 per cent, of agriculture to 0.7 per cent, of industry to -4.5 per cent and 
manufacturing to -4.6 per cent (Shitundu 2002: Table 7.2) 
 
The initial response of the government was to protect its policies from what was 
perceived to be a temporary shock. The National Economic Survival Programme of 
1981 was followed by a home grown Structural Adjustment Programme in 1982 and a 
campaign against economic ‘saboteurs’ in 1983 (Utz and Moon 2008). But the 
international climate was shifting against socialism and planning and internal support 
for these programmes began to run out. Power within Tanzania began to shift from 
the Planning Commission to the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Tanzania, with 
moves towards conventional economic stabilization plans and privatization. 
 
But when Tanzania abandoned catching-up strategies in the mid-1980s it had hardly 
created any indigenous capitalists or even technological capabilities that could sustain 
the rapid emergence of domestic capitalists. Not surprisingly, its experience with 
liberalization and opening up was significantly different from the Asian ones. In 
particular, there was a much weaker acceleration of manufacturing growth driven by 
national capitalists. The weak development of an African entrepreneurial class is in 
fact a major distinguishing characteristic of some African countries, and perhaps 
much more important for understanding relative performance than the resource 
constraints and resource curses that are frequently identified, which are obviously also 
important (Collier 2007).  
 
The absence of a ‘national’ capitalism matters, because as Wangwe and Arkadie 
(2000) point out, the relationship between an African political leadership and a 
‘foreign’ capitalism is unlikely to develop the types of business-government 
relationships that can address the market failures facing entrepreneurs in developing 
countries. On the contrary, these relationships are likely to be founded on suspicion 
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and businesses are likely to be subjected to occasional populist attacks. Since 
businesses know this, their strategies of investment and commitment to the economy 
are also likely to be adjusted accordingly.  
 
The absence of a strong and dynamic class of entrepreneurs is of course a problem in 
a number of African countries. Remarkably, analysis and policy rarely address the 
problems that may be preventing the emergence of black African capitalists in Africa. 
As Bennell (1998: 17) points out, the result may be that many of the policies for 
achieving market efficiency and improvements in poverty targeting that are advocated 
for Africa may fail to have a lasting impact. When these issues are addressed, there is 
a tendency to blame corruption and patrimonialism in Africa for stifling entrepreneurs 
without recognizing that corruption and patrimonialism were structurally associated 
with the emergence of capitalism virtually everywhere else in the world (Khan 2002, 
2006). This is to some extent because significant market failures have almost always 
meant that substantial non-market processes were involved in the emergence of 
capitalism.  
 
Of course corruption and patrimonialism are not sufficient for the emergence of 
capitalism either; otherwise much of Africa would have made a significant transition 
by now. A variety of institutional and political conditions have assisted these 
transitions in different countries, depending on their initial conditions and political 
contexts (Khan 2004, 2005). But simply trying to reduce corruption and contain neo-
patrimonialism will have limited effects if the market failures and the absence of 
capabilities preventing the emergence of dynamic capitalists in Africa are not directly 
addressed. Ujamaa was not trying to create African capitalists; on the contrary it was 
trying to ensure that they did not emerge. Nor did Ujamaa last long enough to enable 
unintended primitive accumulation by Africans to take place that may have assisted 
the emergence of an African capitalism. But Ujamaa did have significant 
achievements and these should not be overlooked. As ex-president Mkapa points out 
(Mkapa 2008), the main achievement of Ujamaa was the development of a modern 
Tanzanian state and the crafting together of national unity in a potentially fragmented 
and divided polity.  
 
Market-enhancing reforms and the growth takeoff  
The reform process that began in the mid-1980s was deepened over time, particularly 
under President Benjamin Mkapa when he was elected in 1996. Privatizations of the 
410 parastatals that had been set up under Ujamaa began in 1993. By the mid-2000s 
significant market-enhancing reforms had been implemented in Tanzania. The 
financial sector was opened up and the two largest state-owned banks were privatized. 
By 2003, more than 380 of the 410 parastatals in manufacturing and commercial 
activities were privatized. Trade reforms were introduced to reduce tariffs. 
(AFRODAD 2007; Utz 2008: 19-20). From around 2000, the growth of GDP also 
accelerated, with a significant improvement in the growth of per capita GDP. Post-
reform Tanzania emerged as one of the rapidly growing economies of the world. 
However, a closer look at the structure of this growth in Table 23 points to a number 
of distinctive features. 
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Table 23 Sectoral Sources of Growth in Tanzania 1990-2005 
 Average Annual Growth Rate Average Contribution to Growth
 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
Agriculture 3.1 3.6 4.8 1.5 1.8 2.3 
Industry 2.0 5.4 9.0 0.3 0.9 1.6 
   Mining and Quarrying 11.8 14.8 15.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 
   Manufacturing 0.4 4.6 7.3 0.0 0.4 0.6 
   Electricity and Water 4.0 5.7 4.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 
   Construction 2.2 3.5 10.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 
Services 1.9 3.8 6.1 0.7 1.3 2.1 
   Public Administration  1.9 1.6 4.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 
GDP 2.5 4.0 6.0 2.5 4.0 6.0 
Source: Utz (2008: Table 1.2) 
 
The highest growth sectors in 2000-05 were mining and quarrying and construction. 
In mining, the growth was the effect of a rapid expansion of gold mining as lucrative 
concessions were granted to mining companies. Mining is still a small sector of the 
economy, accounting for 3-4 per cent of GDP in the early 2000s (Khan and Gray 
2006: 62). So is construction. The small size of these sectors in overall GDP meant 
that these sectors together only accounted for 0.9 per cent of the 6.0 per cent GDP 
growth rate, but the acceleration in these sectors accounted for a significant part of the 
change in the growth rate.  
 
Tanzania has the second largest gold reserves in Africa, after South Africa. Initial 
changes in mining laws in 1987 and 1992 set royalties at 3% of income and set 
normal corporation tax levels. Despite the very generous levels of royalties, there 
were limited foreign investments initially. Then in 1998 there was a further revision 
of laws enabling license holders to use mining rights as collateral without further 
ministerial approval. This facilitated the participation of foreign financial institutions 
in Tanzanian mining and led to a significant increase in investment in the mining 
sector. By 2000, FDI coming into Tanzania had grown from virtually zero in the early 
1990s to more than $500 million, of which 30 per cent went to mining, 31 per cent to 
manufacturing and 14 per cent to trade and tourism (Utz 2008: 33). However, the 
generous royalty levels were maintained in the 1998 Mining Act. While there was a 
30 per cent corporation tax, generous capital deductions meant that little tax was paid 
(Khan and Gray 2006: 60-1). The contribution of mining to gross national product is 
therefore likely to be significantly lower than its contribution to gross domestic 
product.  
 
The second sector with dramatic growth rates during this period was construction, 
with increases in government investment in infrastructure as well as private 
residential and business construction. Public spending on construction, together with 
the growth in public administration (which includes health and education) has been 
significantly assisted in Tanzania by the growth of aid. Together, the growth in 
construction activities and the growth in public administration account for another 0.8 
per cent of the 6.0 per cent growth in GDP during 2000-05. In comparison, the growth 
in the manufacturing sector contributed 0.6 per cent of this total growth.  
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Table 24 Aid to Tanzania 1990-2006 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2006
Aid as % of Gross National Income 28.6 16.9 11.4 12.0 14.5
Aid as % of Imports of Goods and Services 69.9 38.1 45.7 33.6 34.6  
   Source: World Bank (2008). 
 
Table 24 shows the significance of aid in the Tanzanian economy. Although its 
significance has tended to decline in recent years, aid is around 15 per cent of national 
income and equivalent to around a third of the total import bill of the country. Budget 
support as a vehicle for aid delivery has also meant that at least 20 per cent of the 
budget comes directly from aid. These flows have ensured that government spending 
in health, education and public administration have grown rapidly and this directly 
(arithmetically) contributed to the acceleration in GDP growth. The long-term effects 
could also be positive but that would depend on the quality of health and education 
delivered. As Utz (2008: 36) shows, government spending had a critical role in 
sustaining high levels of growth. From 2000 to 2005, of the overall growth rate of 
GDP of 6.8 per cent per annum, increased government spending contributed no less 
than 3.8 percentage points.  
 
The growth takeoff in Tanzania therefore relied on two sets of accidental rents. First, 
there were governance responses to the potential of developing mining and this 
attracted foreign mining companies to drive an important and growing component of 
growth. Second, aid donors with their new interest in Africa and budget support 
provided aid-based rents that created large domestic demand growth and 
arithmetically boosted growth by increasing expenditure on health and education. 
Here too, Tanzania benefited by being able to respond quickly with governance 
adaptations that satisfied donors.  
 
In the main productive sectors of agriculture and manufacturing the picture is 
somewhat different. Some acceleration of manufacturing growth did take place, again 
based largely on foreign investors buying up parastatals or investing in low 
technology manufacturing. But the question is whether the new policies have led to 
sustained improvements in growth in these sectors. The growth in manufacturing and 
utilities was achieved through privatizations of parastatals, with sales often to Asian, 
South African, Malaysian and other investors. These sales did result in productivity 
improvements in many cases, and increases in output (AFRODAD 2007).  
 
The real question for countries like Tanzania is whether there has been a significant 
improvement in sustainable growth as a result of these policies. Even if the increased 
spending on health and education was well spent, the potential improvement in 
productivity will only be realized if employment opportunities are created that can 
absorb workers with somewhat better education and health in the future. Here, when 
we look at the main productive sectors of agriculture and manufacturing significant 
problems appear. Some acceleration of manufacturing growth did take place, again 
based largely on foreign investors buying up public enterprises (called parastatals in 
Tanzania) as they were privatized, or investing in low technology manufacturing. But 
the question is whether the new policies can sustain growth in these sectors.  
 
Given the weakness of domestic entrepreneurs, it would seem that a critical part of a 
growth strategy has to be the creation of domestic entrepreneurial capabilities. This is 
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particularly because foreign investors are unlikely to invest in sectors where long 
periods of learning are required particularly because they are unlikely to develop 
long-term relationships with government that would allow the negotiation of 
incentives to enable such investments. The share of industry as a whole in GDP in 
Tanzania remains relatively small, growing from 16 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 20 
per cent of GDP in 2005. And most of this growth was attributable to the growth of 
mining, with manufacturing showing a more modest increase (Utz 2008: 22). In 2001, 
manufacturing still accounted for only 4.5 per cent of commodity exports (Levin and 
Mhamba 2007: 6-7).  
 
The problems that manufacturing faces in Tanzania are no different to other poor 
countries. Financing investments in new sectors requires investments in upskilling 
labour and is subject to market failures in capital markets and markets for knowledge 
and labour as discussed in Section 4. The general importance of skills and financing is 
corroborated by surveys of Tanzanian manufacturing enterprises (Chandra, et al. 
2008). However, skills development is not just a function of formal education, but 
also of learning-by-doing, which in turn has to be financed by sources of financing 
that achieve an acceptable balance of risks and returns for entrepreneurs and 
financiers. In the case of Bangladesh, where a supply of potential entrepreneurs with 
sufficient capital had been created by primitive accumulation, the adoption of even 
very simple garments technologies on a significant scale required investments in skills 
that became possible because of temporary rents created by MFA. In Africa, AGOA 
and EBA have created opportunities for African garment and textile exporters but 
they are competing with already established Asian garment producers in poor 
countries who also have unrestricted access to these markets or access at very low 
levels of duty. More substantial and directed sectoral assistance to African producers 
may be required that is both time bound and subject to specific governance 
requirements to achieve growth-enhancing outcomes. But even more fundamentally, 
policies may be required to accelerate the evolution of a potential class of African 
investors who probably do not yet exist in countries like Tanzania.  
 
Measures of total factor productivity are problematic in Tanzania given the poor data 
on capital stock. However, Utz (2008: Table 1.4) carries out calculations using a 
number of different assumptions about base year capital stock. The conclusion is that 
it is plausible that total factor productivity grew at between 0.7 and 1.24 per cent per 
annum between 1995 and 2005. But there is little evidence of significant 
improvements in technology in agriculture and industry. Rather these findings are, as 
Utz points out, consistent with improvements in capacity utilization in manufacturing 
as a result of privatizations and rapid increases in (aid-financed) government 
spending.  
 
Agriculture also presents significant challenges. Primary sector exports accounted for 
33 per cent of exports in 2001 (Levin and Mhamba 2007: 6), with coffee, cashews and 
fishing constituting the largest share. Cotton too is a potentially promising sector. 
However, average wages in agriculture were only around 15 per cent of those in 
manufacturing, suggesting very high levels of poverty and very low productivity in 
agriculture (Chandra, et al. 2008: 145). Cotton yields per hectare in Tanzania were 
low even by African standards, about two-thirds of those in Zimbabwe and less than 
half that in Benin or Mali (Baffles 2002: Table 1). Significant improvements in seed 
quality and distribution can be achieved through gradual work with distributors. Some 
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improvements can be made relatively easily through better distribution of higher 
quality seeds. Other improvements in agriculture will have to address the vexed 
question of land rights and land consolidation to achieve scale economies, and the 
capacity to make investments in irrigation and inputs. These reforms may actually be 
much more time consuming to achieve relative to governance arrangements that could 
accelerate manufacturing investments to rapidly create higher paid manufacturing 
sector jobs.  
 
The case of Tanzania is particularly interesting because the governance and reform 
agenda in the country has been strongly influenced by a market-enhancing perspective 
coming from international development partners. To some extent these reforms have 
clearly been very successful. The reform in mining laws gave a lion’s share of mining 
rents to foreign investors, arguably to attract investment into Tanzania when it was 
not an established FDI destination. The government’s willingness to address 
transparency issues and accept PFM reforms allowed the country to receive 
significant aid inflows including budget support, which contributed strongly to public 
expenditure driven growth.  
 
In the future, however, a different set of governance capabilities may become critical. 
The capacity of the state to change rent-sharing arrangements in mining, to increase 
that national claim on mining rents and then re-deploy these resource rents for 
domestic development will be a critical capacity to develop. Another condition for a 
developmental transition would be the evolution of relationships between the 
Tanzanian state and domestic entrepreneurs, perhaps initially Asian but eventually 
black African. The initial evidence from privatizations and casual observation of the 
business sector in Tanzania suggests that black African entrepreneurs are still 
relatively rare.  
 
Growth-enhancing governance to improve productivity and investment in 
manufacturing in a country like Tanzania would have to address the significant 
market failures that are preventing the emergence of a productive class of domestic 
entrepreneurs. This would require the setting up of agencies to provide finance and 
monitoring for industries and entrepreneurs who need to engage in periods of learning 
to become globally competitive. It would also require agencies that could allocate 
land and other assets to emerging industries in a context of high transaction cost 
markets that are not likely to become efficient in the medium term despite the 
adoption of good governance reforms. In agriculture growth-enhancing policies will 
have to address the vexed question of land rights and land consolidation to achieve 
scale economies and to create growth opportunities for successful entrepreneurs and 
agricultural sectors. The governance capabilities required here would be capabilities 
to achieve efficiency in land use and allocation in a context where missing and weakly 
defined land rights prevent markets from operating efficiently. In addition, technology 
upgrading in agriculture is likely to involve very similar types of assistance for 
learning as in industry. 
 
11. Brief Conclusions 
The ways in which growth emerged in our five economies has been the subject of this 
paper. Rather than laboriously repeating what has already been said, and keeping in 
mind that this is the first of four papers on related subjects, we will instead refer the 
 102
reader to the figures that summarize the argument. The rents, governance capabilities 
and policies that drove growth and created specific vulnerabilities for each of our five 
economies are summarized in a set of figures that the reader can rapidly refer to. 
Thailand’s case is summarized in Figure 12 on page 38, Maharashtra in Figure 14 on 
page 69, West Bengal in Figure 15 on page 78, Bangladesh in Figure 16 on page 84 
and finally, Tanzania is summarized in Figure 17 on page 95.  
 
In each case, we have argued that the growth stories in these second tier economies 
have been related to the ways in which market failures have been addressed in the 
past to develop specific entrepreneurial and technological capabilities and the 
continuation of growth has depended on specific business-government relationships 
that have determined the sectoral and technological directions in which growth has 
progressed. In most cases, the rents associated with specific business-government 
relationships were not consciously created or managed, and in some cases rents drove 
patterns of growth that almost entirely by-passed entrepreneurial and technological 
development. No further generalization has been attempted here. In subsequent papers 
we will focus on the analytical lessons that can be drawn. 
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